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ABSTRACT 
The present study undertakes to assess various aspects of India's 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War era with regard to the United Nations. 
India has been a member of the United Nations since its inception on 24"" 
October, 1945. India has always been supporting its policies of maintaining 
international peace and security on the one hand and contributing in socio-
economic activities to make the UN more effective and vital on the other. 
Indian officials, politicians and bureaucrats have served the UN in different 
activities. The role of India in peace-keeping / peace making operations in 
different parts of the world was greatly appreciated by the world 
community. That's why Indian officials are demanded in various capacities 
in the challenging and multifaceted activities of the UN as they have worked 
with diligence," efficiency and impartiality. 
At the time of the establishment of the UN, though India was not an 
independent country, even then, it willingly became its member but soon 
after independence it more vigorously started cooperating with the UN. It 
was none other than first Indian Premier, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, an 
architect of the Indian foreign policy with basic tenets of the UN Charter. 
With this advantage, India, more actively and willingly, wanted to 
strengthen the UN. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of 
cold war started restructuring of the unipolar world, with the US at the helm 
of the affairs. In this changed international political scenario, the emphasis 
of Indian foreign policy was the protection and promotion of its national 
interests. As a result, the other traditional allies of the former Soviet Union 
started rallying around the United States and its allies. Even the traditional 
hostality of Arabs with Israel could not remain as it was in the cold war 
period .They started establishing their diplomatic relations with Israel. 
During the first Gulf crisis (1990-91) India played a 'middle path role' 
instead of 'aggressive role' as it played in the past. In the second Gulf war 
(2003), the US attack on Iraq was a huge blow to international community 
but, the world community still remained a silent spectator. This clearly 
indicates that no one could dare to challenge the US dictatorial role in world 
affairs. Because of internal political crisis and changed international 
scenario, India could not play any significant role in the second Gulf crisis. 
India's inclination towards the US was in favour of its political, 
economic and technical benefits. India being a technocrat giant and its 
booming economy with high potentiality of business and marketing, (due to 
its middle class) compelled the US to forget the past and welcome it in her 
fold for better future interest. 
Moreover, India's past records in cooperating with UN on almost all 
major issues particularly in peace-keeping operations in the war torn nations 
like Korean, Suez, Congo and Somalian crises, it was expected that India 
will play a major role in future in the global politics. In the past, because of 
rivalries between the two super powers, the Indian Ocean remained a bone 
of contention to all nations falling in this region, as the military presence of 
the US bases remained constantly a matter of serious concern, particularly 
for India which has a large boundary attached to it and trade and commerce 
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route to various parts of the world. So India voiced for the first time in the 
Lusaka Nonaligned Summit Conference in September 1970 for the 
adaptation of a United Nations Declaration to make the Indian Ocean a Zone 
of peace. Further details of plan of action were considered at the 
constructive meeting of the nonaligned countries followed by the twenty 
sixth regular session of the General Assembly in 1971. Its voice was paid 
heed but not in the way India wanted. 
India, from the very beginning, has been strongly opposing the 
expansion of nuclear arms and wanted the world to be arms free, be it 
nuclear or any other. At the time of UN establishment none other than the 
US, was a nuclear power. But soon after one by one four other nations, now 
called "big powers", attained the status of nuclear power and are the 
permanent members of the Security Council, Their stand on nuclear 
armament has remained partial. They divided the entire world in haves and 
haves not on the basis of nuclear power status, they have been trying to 
maintain this status, to dictate their own terms and supremacy over the 
world community. In 1974 India successfully carried out nuclear explosion. 
Though after the explosion, it appeared that India would be not so 
competent in its effort of complete ban on nuclear tests as it was earlier. 
However, India continued to oppose the explosion of nuclear arms and 
ammunition. As a result, with the combined effort of world community 
various treaties were signed for the said purpose. The first one was Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1968 followed by Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zones (NWFZ) more accurate than earlier one, yet it has many 
drawbacks. Finally Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed in 
1995. But India which worked all through against the expansion of nuclear 
weapons failed to sign CTBT. India remained in favour of CTBT, but it 
wanted complete ban which is not included in the CTBT. India's stand is 
that the CTBT in its present form is partial and discriminatory in nature as it 
does not stop any kind of nuclear explosion to the big powers. Moreover, 
some of the big powers have developed such a technique called "Computer 
Simulation" through which nuclear test could be carried out without letting 
others know it. This is another loophole that allow them to continue their 
nuclear programme secretly. Obviously, in this situation India was not ready 
to sign CTBT. India's nuclear tests in May 1998 could be seen in this 
context that India could not rely on any other country for her safety and 
security particularly China and Pakistan. Both declared hostile states and 
their hostile attitudes remained a continuous threat to the India's security, 
compelled India to acquire nuclear status. After explosion, India declared 
that it has acquired the status of a nuclear state. 
The heartfelt experience of the Gulf crisis was a blow to the UN. 
The hopes and aspirations of the world community started disintegrating and 
in the changed circumstances, a voice to 'restructure and democratize the 
UN' started coming and gaining momentum day by day. It is argued that the 
representation in the Security Council has no, merit, hence, Gulf like 
situation may arise any time. So it would be the only satisfactory solution 
that the world community may have faith in the UN, that the Security 
Council must be democratized by adding more members, keeping the 
regional and other balances in mind. In the initial phase Germany, Brazil 
and Japan were considered, the countries which have their voice in the UN. 
But still the question remained unresolved whether the new members will be 
given veto power or not. The issue was raised more rapidly by the 
developing countries for many permutations and combination came up to 
ascertain their claim for the permanent membership of the UN Security . 
Council. Pressure groups, organization and experts are engaged. It would be 
interesting to see how the potential states could convince the world 
community in general and the big powers in particular to accept their entry 
as permanent member of the Security Council. In spite of the fact that the 
issue of democratization and reformation of the UN has come to the point 
which cannot be neglected and over looked. However, in the name of 
finding acceptable formula taking into consideration the points that may 
favour the powerful state or their groups are being formulated. This will be 
dealt with deliberately in such a way that may prolong the issue. Now the 
matter is a future problem and nothing could be said how long it will take to 
decide and who will be the new permanent members of the Security 
Council. 
To get the membership of the Security Council, even those states 
which are at the margin, are trying to convince that they deserve for the 
same. Obviously, India is the leading state among the claimants of the 
Security Council membership. India has solid grounds to be granted 
membership whatever the formula is decided. India is also the claimant with 
more reasonable ground than any other countries. The valid grounds are - it 
is the largest democracy in the world and has maintained its democratic 
values throughout its history, besides, it is second largest state in population 
and quite large in area. It ranks fourth position in military power in the 
world, India is a fast growing economy with vast potentiality. Moreover, it 
has already acquired nuclear status and has never been defaulter of the UN 
budget; it also served six times as a non permanent member in the Security 
Council. In the long history of the UN, India has been supporting all 
through, in all major issues not less than any other state. But all these 
favorable points are not enough for India to be granted the membership 
where many other permutations and combinations are working. This means 
India needs a lot to do in this direction. India's performance in diplomatic 
effort has been quite satisfactory. In the beginning it remained at low ebb. 
But, with due course of time it has got momentum. The Indian Foreign 
Minister raised the issue in the UN and its diplomats and other related 
agencies are working day and night to convince the potential countries 
which had their greater say in the UN that it not only deserves for the 
membership but its past records indicates that it would cooperate the world 
body to the fullest of its potentiality and will live upto their expectation for 
maintaining peace and harmony eliminating terrorism, maintaining human 
rights and supporting democratic system and values in the world. In this 
context, India made a lot of smaller and third world states in its favour. 
Secondly it also has sympathetic attitude of some big powers. Still the main 
player, US has not given any positive hint in favour of India, is the matter of 
serious concern. Formation of 'Group Four' countries etc could be seen in 
this context. India has always been under security threat by its two 
neighbours Pakistan and China, both being nuclear states. China has veto 
powers and also has territorial dispute with India, hence a constant threat for 
India may use veto power in the Security Council whenever India's matter 
in its favour is brought forth. This may be a valid and justified ground for 
the other big powers to support India's candidature in the Security Council, 
India should convince the world community so much so that they may 
accept India's claim for the said cause. 
By way of conclusion, some suggestions have been given with 
regard to the India's move for the permanent membership of the Security 
Council. It is expected, if these suggestions are brought into practice that 
with India's entry the UN will grow as a democratic body. But the problem 
is that the new membership will be with the veto power or without veto 
power. Then only membership of the Security Council will bring only 
structural changes in the name of reform. 
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PREFACE 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, an unprecedented 
development took place in the geopolitics, and the bipolar world, has been 
reshaped by the unipolar world. This unexpected event also attracted the 
attention of researchers and scholars all over the world, for them the 
behaviour of international politics in the post-Cold War era has great 
significance in understanding international politics. 
There is no denying the fact that the United Nations (UN) structured 
in a way the member states particularly the permanent members of the 
Security Council wanted, hence it has not been effective in carrying out the 
objectives enshrined in its Charter. Nonetheless, over the years, the UN has 
acquired a momentum, it is no longer a more an association, as was doubted 
by some people, but increasingly becoming an actor and an integral part of 
international politics. 
The theme of the plan under study entitled ''India's Role in the 
United Nations in Post-Cold War Era" is an attempt to take into account 
the notable and distinct changes that took place in the post-Cold War era 
(1990-2005) and to assess and analyse critically the role India has been 
playing in the United Nations on major issues as part of its foreign policy. 
With a view to safeguarding and promoting it's national and larger interest 
as well. 
India has been a member of the United Nations since its inception in 
1945, and of course in spite of many odds it earned formidable reputation 
particularly in the eyes of the international community in peace-keeping 
operation. Furthermore, it took part in all key issues with soul and heart. 
India's participation during 1950s to 1960s clearly stands out that 
the position India took in all key issues whether it was related to the Korean 
conflict, Suez Canal, financial crises or Apartheid problem in South Africa. 
India did its best to strengthen UN as a non-partisan and effective 
organization to free from the undue domination by any single power or 
group of powers. Formation of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) could be 
seen in this context. India played vital role in increasing the member states 
of the NAM and strengthening it just to make more and more states out of 
the power blocs by pursuing the policy of non alignment. The United 
Nations could not work as effectively as it could, because the foreign policy 
coincides with the basic concept of the UN Charter. 
The whole plan of study is divided into four chapters, each under 
specific theme being dealt with some what in detail. 
The first chapter deals with the background and history of the 
United Nations and India's role before cold-war era as an introductory part 
just to have a brief understanding of the central theme of the plan 
understudy. In this chapter nature of India's participation in pre-
Independence day as low profile and after independence with increasing 
pace is analysed. India's foreign policy was framed under the visionary 
personality of the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. And India was 
fortunately in advantage to actively participate and make the UN more 
effective in maintaining peace and security as its foreign policy, coincides 
with the basic tenets of the UN Charter. Attempt has been made to analysed 
the role of India's various institutions like The Ministry of External Affairs, 
The Permanent Mission of India to the UN, New York and Delegations to 
the General Assembly Sessions. The major thrusts of India's diplomacy in 
the UN until the end of cold war have been dweh upon in the first chapter. 
Other thrust areas, dealt with are major international crises like Korean, 
Suez, Congo and Somalian crises. An effort is made to take a brief account 
of India's role in these peace-keeping and peace-making operations. India's 
contributions in these crises were acclaimed by international community. In 
the end of this chapter India's concern for its own security due to Western 
navel presence in the Indian Ocean has been examined. The question of 
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Indian Ocean as a zone of peace has remained before the world body since 
1970s. 
India's effort in declaring Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace is 
assessed at length and it is pointed out that how Indian effort to declare 
Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace has made Indian diplomacy more effective for 
safeguarding its national security. India has been opposed to the growing 
military presence of the Western powers in the Indian Ocean because of US 
support to Pakistan. 
The second chapter examines India's response to post-Cold War 
developments in the context of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Infact 
India's response to cold war development is more adhoc and tentative as 
India has been passing through a phase of internal crises where leadership 
has been weak. It has been pointed out here that how the sole objective of 
the foreign policy of most of the nations concentrated and devoted to their 
security concerns, after the end of the cold war and how the US ambition to 
become a dominant world power came to reality, as a result of which nations 
of the world started rallying round her. This change in international scenario 
in Indian context could be seen as shift in the India's foreign policy towards 
US for safeguarding its interest. That's why India's stand on West Asian 
crisis remained somewhat in favour of US. Subsequently India concentrated 
herself in economic activities more vigorously. Besides this, India's role in 
the UN Peace-keeping operations during post-Cold War era is examined in 
detail. 
India's commitments for maintaining peace and security across the 
globe continued in the post-Cold War era. Its level of participation has 
increased significantly. It took part in 23 peace missions about 15 different 
locations around the globe. Onwards, out of 18 million seven were UN 
peace-keeping operation, and India contributed militarily in five of them. In 
total, India participated in 41 peace mission out of 59, under UN, clearly 
shows India's commitment to its earlier stand even more vigorously in the 
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post-Cold War era. India's calls for constructive balance and cooperative 
approach to human right with emphasis on universality, individuality and 
inter-relatedness of all rights and interdependence of democracy, human 
rights, development and cooperation are also examined in detail. 
The third chapter deals with India's role in nuclear disarmament. 
India from the very beginning has been strongly opposing the expansion of 
nuclear arms and wanted the world to be arms free, be it nuclear or any 
other. At the time of UN establishment none other than the US, was a 
nuclear power. But soon after one by one four other nations, now called "big 
powers", attained the status of nuclear power and are the permanent 
members of the Security Council. Their stand on nuclear armament has 
remained partial. They divided the entire world in haves and have nots on 
the basis of nuclear power status, they have been trying to maintain this 
status, to dictate their own terms and supremacy over the world community. 
An attempt is also made to survey and analyse that how big powers wanted 
to continue their nuclear expansion in one hand while pressurizing the others 
to stop all activities related to nuclear or atomic research. India's stand 
towards nuclear disarmament is also examined in detail. Subsequently India 
conducted a nuclear test in 1974; which provided Pakistan a plea to defame 
India and also the big powers, particularly the US took it seriously. Since 
then, India has been pressurized to sign treaty banning nuclear tests. It is 
relevant to point out here that India made a formal proposal for total 
cessation of nuclear testing in the UN General Assembly in December 1954 
but did not put it to vote. In the resolution nuclear weapon states were 
appealed to suspend their nuclear test in future. In concrete term first treaty 
in this context called Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was signed in 1963 at 
Moscow, followed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 
and the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) and Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT). It is an irony for what India has been taking a lead, over a 
long period, is now among the only three nations which are not signatories 
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of CTBT with an argument that it is discriminatory in nature, as the nuclear 
states are allowed to conduct nuclear tests while non-nuclear states are not 
allowed to do the same even for the purpose of their own security. So the 
treaty in its present form cannot be accepted. The chapter analyses all 
aspects of nuclear proliferation and main aspect of India's objection to the 
treaty. India refused to accept the treaty because of its discriminatory nature. 
The fourth chapter takes an account of the recent issues viz. Gulf 
Crises (1990-1991, 2003), Democratising the UN Security Council and 
India's claim for permanent seat in the UN Security Council. For the 
convenience the Gulf crises is divided in two phases, first 1990-91 and the 
other in 2003. Covering the development from Iraqi attack on Kuwait to the 
sanction on Iraq after its defeat and time taking conditions for ceasefire. The 
chapter traces how in the beginning India's deliberately kept silence as 
against its traditional policy of striving to strengthen the persuasive powers 
of the UN with a view to setling international problem during the Gulf 
crises. In the first phase, India constantly emphasized for peaceful solution 
to the problem and did not cooperate militarily. The Indian government's 
response to Gulf crises has been cautious, somewhat confusing. 
In the second phase, attack on Iraq by the US by neglecting 
international body was a unique event in the history of the United Nations. 
The world community remained as silent spectators and the US unilaterally 
did what it wanted with the sole objective of removing Saddam Hussein in 
the name of elimination of so called weapons of mass destruction. The 
chapter examines all these happenings keeping in mind US economic 
interest from the oil rich country. India did not support the US militarily 
because the government was under high pressure from the opposition parties 
as well as intellectuals. At the same time India failed to condemn US in 
strong word which could be explained in the context of India's interest 
attached to the US. 
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Question of democratization and reformation of the UN Security 
Council was raised soon after the end of cold war and since then it has been 
gaining momentum. With the end of cold war and the role played by the 
Security Council in the Gulf crises revived public interest, in the form of a 
parallel development, headed by a group of developing countries aimed at 
revitalizing and reforming the UN and its agencies. In the prevailing 
situations where many countries are trying to get permanent membership, 
India is also the claimant with more reasonable grounds than any other 
country. India served six times as non permanent members in the Security 
Council and has never been the defaulter of paying dues to the UN Budget. 
Other valid grounds like military strength, population, area, past record of 
cooperating UN and its agencies on all occasions, are definitely in favour of 
India's claim to become the permanent member of the Security Council. 
India's internal as well as external efforts in this direction to make more and 
more countries to support its claim have been dealt with in detail in the end 
of this chapter. At the same time it may be noted that still the most powerful 
country, the US has not declared any support in this regard to India. India's 
effort in this regard from diplomatic and other platforms has been analysed 
at length in the last chapter of the thesis. 
The study is based on the primary sources - extensive scrutiny of a 
variety of UN documents, viz. mainly official records, Security Council 
official records, annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of 
organization, summary records of the officials of government of India, 
statements of leading personalities like Boutros-Boutros Ghali, former 
Secretary General of the UN, Jawaharlal Nehru and I.K. Gujral, former 
Indian Prime Ministers, diplomats like, J.N. Dixit, Hamid Ansari, C.R. Gare 
Khan etc. and scholars like K.P. Saxena, C.S.R. Murthy, Amitabh Mattu, 
Sumit Ganguly, Abdul Nafey, V.P. Dutt, M.S. Rajan etc. Besides this, 
informal conversation with a number of serving and formal officials based 
in New Delhi and New York also provided a fund of details. 
Chapter -1 
India's Role in the United Nations 
The need to ensure effective national participation in the United 
Nations (UN) has never been given adequate attention in India, nor any 
serious attempt is made to analyse how far patterns and problems, if any,.of 
national participation account for lack of sufficient political support in the 
United Nations to India's positions on some of the questions with a bearing 
on its vital interests. Such an assessment forms an integral part of the larger 
questions of making use of the United Nations forum for the purpose of 
safeguarding the country's interest more satisfactorily. 
By September 1946, political development in India had taken a 
dramatic turn; an Interim Government, with representatives of various 
political parties and Jawaharlal Nehru as its leader (Vice-President) was 
constituted. Although transfer of power was yet to come, but for all practical 
purposes the Interim Government enjoyed considerable freedom to run the 
Indian administration and to conduct India's foreign policy. 
As an independent nation, the objectives of India's foreign policy 
formulated by Jawaharlal Nehru were quite in concurrence with the 
principles and purposes enshrined in the UN charter. Indeed, the charter 
spells out what, in effect, have been India's aspirations and declared foreign 
policy goals - pursuit of international peace and security not through 
alignment with any power or group of powers but through an independent 
approach; freedom and welfare of the subject people, elimination of racial 
discrimination, elimination of poverty, disease, ignorance and promotion of 
human rights and economic development as of other countries, especially 
the newly emerging nations.' 
India's participation, as an independent nation, began soon after the 
formation of the Interim Government; an Indian delegation, led by Mrs. 
Vijayalakshmi Pandit, joined the second part of the General Assembly first 
session (Oct-Dec. 1946) in New York. 
On 25 October 1946, Vijayalakshmi Pandit made her maiden 
speech, and pledged on behalf of "the Government and people of India our 
commitment to the principles of peace and justice as enshrined in the UN 
Charter".^ Although, India has not wavered from this commitment. 
India's raising the question of treatment of Indians in South Africa 
heralded its advent on the international scene, since it provided the occasion 
for a heated debate and there were many occasions when the Indian delegate 
crossed swords with its counterpart of the British delegation. As noted in 
media report, Mrs. Pandit, the only women to head a delegation, used her 
"gentle, clear and cultured voice, without mercy, to excoriate South Africa 
for the treatment of Indian there, and everything pertaining to racial 
discrimination, the British Empire and anyone who supported the South-
Africa case". 
In the handling of this question, as on many other issues which were 
before the world forum, representation and participation of independent 
India did have, as the available records bear out, an impact on the 
proceedings of the United Nations. In eloquence, debating skill and favour 
for upholding and promoting principles of international peace and justice, 
Indian representatives proved to be second to none. Yet, one finds 
something amiss during those formative crucial years. Independent India 
was getting first "exposure" to power-politics and "conference diplomacy"; 
and Indians were not yet well-versed with the intricacies of political process 
and procedures and strategy. No wonder that Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit was 
aghast to know what she discovered as behind-the-scene "horsetrading" and 
"the manner in which votes were procured on almost all important 
questions...."^ 
During the very first occasion of independent India's participation 
in the UN General Assembly, it decided to contest election for a seat in the 
Security Council. We refused to withdraw despite friendly advice from both 
the Western Powers and the Socialist countries. India by then must have 
learnt about the "gentleman's agreements", which inter-alia distributed the 
elected seats, group-wise, in various UN bodies. Having lost in 1946, we 
again put up over candidacy, in 1947, as a protest what we called "behind-
the-scene maneuvering" and, of course, suffered defeat. This was a small 
matter but bears testimony to the "inexperienced" and moralistic approach 
of our representatives. 
At the initial stage, India's foreign policy, as noted earlier, was 
identified as having a key feature of judging each issue on merit and not 
aligning itself with one power or group of powers. However, the UN records 
shows that during first four years (i.e., until after the break-out of the 
Korean war), this guideline was observed by Indian representatives more in 
its breach than adherence to the principles. Having laid down the basic 
principles as early as September 1946, the architect of India's foreign 
policy, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, could not oversee the details; 
turmoil and turbulence that erupted in the aftermath of the partisan of the 
country (August 1947) and other pressing domestic problems claimed his 
prior attention. Day-to-day foreign policy matters were inevitably left to the 
discretion of civil servants who invariably took a pro-Western stance. 
Hence, it is not surprising that barring a few issues like the one relating to 
the use of the right of veto on which India abstained, India voted in support 
of US positions. What was worse was that Indian delegates made speeches 
launched in a tone of self-righteousness, and of international morality, at the 
same time voting in a partisan manner. For instance, our vote and support of 
the US proposal for the establishment of "Interim Committee" or "Little 
Assembly" in 1947 and in subsequent years, was at variance with what we 
said in our speech on this question. 
A perspective on India's participation in the United Nations requires 
that it be studied in the context of the principles and objectives of the 
country's foreign policy. The major goals of India's foreign policy spelled 
out by Jawaharlal Nehru, after he joined the Interim Government in 1946 as 
he stated: 
"We propose, as far as possible to keep away from the power 
politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to 
world wars and which may again lead to disasters on even vaste scale. We 
believe that peace and freedom are invisible and the denial of freedom any 
where must danger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war".'* 
From the above and subsequent pronouncement by Nehru in those 
formative years, the following objectives and principles of India's Foreign 
Policy emerged: (1) the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any 
major power or group of powers, but through an independent approach to 
each controversial or disputed issue; (2) the liberation of subject peoples; (3) 
the maintenance of freedom of both national and individual; (4) the 
elimination of racial discrimination, and (5) the elimination of power of 
want, disease and ignorance which affect the greater part of the world's 
population. 
Interestingly the Charter of the United Nations sets identical 
objectives before the World Body. In a basic sense, therefore, pursuing 
India's foreign policy goals meant working for the purposes of the United 
Nations. India viewed the United Nations as an "incomparable vehicle of 
communication"^ especially for the weaker nations, to give expression to 
their hopes and fears. 
In regard to maintenance of international peace and security, India 
believed that the United Nations should emphasize methods of pacific 
settlement of disputes rather than enforcement measures. Despite the 
criticism that India's views (as for instance, in regard to the "Uniting for 
Peace" resolution) did not help the ultimate objective of transforming the 
United Nations into a world government"^, India held that over-emphasis on 
enforcement measures tended to disrupt rather than strengthen the 
organization.' The United Nations could only be an instrument of peaceful 
change, however piece mental that change might be. The United Nations has 
the potential of playing a helpful role in such basic objectives as protection 
of human rights, liberation of dependent people and development of 
economically backward countries. In other words, because of similarity 
between the UN purposes and India's foreign policy objectives, the United 
Nations as a forum provided unique opportunity to India to interact with 
fellow governments for promotion of its national and larger interests. Thus, 
the United Nations has played and should continue its role as a factor in the 
realm of India's foreign policy planning and its implementation. The 
effective accomplishment of the foreign policy goals would, thus, naturally 
depend on the patterns of its diplomatic conduct at the United Nations, and 
also its mechanism of participation in the UN bodies. It is these two 
questions - in a reverse sequence that will be addressed here. India's 
mechanism of participation in the UN has three aspects - the apparatus in its 
national capitals; the Permanent Mission at New York; and the national 
delegations to meetings of UN bodies like the General Assembly. 
Independent India inherited from its colonial rulers as well 
established administrative machinery in many fields of governmental 
activity with one significant exception, i.e. the conduct of foreign affairs and 
diplomacy. The Counsel of India did have political department but it served 
largely as an appendage of the British Foreign Office. There were certainly a 
handful of Indians who occupied positions but these Indians were never 
expressed to subtle art of negotiation and other tasks of diplomacy. 
Therefore, India had to start from the scratch after Independence, in devising 
its administrative machinery in foreign affairs and manning it with suitable 
personnel. 
The most important institution, providing the vital link in regard to 
India's participation in the United Nations with the Ministry, is the 
Permanent Mission to India to the United Nations (PMIUN), New York. The 
Permanent Mission, in a way, is similar to India's embassy in a national 
capital in terms of structure and objective. The Mission chief function, as is 
the case with an Indian embassy in a national capital in terms of structure 
and objective like other embassies, its main task is to safeguard and 
promote. 
The organizational arrangement of the permanent mission has 
varied from time to time. Generally it is composed of personnel with ranks 
similar to those posted in national capitals. Although India has not officially 
stated as to what kind of men it would like to post at the PMIUN, Krishna 
Menon who played no mean a role in the past in directing India's diplomacy 
at the United Nations once reflected on this: 
[We] don't want any 'genius'. He would ruin us at the UN that is 
not what is wanted. He needs good men, men with dedication and a sense of 
proportion. We don't need self opinioned heroes.8 
As is the practice with any Member state, India sends every year 
delegations to the regular session of the General Assembly (also to its 
special session and other United Nations bodies too, when required). The 
Charter and rules of procedure allow participation of five representatives 
and five more as alternate representatives. But this limit was hard to follow 
because of increase of work in the Assembly sessions. The delegations are 
normally led by the Ministry of External Affairs or Minister of State for 
External Affairs. In their absence, the Permanent Representatives head them. 
The delegates participate in the political process of the United Nations on 
the basis of instructions given by the Ministry. The nature and the extent of 
instructions given to delegates depend, to as very large extent, on the 
political and personal equation the delegates have with the Prime Minister or 
the Minister for External Affairs. For instance, Krishna Menon who was the 
India's Chief delegate, several times in the Nehru era claimed to have no 
instructions, as he had the confidence of the Government. Elaborating on 
experiences, Menon boasted once: 
In the absence of a particular instruction I voted according to my 
discretion... When I wanted instructions I sent a telegram to the Prime 
Minister setting out the case suggesting how and what should be done; in 
fact more or less informing him what our instruction should be. He [Nehru] 
would usually send a telegram back and say, 'I generally agree with your 
analysis. You must use your direction'.' 
Menon further revealed that other delegates at the United Nations 
knew about it. He added: "sometimes, to gain time, I would say, 'I want 
time for instructions', which I was entitled to say. And they often laughed". 
In the context of the diplomacy conducted in the United Nations, it is 
obvious that the most important function of a delegation/mission is to win 
friends and influence other delegations. Effectiveness of delegations or the 
PMIUN depends on its working methods and the coordination among the 
components of national mechanism. During the General Assembly sessions, 
the Indian Mission follows the practice of holding meetings of the 
delegations every day, generally in the morning. 
Promotion of International Peace: 
India's efforts in this direction included the encouragement, through 
the United Nations, of pacific settlement of international disputes and 
peaceful coexistence of nations of diverse ideologies and social systems, 
diplomatic efforts to enlarge the area of peace and achieve disarmament, 
approach to the superpowers, participation in peacekeeping activities and 
attempt to resolve the conflicts which had broken out. 
As India used the United Nations forum, among other agencies, for 
strengthening the foundations of peace and promoting international peace, a 
brief analysis of India's views on the structure of the organization seems to 
be necessary and hence is given. Finally, an attempt is made to assess the 
extent to which India was successful in its efforts to strengthen the 
foundations of peace and to promote it. 
Ever since India became independent, it has taken active part in the 
working of the United Nations. India has been active because it believes in 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. As its 
Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru once remarked, in spite of its faults, the 
United Nations serves an essential purpose and "if we do not have it today, 
undoubtedly countries will have to come together to build up something like 
it again".'° 
In a message broadcast by the United Nations' network, New York, 
on 5 May 1950, Jawaharlal Nehru said that there was no doubt that the mere 
fact of the United Nations existence "has saved us from many dangers and 
conflicts. Also, there is no doubt that in the world of today, it is the only 
hope of finding a way for peaceful cooperation among the nations"," 
The domination of one people by the government of another, the 
practice of racial discrimination, the gross underdevelopment of many 
nations, especially in Asia and Africa, in their economy and the widespread 
existence of malnutrition, disease and illiteracy, in India's view, corrode the 
foundation of peace. That is why Prime Minister Nehru, in defining the main 
objectives of the foreign policy of India at the Columbia University on 17 
October 1949, emphasized "the liberation of subject peoples; maintenance 
of freedom both national and individual; the elimination of racial 
discrimination of want, disease and ignorance which afflict the greater part 
of the world's population".'^ It is urgent to supply correctives through 
international action, so that the peace, which the people of the world desire, 
can be built on solid foundations. In accordance with these postulates, India 
has taken the lead, or supported the lead taken by the delegations of other 
member states in the United Nations, to work out acceptable ways of 
achieving the desired goals. 
Among the nations whose emergence to political freedom India 
supported, the pride of place must be given to Indonesia. Before the Second 
World War, Indonesia had been a colony of the Netherlands. A republican 
government was established in Indonesia after the war and on 25 March 
1947, the Dutch formally recognized the de facto authority of the Republic 
over Java, Sumatra and Madwa. In July, however, a full scale military action 
against the Republic was started by Dutch. India referred the matter to the 
Security Council under Article 34 of the Charter which authorizes the 
Security Council to investigate any dispute, or any situation which might 
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute which was likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security 
Council, after considering the question passed a resolution on 1 August 1947 
calling upon the parties to cease hostilities and settle their dispute by 
peaceful means. The intervention of the Security Council did not, however, 
lead to a peaceful settlement; a Good Offices Committee was constituted by 
the Council to secure a peaceful settlement; Netherland Government, on one 
pretext to another, continued the military operations and the Indonesian 
question continued to engage the attention of the Security Council. 
Prime Minister Nehru convened an eighteen nation Conference on 
Indonesia at New Delhi on January 1949. The aim of the conference was to 
consider the situation in Indonesia. In doing so, Nehru explained "we meet 
to supplement the efforts by the Security Council, not to supplant that 
body." The specific tasks of the Conference, was outlined by Nehru, 
justified that interpretation among them were : "to frame and submit to the 
Security Council proposal which would if accepted by both parties 
concerned, restore peace immediately to Indonesia and promote the early 
realization of freedom by the Indonesian people", and also to suggest to the 
Security Council what action it should take if either party to the dispute 
failed to act according to its recommendations.''' Nehru told the conference: 
"It must be appreciated that so long as any form of colonialism exists in 
Asia or elsewhere, there will be conflict and a threat to peace.''* 
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The concern to accelerate the ending of colonialism culminated in 
1960 in the adoption by the Assembly of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and peoples. Forty three African and 
Asian countries, including India, sponsored the declaration which was 
passed on 12 December 1960 by 89 votes to 0 with 9 absentations. The 
essence of the Declaration is three fold: (i) to declare that the subjection of 
peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitute a denial 
of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United 
Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and 
cooperation; (ii) all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development; and (iii) immediate steps shall 
be taken, in trust and non-self governing territories, or all other territories, 
which have not yet attained independence to transfer all powers to the 
peoples of those territories without any conditions or reservations in 
accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any 
distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy 
complete independence and freedom.'^  
India followed this up in 1961 by Co-sponsoring a resolution in the 
General Assembly (with 37 other members) reaffirming the objectives and 
principles enshrined in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in the resolution of 1960 and 
establishing a special committee of Seventeen (later raised to twenty four) 
"to examine the application of the Declaration to make suggestions and 
recommendations on the progress and recommendation of the Declaration 
and to report to the General Assembly." In introducing the resolution in the 
General Assembly, V.K.Krishna Menon, leader of the Indian delegation, 
said that it was a step forward from demands and complaints to 
implementation of the Declaration and the dismantling of empires. The 
world could not, he declared "line half-free and half save".'^ 
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The speeches of the members of the Indian delegation in the 
Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly indicate the general Indian 
approach.'^ India has argued that the United Nations must have the ultimate 
power to supervise the administration of the trust territories and the 
administering power should act only as the agents of the United Nations; 
early steps should be taken to grant complete self-government to the people 
of the territories; no form of racial discrimination should be practiced in the 
territories; the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of the Charter should 
be observed by the administering powers in broad and liberal spirit. 
When the draft trusteeship agreements were considered in the 
second part of the first session of the General Assembly in 1946, India 
submitted various amendments to circumscribe the authority of the 
administering states in the trust territories. One such amendment provided 
for the inclusion in all agreements of the following clause. 
The Administering Authority shall administer the Trust Territory 
solely for the benefit and in the interest of its people, and on the termination 
of the Trusteeship. All powers of the Authority shall cease and it shall 
surrender the Territories to the people whose sovereignty and whose right to 
self-government or independence shall is to be recognized. 
India has stood steadfastly by the principle of racial equality. 
Article 15 of its constitution states unequivocally that the state shall not 
discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, 
birth or any of them. It has accepted the statement on the purposes and 
principles of the Charter which includes "promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion". The Government and the 
people of India subscribe whole heartedly to Article 2 in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly on 10 
December 1948. 
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Every one is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. 
This whole hearted support is also explained by the fact that there is 
no scientific basis for racial inequality. A work published by UNESCO has 
established that "race" is a purely biological concept from which "it is 
impossible to draw any valid conclusion whatever as to the disposition or 
mental capacity of a particular individual.'^ Jawaharlal Nehru in his first 
statement on foreign policy on 7 September 1946 stated India's general 
approach to racial problems. "We are particularly interested in the 
recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races.^° 
The racial policies of the Government of South Africa were first 
raised by India in a complaint to the United Nations that the South African 
Government had enacted legislation discriminating against South Africans 
of Indian origin in violation of treaty obligations^^ and of the United Nations 
Charter. In 1952, the wider question of racial conflict in South Africa arising 
from the apartheid (racial segregation) policy of the Government of South 
Africa was raised by thirteen Arab Asian states including India in a 
communication dated 12 September 1952 to the Secretary General. The two 
related questions continued to be discussed as separate agenda items until 
they were combined under one title at the Seventeenth session, in 1962, as 
"The policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa." 
The following resolution moved by Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, 
leader of the Indian Delegation, before a joint session of the Political 
Committee and the legal Committee (of the UN General Assembly) clearly 
indicates the Indian point of view; 
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The General Assembly, having taken note of application made by 
the Government of India regarding the treatment of Indians in the Union of 
South Africa and having considered the matter and is of the opinion that: 
(1) The Union Government's discriminatory treatment of Asiatics in 
general and Indians in particular on the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and is contrary to the Charter; 
(2) The Union Government's in general and the enactment of the Asiatic 
Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, 1946, in particular, have 
impaired friendly relations between the two member states, and 
unless a satisfactory settlement is arrived at immediately, these 
relations are likely to be further impaired." 
The representative of South Africa opposed the very principle 
underlying the resolution and contended that the treatment of the people of 
Indian origin in South Africa was essentially a matter of domestic 
jurisdiction in terms of paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the UN Charter and, as 
such, could not be considered by the General Assembly; besides, terms like 
"human rights" and fundamental freedoms" had not been properly defined, 
and therefore, the members of the United Nations had no specific 
obligations under the Charter in regard to them. The Indian delegates 
contested these points.^'' 
On the question of domestic jurisdiction, India's view was that the 
signing of the UN Charter had resulted in the contraction of the domain of 
essentially domestic matters; it was for the organization to decide whether 
any matter was essentially domestic in its nature that the United Nations 
would refrain from interfering with the exercise of discretion by a sovereign 
State.^ ^ On the second issue raised, the Indian delegates asked the 
Assembly: 
Do the Members present here have any doubt as to what human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
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language or religion means....And have they any doubt that discrimination 
between race, segregation of one race as an inferior race, violates the 
Principles of the Charter.^ ^ 
Indian, an its part, followed up its oral disapproval of south Africa's 
policy by severing its trade relations with south Africa and recalling its High 
Commissioner in the Union on 17 July 1946; this trade and diplomatic 
reverence has continued up to this day. The broader question of race conflict 
came before the United Nations, as noted earlier in 1952. Thirteen Arab-
Asian states including India stated in an explanatory memorandum that the 
race conflict in the Union was creating a dangerous and explosive situation, 
which constituted both a threat to international peace and a flagrant violation 
of the basic principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. The memorandum added that 
the Assembly should give urgent attention in order to prevent any already 
dangerous situation from deteriorating further and to bring about a 
settlement in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.^ ^ 
The issue came before the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the 
Assembly on 13 November 1952 when joint draft resolution was sponsored 
by 18 nations including India before the Committee. The draft recalled that 
the General Assembly had declared in earlier resolutions that it is in the 
higher interests of humanity to put on end to religions and so-called racial 
persecution and that a policy of racial discrimination (apartheid) is 
necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination and sought to 
establish a, commission to study the racial situation in the union of south 
Africa in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and in the 
light of Article 2 para? relating to domestic jurisdiction. 
The leader of Indian delegation, speaking on the resolution, 
expressed Indian's view on the subject: Indian would welcome the study of 
the situation in South Africa with a view to assisting the union government 
to revalue it on humanitarian basis and on a basis of mutual toleration and 
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understanding amongst the racial groups. The Indian delegation had co-
sponsored the item under discussion not with a view to condemning South 
Africa; that India harboured no rancour; and that is only desire was to end a 
situation as degrading to those who enforced the discriminatory laws as to 
the victims,^* 
The Commission, referred to in the resolution, was duly appointed, 
and it submitted its report, though the Government of South Africa letused 
to extend its cooperation of the committee. The Assembly, and later the 
Security Council as well, consider the question of racial conflict several 
times; but the attitude of South Africa continued to be the same, viz., the 
United Nations had no competence to deal with this question as it was a 
matter of domestic jurisdiction. The Security Council also applied sanctions. 
In 1963, for example, it called upon all states to cease the sale and shipment 
of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa. On 15 December 
1965, the Assembly declared that universally applied economic sanctions 
were the only means of achieving a peaceful solution of the problem and 
urgently appealed to the major trading partners of South Africa to cease 
"their increasing economic collaboration" with South Africa "which 
encourages that Government to defy world opinion and to accelerate the 
implementation of the policies of apartheid". 
It is significant, to note that the General Assembly, in a resolution 
adopted in 1970 (India supporting it) reaffirmed the legitimacy of the 
struggle of oppressed peoples everywhere, and in particular those of South 
Africa, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and territories under Portuguese 
colonial domination, to obtain racial equality by all possible means, and 
called for increased and continued moral and material support to all peoples 
under colonial and alien domination, struggling for the realization of their 
right to self-determination and for the elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination. Earlier, in 1969, the General Assembly had designed 1971 as 
International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. 
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India played an active role in setting the agenda for the UN on the 
foregoing issues and influencing projects and policies which were discussed at 
the UN itself and the various international conferences organized by the UN. 
Korean Crisis (1950-54): 
The techniques of Indian diplomacy applied in the case of Korea in 
much the same way: India had recognized neither North nor South Korea, for 
as Nehru argued, this division between North and South Korea could not lost. It 
was artificial and the less the division was confirmed, the better.^ ^ When the 
war between North and South Korea started on 25 June 1950, India had voted 
in the Security Council for the resolution, describing North Korea as aggressor, 
as it was perfectly clear from the evidence that North Korea had "indulged in a 
full-scale and well-laid-out invasion"; but later, India was more concerned with 
the localization of the war then with the logical consequences of having 
declared North Korea the aggressor. Indeed, India itself did not think it possible 
to send its armed forces to join the United Nations forces against North Korea. 
The significance of this, in the context of Indian diplomacy seems as follows : 
One of the overall aims of India's policy was to help to maintain world 
peace and reduce international tensions, and further, in implementing this aim, 
it was always useful to ensure that (i) neither party in a conflict should suffer so 
much as to leave lasting bitterness behind; and (ii) the root cause of conflict 
should be solved in order that peace, and not merely a truce, should be 
achieved. The efforts that India made in helping to resolve the Korean crisis 
were therefore directed to securing a negotiated settlement of the issue. The 
possibility of such a settlement depended, India felt, on the representation of 
the Peking regime in the United Nations, for it was clear to India that with the 
walkout of the Soviet Union from the Security Council and the non-
representation of Peking, the United Nations had ceased to be what it originally 
intended to be: it would "inevitably drift towards being an agent for war or 
preparations for War". On 13 July 1950, Nehru addressed communication to 
Marshal Stalin and Dean Acheson for representation of the Five Big Powers in 
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the Security Council to facilitate the negotiation of a settlement in Korea. As 
Nehru later told the Parliament that his emphasis was on "its urgency", rather 
than "the rights and wrongs of the matter". India was not deterred in its peace 
efforts by the unfavourable reception given to the appeal by the United States: 
Dean Acheson, considering the issue as a question of principle, perhaps rightly, 
replied that "policy in regard to recognition of China should not be dictated by 
an unlawful aggression".^ " The Indian comment on this attitude was well 
expressed at the time by C. Rajagopalachari, Minister without Portfolio: 
, Aggression has to be checked, I am for that. But what then? Are you 
going to garrison Korea for all time and keep off the enemy at the pint of the 
bayonet? No: it is impossible. Therefore, something should be done in order to 
relieve the tension.... Independently of checking aggression, let us get all the 
nations together around a common table and decide. 
When it appeared difficult to get Big Powers together for peaceful 
discussion of the issue, India attempted to pool the help the smaller nations 
could give in resolving the conflict. It itself refi*ained from voting in favour of 
American and other resolutions condemning Communist China in order to help 
get the parties together if and when possible. Sir Senegal Rau informally made 
a proposal on 14 august 1950, that a committee of the six non-permanent 
members of the Security Council - then India, Yugoslavia, Norway, Egypt, 
Cuba and Ecuador - should study all resolutions or proposals that have been, or 
may be, proposed for a peaceful and just settlement in Korea; though 
favourably received by the Western Powers, the proposal was not finally 
moved. 
Indian diplomacy in the Korean crisis was perhaps at its best in 
relation to the crossing of the 38^ Parallel by the United Nations troops. It will 
be remembered that in August September 1950, when North Korea had 
suffered a military reverse, the question arose whether the United Nations 
forces should stop at the 38'*' Parallel in pursuit of North Korea's troops. India 
pleaded that the North Koreans had been adequately defeated for the time being 
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and had been prevented from achieving their original aim of unifying all Korea 
by military means that at the hour of United Nations success moderation should 
be shown and resort should be had to peaceful means for achieving the 
unification of Korea. India also warned that the crossing of the 38 Parallel by 
UN forces might have the unfortunate effect of bringing China into the War. 
On 6 December 1950, Nehru said in Parliament: 
"We consulted our Ambassador in Peking and our representatives in 
other countries about how the various Governments were viewing the scene. 
We had perhaps a rather special responsibility in regard to China, because we 
were one of the very few countries represented there.... The Chinese 
Government clearly indicated that if the 38"^  parallel was crossed, they would 
consider it a grave danger to their own security and that they would not tolerate 
it.^ ^ 
The warning was disregarded; on Indian resolution proposing the 
appointment of a sub-committee to take into consideration all resolutions, 
proposals and suggestions concerning the Korean question in order that it 
might recommend to the committee a resolution on the subject commanding 
the largest measure of agreement was defeated and on eight-Power resolution 
virtually authorizing United Nations troops to enter any part of Korea and 
create conditions for the unification of Korea was passed (7 October). On 9 
October, the United Nations forces crossed the 38"^  Parallel, and Chinese 
"Volunteers" joined the forces of North Korea. It is clear from available 
evidence that Britain was not wholeheartedly behind UN resolution/. "In the 
evening of the 9^, writes K.M. Panikkar, "the Prime Minister transmitted to me 
a message from Ernest Bevin to be communicated personally to Chou En-Lai. 
It was friendly in tone and continued vague assurances".''^  
Consistent with India's stand that it was not desirable that a military 
solution to the problem of the unification of Korea be sought by either party, 
India also appealed to Mao Zedong to halt the "volunteers" when it appeared 
that the Chinese "volunteer" forces were driving the United Nations forces 
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beyond the 3^^ Parallel. The appeal was ignored by Peking, just as the West 
had ignored an earlier appeal by India not to cross the 3S^ Parallel. 
The further story of the achievement of a truce in Korea needs not 
to dealt with at length. It is significant that the Indian approach to the 
problem, not to press a political solution by military means, was, in its 
essentials, finally accepted by the parties but only after much blood had 
been shed.^ '* 
When the militarist approach had resulted in a stalemate, the 
Security Council on 8 November 1950 accepted a United Kingdom 
resolution calling upon the representatives of the People's Republic of China 
to appear before the Security Council on 30 November. President Truman 
hinted that the atom bomb might be used in Korea. Then followed Prime 
Minister Attlee's visit to Washington; apparently Attlee read more in 
Truman's statement than Truman perhaps meant. Nevertheless, the visit was 
certainly worthwhile as it helped Attlee to apprise the President of the fear 
widespread in several Commonwealth countries that United States policy 
was inclining more and more towards a military solution of the Korean 
problem. It was significant, too, that there had been communication between 
Nehru and Attlee prior to the latter's discussion with Truman. Nehru said in 
Parliament on 6 December.^ ^ 
We welcomed the decision of the Prime Minister of England to go 
to the United States to meet President Truman and wished him Godspeed in 
his endeavours to prevent war and to find a peaceful way of this tangle. We 
found that there was a good deal in common between the British Prime 
Minister's view on the present situations and ours. We let him have our own 
viewpoint in detail in case he needed it during the discussions.^^ 
On 12 December 1950, the thirteen nation Arab-Asian Group, with 
the support of the United States and the United Kingdom, submitted a draft 
resolution requesting the President of the General Assembly to constitute a 
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group of three persons, including himself (the Iranian representative), to 
determine the basis on which a satisfactory ceasefire in Korea could be 
arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as early as 
possible. Though the Soviet Union opposed it was adopted by the General 
Assembly and a commission of three was formed, of Iran, India and Canada. 
The group made a some suggestions for ceasefire in Korea, but, as Peking 
considered the resolution under which group had been constituted, illegal 
null and void until people's China was seated in the United Nations, the 
representative of India had to report the failure of the group to the First 
Committee. In doing so he emphasized the need for continuing the efforts 
for a negotiated settlement . Norway took up the suggestion and 
successfully sponsored a resolution that the President of the General 
Assembly should communicate to the Government of China the four 
principles of the supplementary report of the group for its comments. The 
Principles were: an immediate ceasefire, negotiations and withdrawal of all 
foreign troops from Korea; holding of elections and the setting up of a body 
consisting of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
China to discuss all Far-Eastern problem including Taiwan, Peking stuck to 
its earlier position that ceasefire should follow and not precede negotiations, 
but agreeing that a negotiated settlement of the Korean crisis was desirable 
and possible, put forward a counter proposal India sought clarification of the 
counter proposal from Peking and placed it before the Assembly, India and 
the other members of the Asian Group then acted on a Canadian suggestion 
and introduced a proposal suggesting a conference of the United Kingdom, 
the United States, France, the Soviet Union, China, Egypt and India for 
discussion on Korea. This was not adopted. Instead, the United States 
sponsored a resolution declaring China as aggressor. This resolution, though 
not co-sponsored by Britain and Canada, was adopted. India voted against 
the resolution. The military stalemate continued. Opinion even in the United 
States and the Western Countries gradually veered round to the view that a 
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large scale war to defeat China was undesirable and this resulted in the 
historic decision of Truman on 10 April 1951, to dismiss General Mac 
Arthur from the Post of Commander of the United Nations forces. Dean 
Acheson on 2 June, and Jacob Malik of the Soviet Union on 23 June, 
virtually expressed their readiness for ceasefire negotiations which 
commenced in July 1951.^ ^ 
The armistice negotiation between the military commanders of the 
opposing side were, however held up over the question of exchange and 
repatriation of prisoners of war. The Government of India made some 
proposals in this regard in the UN General Assembly which the Assembly 
approved on 3 December 1952.^' Though these were rejected by the Chinese 
and North Korean authorities when they were referred to them, it is 
interesting to record that the agreement reached between the two belligerents 
(the UN Command on the one hand and the Korean People's Army and the 
Chinese People's volunteers on the other) on 8 June 1953 on the question of 
prisoners of war continued provisions very similar to the proposals made by 
India earlier and accepted by the General Assembly. The Armistic 
Agreement was signed on July 1953; under the Agreement, India was made 
a member Chairman and Executive Agent of the Neutral Nations 
Repatriation Commission consisting of India, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Sweden and Switzerland. India was also to provide the armed forces and the 
operating personnel required for the functioning of the Commission. That 
functioned from 9 September 1953 to 21 February 1954.'*° The working of 
the Commission, inevitably in the circumstances, gave rise to several 
controversies with which we need not concern ourselves here. The relevance 
of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for our purposes is two-
fold, first, the suggestions made by India in regard to the repatriation of 
prisoners of war formed the basis of the agreement; and second, India was 
called upon to take up the Chairmanship and Executive Agency of the 
Commission, largely because, as an nonaligned country, it had won the 




In the Suez crisis, India played both visible and invisible role. The 
Suez Canal, 101-mile long canal, extends from Port Said to Port Suez. On 
30^*" November 1854, the then Khedive (Viceroy) of Egypt gave a 
concession to a Frenchman Frendinand de Lesseps to establish an 
international company under the name Universal Company of the Maritime 
Canal of Suez to build a canal. It was leased out for 99 years and after the 
completion of the leasing period the canal was to be handed over to Egypt. 
The construction of the canal was started in April 1859 and the completion 
of the work took nearly ten years. The canal was opened to traffic in 
November 1869. The canal was within the Egyptian territory but it was an 
international waterway, built and owned by an international company. 
Prior to that due to financial crisis the Khedive had sold the share of 
the Suez Company to Britain in 1875. That brought in the British to begin its 
dominance in the region. In 1882 Britain temporarily occupied Egypt in 
order to ensure 'Stability and Peace' in the region and to protect her share in 
the Company. The temporary occupation developed the tendencies of taking 
permanent character and continued up to 1922 when Egypt was granted 
independence. Despite this new development the British forces stationed 
there continued. In 1936 Britain imposed a Tready upon Egypt by which 
Egypt gave the British people the right to defend the Suez Canal. The treaty 
came to an end in 1951 by the unilateral abrogation by Egypt. The 
abrogation of the Anglo-Egypt Treaty followed great changes in Egypt 
leading to the military supremacy".'*^ The Britain agreed to withdraw its 
forces by 1956. The British withdrawal process was initiated. But meanwhile 
a Baghdad Pact was signed which brought the Anglo-American forces 
nearer to the Egyptian soil. Israel was already an enemy of the Arabs. To 
counter the military developments, General Gamal Abdel Naseer, the then 
Army Chief of Egypt, made arms deals with Czechoslovakia and Russia. In 
July 1956 USA abruptly broke off negotiations with Egypt, which was 
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expecting big finance from USA for its ambitious project, the Aswan Dam 
that was second largest in the world. Naseer countered by expropriating the 
shares of the Suez Canal Company and asserting Egypt's sovereign right to 
operate the canal itself. The objective was also to raise additional sources of 
revenue to finance the dam. However, the main purpose of the 
nationalization was indeed to find money for the dam. But, nonetheless, it 
did affect the power equations in the area and the world.'*'* 
The US Administration's withdrawal of economic aid from Egypt 
had caused the nationalization. Egypt also refused to take part in the US 
inspired alliance system in the region (Middle East Defense Organisation). 
Of the Western powers Britain and France, who were also members of 
NATO, were visibly upset by the steps taken by Gen. Nasser. Both of them 
were erstwhile controlling parties of the Suez Canal Company. The Suez 
crisis was thus initiated which experienced the Superpower involvement and 
United Nations intervention.''^ India played a crucial role. Its participation 
was active and extensive. Britain and France were the allies of USA. 
Naturally the US reaction could not be as sharp as non-aligned India's. 
Israel attacked Egypt on 29 October 1956. The inevitable happened 
when Franco-British forces launched a military attack on Egypt. Along with 
India the two Superpowers denounced the Franco-British military action on 
Egypt. 
Factors behind India's stand: 
Its basic attitudes and interests dictated the Indian stand in the Suez 
crises: 
1. It was against colonialism. Jawaharlal Nehru denounced the attack as a 
"flagrant case of aggression by two strong powers against a weaker 
country".'*^ 
2. India was determined to support a neutral country in its attempt to 
make the nearby region of its own country a Cold War free zone. 
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3. It was also interested in supporting progressive Arab nationalism as 
practiced by Egypt as a means of minimizing the danger of unqualified 
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Muslim support for Pakistan and an anti-Indian course. 
4. The most important single factor attributable to India's stand with 
regard to Suez was "the inclusion of Pakistan in the Bangladesh Pact, 
which aroused the fear that the Cold War had been brought close to her 
door"/« 
5. In the words of V.K. Krishna Menon, the then Minister without 
Portfolio: "India was concerned in the Suez Canal as a life line in her 
economy... 76 per cent of her exports pass through the Canal. The 
fulfillment of India's Five Year Plans depended upon traffic through it. 
India did not approach the problem in a legalistic way but with a full 
sense of the reality of the importance of the canal for many countries of 
the world who used it".''^  
The Security Council could not take any positive step due to Anglo-
French veto. Both the Superpowers demanded immediate cessation of 
hostilities. Yugoslavia suggested convening of the General Assembly under 
'Uniting for Peace Resolution'. The Assembly met on November 1956. The 
British Premier Anthony Eden charged India for its clandestine role to 
present the proposal through Yugoslavia. "India and Canada, both 
suspicious of the motives of the two Superpowers and fearful that simple 
ceasefire may not be enough, proposed, that there be an International 
Emergency Force, under the UN, to be constituted of the willing 
contribution of small powers only.^ *^  It was at that point that India came to 
play a role in the UN for the first time with regard to the issue. A ten 
member (including India) International Force was formed on the basis of 
resolution adopted on S"' November 1956. On November 6 Britain declared 
that it would be willing to order a ceasefire from the midnight. But it was 
victory for Arab nationalism as the proposal put an end to Anglo-French 
imperialism-colonialism. 
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In essence, the Indian stand was a novel kind of neutralism. It never 
helped either of the party, but could put a check on both. It checked the 
growth of colonialism. Further it encouraged the Afro-Asian nations to 
pursue neutralism. India also secured the support of a Muslim State in its 
future conflicts with Pakistan. Egypt also joined the Indian Mission for the 
Non-alignment cause. Sarbadhikari observed : "India's stand during the 
crisis therefore measured up with the principles guiding her foreign policy in 
that area. Her efforts towards the withdrawl of foreign troops stemmed both 
from her anti-colonial policy and the fear that the intervention of the Great 
Powers, which was in the logic of events, would spark off a major war. The 
impact of the crisis in strengthening the non-aligned policies of some Arab 
governments, such as Egypt and paving the way for others to follow suit, 
such as Iraq, was a success for India's rationale, that neutralism was the 
most logical policy for the developing states. Moreover, the support of a 
secular India for a Muslim State on the basis of colonial intrusion was an 
active embarrassment for Pakistan, wedded as she was to Western 
alignments; it revealed that diplomacy on the basis of religion was unsuited 
to modern relations of States.^' 
CONGO CRISIS 
In the Congo Crisis, India's position was anti-colonialist. The 
second part of the 20"^  century experienced awakening in Africa. Africa was 
the unfortunate scene and example of the arrogance of the Western 
countries. Exploitation in Africa knew no limits. Colonial power adopted the 
racial discrimination (apartheid). It was observed through physical and 
cultural segregation of the Black community. Congo, situated in tropical 
Africa was under the Belgian control for decades. Belgium ruled over 
Congo in a paternalistic-colonial way and had not cared much for the 
welfare and real interests of the people of that country. Rather it was busy to 
exploit the land commercially, which had the rich mineral resources. 
Meanwhile, the two developments stirred nationalistic sentiments in Belgian 
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Congo (Leopoldville). One, of the neighbouring French occupied Congo 
(Brazaville) attained independence and the other was, in Accra AH African 
People's Conference was held and urged for the end of Colonial system." In 
the Round Table Conference between January to March 1960 the demand 
for immediate freedom was accepted and 30"^  June 1960 was fixed for the 
commencement of Congolese sovereignty. 
Joseph Karavuba and Patrice Lumumba assumed offices as the 
President and Prime Minister of Central Republic of Congo respectively. 
But within hours after independence, a wave of unrest began sweeping 
across the country. There was another competitor for power, Moise 
Tashombe who was the Premier of the Province of Katanga. The region was 
rich with minerals. Without Katanga's financial support Congo could not 
think of progress. But on ll"' July 1960 Katanga announced its succession 
from Congo and form a new state allied with Belgium.^ ^ Prior to that P.M. 
Lumumba had asked the Belgians to vacate Congo. On July 12, 1960 the 
Belgian troops from Katanga, had already marched into Leopoldville. The 
situation became chaotic. "Faced with that Kind of circumstances Lumumba 
looked for assistance from President Eisenhower, Premier Khurshchev, as 
well as to Beijing and on 12"* July sent urgent appeal to the UN Secretary 
General for the UN assistance in maintaining the national integrity of his 
country against the aggression being hatched by foreign interests"^* The 
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjoeld took the matter immediately to the 
Security Council. The Secretary General threw the resources of the UN into 
his effort to save the Congo from becoming an East-West battleground. 
The Congolese crisis took a new turn when President Kasabuvu 
dismissed Premier Lumumba and the latter did the same to the former. 
Seeing an opportunity, pro-Western Colonel Joseph Mobutu took command 
of the armed forces through a coup, thus making it possible for the Belgians 
to return to Congo, as unofficial advisers. Both the Superpowers reacted 
sharply. As expected the USA supported Kasabuvu - Mobutu faction for 
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their claim to have legitimate government and the Soviet gave moral and 
material support to Lummba. Both the Superpowers remained adamant on 
their stand. "This helplessness was mitigated to a degree by the action in the 
emergency session that followed it of an overwhelming majority including 
India, which supported the US position; and therefore the Secretary 
General's position....^^ 
An irritated Khruschev presented his Troika Proposal, which could 
have three-man committee replacing one Secretary General who shall be 
representing three worlds both the Superpowers and the third world). India 
opposed the Troika proposal, but suggested for the reform of the Secretariat 
by having an advisory Committee from different geographical areas. In 
December, India along with seven non-aligned nations asked for immediate 
convening of the Congolese Parliament. In a debate on this resolution Indian 
representative Krishna Menon emphatically observed, "that his government 
considered the Kasabuvu regime as unvarnished, unashamed and 
unconstitutional dictatorship".^^ 
The death of Patrice Lumumba in a mysterious situation shocked 
the conscience of the world. The Soviet Union demanded that Gizenga, who 
was Lumumba's deputy, be the head of the lawful Congolese government. 
But later on the Soviet Union had to change its stand and supported the UN 
decision. For this P.M. Nehru played a significant role," India took 
leadership with Afro-Asian members passing a resolution calling upon 
Belgium to accept its responsibility as a member of the UN and the proposal 
demanded with withdrawal of all military and non-military personnel from 
Congo. That led to a UN resolution rejecting Katanga's claim as a sovereign 
nation and authorized the Secretary General to take all possible steps to 
make the area free from foreign action.^ ^ 
In the Congolese crisis apart from the support or opposition to 
proposals in the UN, India had a share of 5600 strong force in a 30-nation 
pool of 20,000 forces. It also contributed $105,000 to UN Fund for Congo. 
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Rajeshwar Dayal, an Indian diplomat, served as Secretary General's 
personal representative in Congo. He was instrumental in bringing the UN to 
a stage for strong action through his reports. India's military contribution 
was politically important for the UN.^ ^ 
The Secretary General who was accused as the agent of the Western 
colonialism could function strongly because he received the support of the 
neutral powers and India was one of the prominent supporters.^" Another 
observer said that the successful conclusion of the UN operation in Congo 
depended to a large extent on two powers - India and USA. "In a real sense 
India and the USA were two countries the UN operation most depended 
upon, both for political support in New York and for military in Congo. 
Despite some differences in interpreting the mandate, the US India 
partnership remained solid throughout the Congo drama. The Congo 
operation would probably have collapsed if either New Delhi or Washington 
had withdrawn its support before integration of Katanga".^ ^ 
SOMALIAN CRISIS 
Somalia, an Africa century had a significant strategic position at the 
mouth of the Gulf of Aden in the Indian Ocean and had remained an 
attractive domain of Superpower rivalry during 1970 and 1980s. In January 
1991, after 21 years of dictatorship, the Somalian President Saed Berre was 
overthrown by the general mass led by General Mohammad Farah Acdeed.^ ^ 
Though the dictator was over thrown but no agreement was reached among 
rival factions. This resulted in the outbreak of a civil war - mainly between 
the two powerful clans. In the heavy fighting about 20,000 people had been 
killed alone in Mogadeshu in November 1991 followed by severe draught 
proved very disastrous for the entire population of the country. 
The UN's role in Somalia started with humanitarian aid to the 
starved Somali people. As there was no change in the ground realities. By 
then it became a threat to international peace and security, the UN adopted a 
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resolution in 1992 and imposed arm embargo on Somalian forces and was 
called for ceasefire, subsequently Fourty Blue Helmet of UN were send to 
control the law and order situation in the Somalia but nothing could 
materialize as the embargo was not tight. Inspite of the fact that the number 
of soldiers were raised to 4000 by 1992 but the conflict continued." 
The UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) can be regarded as one of 
the most dangerous and risky operation undertaken in the post-Cold War 
era. India suffered severe setbacks in Somalia. Within four months of 
deployment, in April 1993, India suffered seven casualties. Ten day later on 
1 September, three Indian doctors were also killed in a rifle grenade 
explosion in Baidoa. The loss of 10 Indian jawans in Baidoa let to a great 
uproar in the Indian Parliament. The opposition in the Rajya Sabha tabled a 
motion for the immediate withdrawl of Indian troops from the UN 
peacekeeping force in Somalia.^ '* 
The Indian government, however, continued its active involvement 
in Somalia based on the premise that it was their onus to fulfill their 
responsibility to the international community at large. As expressed in 
Tribune, the killing of the soldiers should not provoke the Indian 
peacekeepers to follow the US example. 
The Hindu, it was pointed that 'what contributed anarchy to the 
operation in Somalia was the American over-reaction to events on the 
ground. In contrast. Third World soldiers throw their low profile are proving 
successful in helping to bring life back in Somalia.^ ^ For example, the Indian 
military contingent was quite successful in controlling the level of violence 
in the area of its deployment, that is in Baidoa (South of Mugadishnu). 
Instead of reacting immediately in the event of an attack, a major tactic used 
by the Indian force was a 'wait and watch' approach. In other words, the 
Indian officers did not return fire once the first shot was beared from the 
factions. The Indian troops, instead of exchanging fire, took time to study 
the situation and to identify the parties that started the shooting. As 
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Brigadier Bhagat asserted 'the Indian soldiers in Somalia have come to 
assist them, not to suppress them further.^ ^ 
Question of a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean: 
The year 1971 is notable in the history of India's diplomacy at the 
United Nations in the light of another equally important question: the 
initiative to have the Indian Ocean declared as a "zone of peace". The issue 
arising from the initiative have a serious bearing on security interests of 
India as also of nearly fifty other member countries including the Permanent 
Members of the United Nations Security Council, Little wonder, therefore, 
harmonizing those divergent interests has turned out to be an increasingly 
intractable task for the World Body ever since the 1971 initiative. 
The Indian Ocean, world's third largest ocean, is of great 
geographical importance in view of its water space, the countries and the 
populations it covers, the multiple natural resources it is known to possess, 
and the important transit route of trade and commerce it offers. Extending 
over 75 million kilometers, the ocean is about half the size of the Pacific and 
only slightly smaller than the Atlantic. With Africa, Asia and Australia 
surrounding its northern part the ocean acquires some features of a "land-
locked sea". Around 40 per cent of world's offshore oil production comes 
from the Indian Ocean region. Besides, the ocean region is rich in deposits 
of minerals like bauxite, chrome, copper, gold, manganese, platinum, 
uranium etc. The volume of the maritime traffic in the ocean is the third 
largest - every year nearly 30,000 ships use the sea route in this ocean.^ ^ 
The control of the Indian ocean by native kingdom came to an end with the 
arrival of Europeans in the fifteenth century. Afterwards, the history of the 
Indian Ocean is marked by intense rivalry among the Protguese, the Dutch, 
the French and the British for control of the sea lanes first for commerce and 
then to colonise much of the region. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
except for Ethiopia and Siam which remained independent, the whole of the 
Indian Ocean coastal region was under domination of one or the other 
European power. 
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The close affinity the Indian Ocean has with India is obvious from 
its very name. Geographically located in the centre of the Indian Ocean's 
littoral, peninsular India's vast coast projects two thousand kilometers into 
the ocean which means that India has one of the world's largest exclusive 
economic zones (nearly two million square kilometers). A huge proportion 
of India's foreign trade worth Rs. 92,000 crore now is sea-borne. 
Historically India enjoyed strong political, cultural and commercial ties with 
the territories of both the western and the eastern Indian Ocean. Particularly 
the commercial affluence and political influence during the region of the 
Cholas, Pallavas, Pandyas and Satavahanas was because of effective 
projection of sea power. Subsequently, the neglect of this element of power 
paved the way for unchallenged sway of Europeans over the waters of the 
Indian coast and brought the country under the colonial yoke. Indeed, the 
British could consolidate their empire in and around India only because the 
effectively converted the Indian Ocean into a "British lake". It was to set 
right this gross neglect of seas in India's security consciousness, historians 
stressed the need to make the Indian ocean truly Indian.^ ^ History bears out 
that without adequate protection of India's 5,600 kilometer long coast, no 
industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure 
would be possible. 
Despite the strategic significance of the Indian ocean to India's 
security and economic well-being, defence of the sea-coast did not receive 
due attention, say upto mid-1960s, owing mainly to the country's 
preoccupation with its territorial security problems on the north.^ ^ 
Fortunately, the wider strategic situation prevailing in the Indian ocean than 
was not too alarming. The Indian Ocean, as compared to the situation in the 
Atlantic or the Pacific, was relatively free from superpower military rivalry. 
Although the British novel presence was notable, the influence of the United 
Kingdom along with its empire was on the decline ever since India's 
independence in 1947. 
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For the purpose of safeguarding its legitimate interests and to 
oppose military build up by extra regional powers, India appeared to follow 
a two-track policy. The first course relates to expanding its naval force and 
assert its naval force and assert itself as a credible regional power to reckon 
with (the manifestation of which was evident in course of the 1971 war with 
Pakistan). The second track was to work through diplomatic means for 
maintaining the Indian ocean as a zone of peace free from great power 
rivalry. In view of the focus of the present work on diplomatic interactions, it 
may be worthwhile to refer to the chief aim of the Nehruvian foreign policy: 
"pursuit of peace not through an independent approach". This basic postulate, 
although formulated in the wider context of cold war, appeared to constitute a 
policy fore-runner with reference to the Indian Ocean too. In other words, the 
nonalignment policy presented an ideological framework for the diplomatic 
efforts by Indian and other countries concerned to keep the Indian Ocean free 
from global rivalry of great Powers. 
The question was raised in the Lusaka Nonaligned Sunmiit Conference 
(September 1970) which called for adoption of a United Nations Declaration to 
make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Further details of the plan of action 
were considered at the consultative meeting of nonaligned countries' foreign 
ministers attending the twenty sixth regular session of the General Assembly 
(September, 1971).'" Soon afterwards the question was formally taken to the 
General Assembly. 
The attempt to involve the United Nations suited Indian approach well, 
for India viewed the world forum as an incomparable vehicle of 
communication and negotiation. One could think perhaps of no other question 
more appropriate for UN consideration. Given the fact of numerical advantage 
the Third World enjoyed in the UN General Assembly where one member one 
vote principles operates without any veto privileges to the Permanent 
Members necessary political support to the views of India and other non-
aligned countries was certain. 
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Ceylon (since May 1972 known as Sri Lanka) took the initiative and 
sought in October 1971 inclusion of an item entitled "Declaration of the Indian 
Ocean as a zone of Peace" in the agenda of the twenty sixth regular session of 
the General Assembly. Tanzania too joined to co-sponsor the move7^ 
It may be noted that the General Assembly session was already in 
progress with a comprehensive agenda under consideration. Under the General 
Assembly's rules of procedure, only those items of an "important and urgent 
character" can be included in the agenda as on "additional item "doing the 
session, if supported by a majority of the Members present and voting 
(rule 15). 
As to the timing of the Ceylonese initiative, it may be recalled that the 
Lusaka Non-aligned Summit desired adoption of a peace zone declaration by 
the General Assembly during the twenty fifth session. But the initiative was 
taken after a lapse of one year, particularly after the foreign ministers of 
nonaligned Member states attending the General Assembly twenty, sixth 
session (September 1971) called for a concrete steps to implement the Lusaka 
decision. But the question as to why Ceylon alone took the initiative remains 
moot. 
Why did not India take the initiative? Two explanation can be offered. 
First an initiative by Indian might have aroused suspicion among some littoral 
states about India's designs to dominate region. Perhaps, that party explained 
why India's Minister for External Affairs states that India preferred to leave the 
initiative to the smaller countries of the region.'^  Secondly, India was too 
preoccupied at that timer with developments in East Pakistan to take major 
initiatives of this kind. Indeed, India-Pakistan war broke out by the time the 
United Nations bodies took up the Indian Ocean question for consideration. In 
course of the debate in the Assembly's First (Political and Security Questions) 
Committee some Western delegations (for example. New Zealand) openly 
questioned the appropriateness of a declaration of a zone of peace in the Indian 
Ocean, when two littoral states were fighting each other.'" Pakistan took the 
34 
opportunity to allege that India's deeds were not in conformity with the 
provisions contained in the draft declaration. China, accused India of deceiving 
the world by "Sheer sinister double-dealing". In reply, the Indian 
representatives characterized the criticism as "distortion of facts." 
In seeking the inscription of the item, Ceylon's objectives, as stated in 
its memorandum to the UN Secretary-General was to secure the United Nations 
approval of an international domain, subject to international regulation and 
responsibility, covering the entire high seas of the Indian Ocean. To quote from 
the memorandum, what Ceylon asked for was that the entire high seas area of 
the Indian Ocean will be declared a peace zone to be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes. This would mean the exclusion of armaments, defensive or 
offensive, and military installations from the prescribed area. Warships and 
ships carrying warlike equipment will exercise the right of transit but may not 
stop for other than emergency reasons of a mechanical, technical or 
humanitarian nature. The use of the sea bed area by sub-marines, except for 
reasons of a mechanical, technical or humanitarian nature, is to be prohibited. 
There will be a prohibition on naval maneuvers naval intelligence operations 
and weapons tests in the area.'^  
Such an ambitions scheme was certain to be actively opposed by the 
outside naval Powers. Moreover, some littoral countries like Australia, 
Madagascar, Singapore and Thailand too had strong reservations. What was 
more notable was that there was no attempt to draw any distinction between the 
naval operations of the outside Powers in the Indian Ocean and the legitimate 
naval activities of the littoral states. Indeed the issues involved were too 
complex to be sorted out in a Declaration. Hence, it was for the littoral states 
like India to se that the draft Declaration was couched in a language which 
would emphasise the basic principles of the peace zone without bringing 
contentious issues, so that the proposal received adequate support from 
Member States. Therefore, the original formulation underwent "radical change" 
to limit the scope of the proposal.^ ^ 
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The go-slow approach was very much evident in the 9-power text.'' It 
solemnly sought to declare the Indian Ocean-the geographical limits of which 
were notably left unspecified together with the air space above and the ocean 
floor subjacent thereto as a zone of peace for all time. In pursuance of this 
objective, a system of dual track consultation/negotiations were envisaged : one 
set was to be entered into by "great Powers" with littoral states for (a) halting 
the further escalation and expansion of their [great Powers] military presence in 
the Ocean and (b) "eliminating" from the Ocean, all bases, military 
installations logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military 
presence... conceived in the context of great Power rivalry. The second track 
of consultations was envisaged among three categories of States concerned 
viz., the littoral and hinterland states, the Permanent Members of the Security 
Council and other major maritime users of the Ocean to ensure that -
(i) warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat 
or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
independence of any littoral or hinterland state of the Indian Ocean in 
Contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, 
(ii) subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international 
law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all 
nations is unaffected; and 
(iii) appropriate arrangements are made to give effect to any international 
agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the 
Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. 
Notably, of the two tracks of consultations, priority, specificity and 
urgency were adduced to the first, i.e. great Power consultations with littoral 
states on halting/elimination of their military presence. The second track of 
consultations was general and long-term in nature. Nonetheless, 
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acknowledgement of the need for consultations indicated the willingness to be 
flexible on the part of the littoral countries. 
The "great Powers" - meaning in particular, the United States and the 
Soviet Union were unimpressed with the toning down exercise and expressed 
reservation on the proposal. The United States contended that Indian Ocean 
was not the property of any one nation to establish a new regime. The Soviet 
reservations were more politely worded: Although all countries, island, oceans 
and seas should become "total zone of peace", it was not possible to "achieve 
everything at the same time". Neither of them accepted the assumption that 
great Power military presence as such as a threat to the peace atleast insofar as 
one's own activities were concerned. Both of them asserted their right to 
freedom of high seas under international law. 
What was remarkable was that more than great Power resistance, the 
lukewarm attitude among several other Member State including some littoral 
countries made adoption of the text by the General Assembly extremely 
difficult. As an extreme manifestation of this trend, Madagascar sought, in the 
Assembly's First Committee, postponement of vote on the draft, ^' which 
would have effectively, if successfiil led to decline of enthusiasm in the 
initiative. Once the delay tactic failed to make any dent, other tactics were 
employed; to put all the there focal, operative paragraphs to a separate vote. In 
the vote that followed, although no country cast a negative vote, abstentions 
were roughly as many as positive votes. Plenary vote too, reflected the voting 
pattern in the Committee. While 61 voted in favour, 55 countries abstained. 
Interestingly, in this instance, abstentions were resorted to by even those 
members who went on record to express their substantive opposition on several 
courts. 
Notwithstanding the large number of abstentions, the first of the 
adoption of the Declaration on 16 December 1971 could be construed as a 
major polifical victory for the littoral countries like India. 
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As already noted, India let other countries take the initiative. As part of 
its low-key diplomacy, India confined itself to backstage 
negotiations/consultations on the wording of the text without appearing to steal 
the limelight from the principal sponsors of the draft resolution. India was not 
one of the nine Powers that originally co-sponsored the text. 
India's representative expressed support to the more succinctly thus: 
India, together with all the nonaligned countries, has subscribed to the concept 
of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. This concept means that the area... be 
kept free from great power rivalry and competition. We therefore congratulate 
and welcome the initiative,... so that serious discussions could take place on 
how our objective could be achieved. There is a need for intensive 
consultations in order that a consensus could be reached on a declaration.... 
All these characteristics of India's diplomacy represented a deliberate 
strategy to ensure that the wording of the UN Declaration did not impinge on 
India's interests in any way. As it eventually turned out, the Declaration 
focused on the peace in the Ocean itself; the urgency of halting or removal of 
military activities of the extra regional Powers; reaffirmation of Universal 
system of collective security without military alliances with power blocs (in 
other words nonalignment ideology), and appropriate international legal 
arrangement to give concrete effect to the Declaration. '^ 
In essence, the 1971 Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of 
peace could be interpreted as a clear instance of India's effective diplomacy for 
safeguarding its vital interest. No wonder, India was determine to make the 
Declaration the bedrock of its diplomacy in various UN bodies that dealt with 
the question, especially the Assembly's 44-member Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Indian Ocean set up in 1972 to study the implications of the Declaration and to 
consider practical measures" in fiirtherance of the objectives of the Declaration. 
India has been a member of the Committee ever since its inception. Ever since 
1972, India's diplomacy is directed to : (a) Keeping the focus on the various 
forms of military activities of great Powers, and opposing any attempt at 
38 
diversion from or dilution of this focus, and (b) forging a concert of the littoral 
and hinterland states and discouraging any trend inimical to the unity among 
the regional countries. The discussion in the following pages will analyse the 
issues, problems India's diplomacy grappled with and extent to which India 
purposefully furthered its point of view on the question of implementing the 
UN Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. 
As was clear from the stand taken by the Soviet Union and the United 
States in 1971, neither of them was eager to cooperate in the implementation of 
the Declaration (Of course, the Soviet Union heralded a fundamental attitudinal 
change by voting in favour of the General Assembly resolution during the 1977 
session as a mark of its "sympathy" for the zone of peace idea). As a logical 
corollary, they refrained from participating in the work of the Ad Hoc 
Committee. Under the circumstances and as a preliminary step, an experts 
body, constituted in 1973, prepared a detailed report on the military presence of 
great powers in the Indian Ocean area as manifested in deployment of 
worships, military installations and naval bases. The sharp criticism the report 
gave rise to, especially from the United States and the Soviet Union expectedly 
led to a revised and toned-down version.^ ^ 
The United States justified its military presence in the region by 
contending that its military activities did not aim to use or threaten to use of 
force against any littoral country. According to the United states, the American 
military presence including its base facility in Diego Garcia contributed to 
regional security and was indeed in conformity with the UN Charter. The 
Soviet Union, on its part, stoutly denied that it had a base facility in Berbera 
(Somalia). The Soviet Union "never had, has not established' and is not now 
establishing any military or naval bases in the Indian Ocean region. Soviet 
ships and vessels have never posed a threat to any one in that region.*^ 
Despite these views, India's diplomacy focused on the growing great 
Power military presence in the Indian Ocean in the context of their global 
rivalry. In India's view, the American contention that its military presence was 
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promoting Security of littoral States was a virtual "arrogation of the right to act 
as purveyors of the security" of all countries in the area.*'* India specially 
singled out the American facility in Diego Gracia and vigorously demanded its 
immediate dismantling. India's sharp criticism of the United States policy 
should be seen in the light of Latter's persistence in augmenting the operational 
capacity of the Diego Gracia base facility over the years-first from a mere 
communication station to what was purported later to be a base for nuclear, air, 
and naval deployment, including stationing of the "Rapid Deployment Force". 
Nonetheless, the Indian views attracted criticism in Western countries as a 
"turning a blind eye" to activities of the Soviet Union in the region. For 
instance, the Australian Prime Minister was quoted as stating: .. .this showed a 
lack of reality. A number of nations have said to us privately that they support 
what the United States is doing to maintain a balance; but they are not prepared 
to say it publicly.*^ 
India's answer to the criticism was that Diego Garcia was the only 
official acknowledged base facility, in case any other base facilities were 
officially acknowledged India would not hesitate to demand their dismantling 
too. 
Nonetheless, it appeared that the political and diplomatic pressure 
brought to bear through the world forum did yield some results. The United 
States and the Soviet Union who chose to keep out of the UN Ad Hoc 
Committee initiated bilateral talk in 1977 on limiting their arms build-up in the 
Indian Ocean. Although the talks were held outside the UN the Ad Hoc 
Committee was kept informed of the progress.*^ India, along with others, 
welcomed these talks as a first step, but it would have liked littoral countries of 
the Indian Ocean too to be associated with those talks.*^ The talks were broken 
off in 1978 in view of the developments in the Horn of Africa. The subsequent 
deterioration in the general climate of super power relations caused by the 
Soviet interventions in Afghanistan in 1979 not only aborted all hopes of 
assumption of bilateral talks but also brought about remarkable change in their 
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tactics in response to the diplomatic moves made in the UN. Notable among 
those moves was the convening in July 1979 of a Meeting of the Littoral and 
Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean which kept the issue of the escalation of 
great Power military presence in prime focus. Further, to keep up the 
momentum the General Assembly, in 1979, gave a call for convening an 
international conference, under the UN auspices, on the subject to be held in 
Colombo in 1981.^ ^ 
The great Powers (that is, the permanent members of the United 
Nations, except China was already a member) accepted the UN invitation and 
became member of the Ad Hoc Committee in early 1980. This was a major 
change in their tactical approaches to the question. One could look at this 
change in two ways. First, as a positive outcome of the efforts made by the 
littoral and hinterland countries within the United Nations. India and many 
other countries welcomed these countries' entry into the Ad Hoc Committee 
and hope that their association would facilitate the work of the Committee. On 
the other hand, a view could be taken that the great power did not effect any 
reversal of their original positions on the 1971 Declaration but only wished to 
persist with their opposition by means of working withm the committee, rather 
than outside. (Again the timing of their decision should be viewed against the 
backdrop of the General Assembly's decision, only a few months earlier, to 
schedule a conference on the Indian Ocean for 1981). The interactions between 
the extra-regional Power (including India) during the years 1980-92 provide 
guidance as to which of the above two interpretations truly reflected the 
intention of the great Powers. 
During the years 1980-92, chiefly three issues dominated deliberations 
in the United Nations on the question in general and India's diplomacy in 
particular. They are - (a) an appropriate approach to the zone of peace in the 
Indian Ocean; (b) preparatory work for the Conference, and (c) working 
methods. 
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How most littoral countries conceived of the peace zone was best 
stated by Sri Lanka in 1973: 
...conditions of peace and stability would be ensured by the exclusion of great 
Power rivalries and competition as well as elimination of base conceived in the 
context of such rivalries and competition. The Declaration was also intended to 
serve as a contribution to the relaxation of general international tensions and 
the strengthening of international peace and security, as well as to ensure 
conditions of security within the region which would render redundant and 
superfluous the need for military alliances with outside Powers... This would 
help the states to devote more attention to the tasks of economic 
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reconstruction. 
India consistently supported this conceptualization of the zone of 
peace, right from 1971, for it would replace "outmoded" doctrines of 
containment and balance of power.^ ° The socialist bloc and the Soviet Union in 
particular supported the nonaligned concept, but argued that the concept 
involved the West-South relations, not the "North-South" confrontation.'^  
These Western countries were emphatic in characterizing the basis of the 1971 
concept of peace zone as "outcomed" and orthodox".'^  These countries called 
for re-examination of the principles of the 1971 concept with a view to 
changing that concept "to reflect the real world". The points made in this 
connection included (a) That military arrangements agreed to between states in 
the region and a great Power in pursuance of self-defence (a right granted 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter) could not be deemed as "conceived in the 
context of great Power global rivalry", (b) Conflicts and tension in the region 
were not caused only by the great Power military activity in the region, (c) As 
borne out by developments, the notable source of major threats was the land-
based military presence of a great Power (d) No peace zone concept could 
prejudice customary rights under international law including freedom of the 
seas, (e) Important would be elimination of sources of tension among States in 
the region and consistent application of the principles of the UN Charter in 
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regard to non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes. In other words, 
the contention was that implementation of the 1971 peace zone concept might 
cause greater instability and tension in the area precisely like opposite of the 
original objective of the Declaration. The West took the next logical step and 
presented a detailed set of political, security and economic principles that 
would constitute the basis of a "contemporary" approach to a zone of peace in 
the Indian Ocean.'^  The highlights of those principles were: respect for 
sovereignty, right of states to be from military occupation, peaceful settlement 
of disputes, avoidance of arms competition, withdrawal of foreign occupying 
troops from the regional states, expansion of mutual trade in goods and 
services, encouragement to regional economic cooperative arrangements, 
common efforts to increase food production and application of a new 
technologies to industrial scientific and environmental activities in the region. 
Clearly, the objective of the sponsors of the revisionist move was to 
deflect, dilute the focus on their permanent naval presence in the Ocean, to 
internalize - not externalize - the action for establishment of peace zone and, in 
the process, to turn the tables on those (the Soviet Union) who endangered the 
prospects of zone of peace by policies of intervention and occupation. The 
Soviet Union reacted to say that the attempt might shift the discussion towards 
problems not directly related to the peace zone question.^ '* Most littoral and 
hinterland countries criticized the initiative as diversionary and evasive. 
Ethiopia noted that the "new" approach dealt with a whole range of subjects 
but failed to deal with the question of Indian Ocean itself.^ ^ 
India sharply criticized the Western proposals; for they would, in its 
view, alter the very concept of "the zone of peace" and shift the focus of 
attention away from the dangers posed to the littoral and hinterland states by 
the increasing military presence of great Powers in the Indian Ocean area. 
Consideration by the Committee of matters alien to its mandate would 
undermine the very basis on which it had been established.^ ^ 
India, also, pointed out^': 
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"If delegations wish to put forward a new concept of zone of peace in 
the Indian Ocean, or conversing any other relevant area, it would have been 
more appropriate for them to put forward their suggestions separately in a 
resolution of the General Assembly which my delegation might or might not 
have voted for.... 
India's views were shared by the delegations of China, Ethiopia, Sri 
Lanka, Yugoslavia and many other members of the Ad Hoc Committee. Even 
Pakistan went on record to refute politely the claims on "antiquated, 
contemporary or ftituristic" concept of zone of peace, although in principle it 
welcomed the proposals.^^ The notable nonaligned littoral states that were 
receptive to the 'modernise' concept of peace zone were Bangladesh and 
Egypt. They advised open-mindedness, to all views and proposals. 
It seemed that the proposals for flexibility made an impact. The Ad 
Hoc Committee set up an open-ended working group in 1985 to work out 
agreeable principles of the peace zone concept. The group, after four years of 
deliberations outlined nineteen principles - which to a great extent 
accommodated the ideas put forward by the Western Countries in 1982 also.'^^ 
But unfortunately, the exercise turned out to be futile, as the United States 
along with France and the United Kingdom withdrew from the Ad Hoc 
Committee in 1990, in protest against the "absolute" concept of the peace 
zone.' ' Once the Soviet Union too tended to support a "realistic approach"'*'^  
the littoral states of the Indian Ocean appeared to have given in to the demand 
for a new approach: the General Assembly, in its forty seventh Session, to the 
concept of zone of peace, taking into account the changing international 
situation.'"^ 
The methods by which various Member States interacted within the 
United Nations bodies carried their own political and diplomatic significance. 
Given the apparent divergence in perceptions of interests and the imperatives 
of securing cooperation from the great powers, the normal, well-known 
working methods like public speeches and recorded voting method might not 
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be fully effective. Therefore, India had supported other les formal working 
methods like informal consultations, entrusting specific negotiating tasks to 
limited groups, avoidance of formal vote, etc. It is not the argument here that 
these methods were never employed in other contexts of United Nations 
diplomacy, but significantly their application served the objectives of India's 
diplomacy on the question under study. 
Among the various working methods that bound India and various 
other sections of member states including the great Powers, "Consensus" as a 
decision-making principles was the most important one. 
Aware that implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a 
zone of peace singularly depended on the great Power cooperation, India's 
participation aimed at engaging them in the endeavours of the United Nations 
in a give and take manner. For instance, India supported a compromise formula 
suggested by the Chairman which avoided specific reference to either 
resolution A/34/80B or A/135/150 but was based on A/35/150 because it was 
adopted by consensus and deserve pride of peace.'"'' For the first time, since 
1972, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the subject by consensus 
in 1980. 
Since then, till 1989 with the exception of 1983, the Ad Hoc 
Committee adopted texts on the question of the Indian Ocean by consensus. 
Indeed, the United States made it clear several times that its cooperation would 
be predicted on adherence to consensus method of decision-making. India 
extended all support to consensus method in good faith but cautioned against 
misuse'^ :^ 
We hope that the working methods of the Ad Hoc Committee [are] 
aimed at securing the widest cooperation of all delegations in the task of 
implementing the Declaration.... And will not be used to obstruct our action in 
that direction. On the other hand, they should provide the impetus to carry 
forward our task in a constructive spirit to achieve the desired goals. 
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But the fears about the possible misuse of consensus method to stymie 
any progress became a reality sooner than later. For instance, in the name of 
consensus, the proposed conference, originally scheduled for 1981, was 
regularly and repeatedly rescheduled. In the name of consensus, again, the 
General Assembly resolutions acknowledged the importance of "recent events" 
that had a bearing on the political and security climate in the region, etc. India 
joined the consensus but expressed its disappointment and "anguish" on the 
negative trends. The climax of those negative trends occurred in the forty 
fourth regular session of the General Assembly. As Yugoslavia on behalf of the 
nonaligned group explained'^ ^: 
The [see] protracted negotiations... are a resuU of the violation of the 
consensus rule: certain member states have not agreed to attend the conference 
in violation of the decision of the General Assembly contained in resolution 
43/79, which was adopted by consensus.,.. That a vote has to be taken in a 
situation created by the inflexibility of the positions taken by certain states, and 
this too in the teeth of numerous concessions by the nonaligned group. 
One of the compromises suggested was to suspend the Conmiittee and 
sanction consultations, under the Committee Chairman's (Sri Lanka's) 
authority to find a way out of the stalemate. As the suggestion was certain to 
whittle away the Committee's authority, the formula was rejected and formal 
vote was taken in both the Political/Security Committee and Plenary. One 
positive indication that emerged from the vote was that there was no littoral 
and hinterland country to joined some of the Western countries as abstainers. 
Which is to note that from 1971, the littoral and hinterland countries except for 
Australia, journeyed a long way to shed earlier postures of discard. 
On the negative side, however, the negative vote cast by France, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States in 1989 and subsequent 
sessions too represented a serious setback to the UN efforts to further the 
objectives of the Declaration. Besides, because of the formal vote, the littoral 
countries had to become painfully aware of the changed voting behaviour since 
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1990 of the East European countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania 
who were among the enthusiastic advocates of the idea of the zone of peace in 
the Indian Ocean earlier. 
The breakdown of consensus as working method of the UN 
endeavours led to the United States decision to withdraw from the Ad Hoc 
Committee which India very much regretted.'°^ 
It is interesting to note that India's active support to the principles of 
consensus had a strong regional ramification, too. For, just as elimination of all 
forms of great Power military presence "conceived in the context of their 
global rivalry" was a predominant theme in India's diplomacy on the question 
of peace zone in the Indian Ocean, ensuring that littoral countries were not 
distracted by divergent security perceptions and interests also emerged as a 
concomitant task in this regard. That sharp political differences existed among 
littoral states India could not deny. But according to its perception, they had 
been excreted by the interference or involvement by extra-regional powers, and 
it was to the elimination of such dangers that the [UN]Committee must address 
itself on a priority basis.'°* Some littoral countries contested the Indian 
perception about the priority to elimination of naval activities of extra-regional 
Powers. Pakistan was vocal among them. According to its representative, the 
issue, that was central to the concept of peace zone - the security of the littoral 
and hinterland states had two aspects. 
First, threats from within the region, which are rooted in the ambitions 
of powerful regional states; secondly, extra regional threats arising from 
foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean region, including the territories of 
the littoral and hinterland states."'^  
In Pakistan's perception, regional conflicts and tensions created 
conditions for the great Powers outside the Indian Ocean region to perpetuate 
their military presence in the area, that is to say, precisely the opposite of how 
India perceived. 
47 
The policy of Pakistan, Bangladesh and a few other countries was 
marked by what they called "Comprehensive approach" to the question of the 
peace zone in the Indian Ocean. The approach highlighted the following: (a) 
the military presence of the outside Powers, both ocean-based and land-based; 
(b) both extra-regional and regional threats to the security of the Indian Ocean 
States; (c) commitment towards renunciation of use of force and peaceful 
settlement of disputes; and (d) keeping the area free from nuclear weapons. 
India's interactions in relation to all the above elements had to contend 
with counter-points of view. The entire process, as a result, pointed to 
implications of an unexpected nature in regard to effective pursuit of India's 
objectives on the question. What is attempted here is an analysis of India's 
views on three specific issues that demonstrated the discord between India and 
a number of littoral states. 
The first issue concerns geographical delimitations of the Indian 
Ocean peace zone. A number of littoral and hinterland states supported wide 
zonal limits in the 1979 meeting of littoral and Hinterland states. In other words 
the zone should include not merely the water mass of the Ocean, its natural 
extensions, the islands thereon and its ocean floor but also neighbouring 
landmass. It may be observed that the 1979 limits went a step further than the 
1971 Declaration's identification of the limits which were confined just to the 
water mass of the Ocean. Pakistan vigorously supported the 1979 wider limits, 
because it would by implication encompass the fact of the land based Soviet 
military presence in the neighbouring Afghanistan - a hinterland State of the 
Indian Ocean. Whereas India favoured the more restricted limits (i.e the water 
mass only) as envisaged by the 1971 Declaration. No doubt, India conceded the 
negative consequences of the Afghanistan events on the efforts to establish a 
zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. That was perhaps not enough. A ready 
support to the 1979 geographical limits would have gone some way in serving 
two purposes. Firstly, it would have established a semblance of even 
handedness in India's positions with reference to perceived threats posed by the 
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American sea-based and the Soviet land-based military presence in the region. 
Secondly, it would have met some of the security concerns of the regional 
countries including those of Pakistan.'^'' Indeed, even the Soviet Union revised 
its view lately and dubbed India as a part of "small minority"."^ 
The Indo-Pakistan discord surfaced in a major way in the context of 
the second issue, which concerned certain positive and negative commitments 
to be undertaken by countries of the Indian Ocean region in the cause of 
enhancing their security. In essence, the issue revolved around the fears among 
smaller/weaker countries about the possible domination by stronger/larger 
countries (like India, Indonesia and Iran) in different sub regions of the ocean. 
The chief delegate of Sri Lanka spoke for many when he pointed out that 
driving out Satan by Beelzebub should not allow some other powers within the 
group of littoral and hinterland states to take the place of the super-powers. It 
was in this context the Pakistan sought to promote a code of conduct to be 
observed by littoral and hinterland states in the conduct of their foreign 
relations. Such a code would involve commitments (a) to abide by the 
principles of the UN Charter; (b) on maintenance of a reasonable ratio of naval 
and military forces; and (c) on incepting a regional machinery for settlement of 
problems between them. India, expectedly, did not wish to endorse any 
proposal for a code which would restrict its freedom of policy and action in the 
absence of a corresponding code of the great Powers in the global context. 
Accordingly, India registered suitable objections to safeguard its interests. That 
the code specially designed for the states of the Indian Ocean region alone as 
though their conduct was comparatively below the mark was urmecessary that a 
"reasonable ratio" of force was extremely difficult to determine objectivity. 
That the regional machinery for settlement of mutual problems would lead to 
regionalization of bilateral problems.''^ 
The third issue that divided India and some regional countries in the 
United Nations concerned preventing the Indian Ocean countries from 
acquisition, stockpiling, or deployment of nuclear weapons in the region. The 
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issue was viewed as an integral element of the 1971 Declaration. Sri Lanka's 
representative cautioned that the emergence of one nuclear power from among 
the regional countries was likely to prompt others to either go nuclear 
themselves or seek protective umbrella of nuclear-weapon powers outside the 
region - which would only be inimical to the objectives of the peace zone idea. 
For India, to accept binding obligations against production of nuclear 
weapons would be in conflict with its options - open policy, despite India's 
expressed disinclination in acquiring nuclear weapons. India therefore, sought 
to argue that deliberations on securing commitments from states which already 
renounced the nuclear weapon option would distract attention from the main 
objective: securing binding commitments from nuclear weapon powers.^ '^  
Of course, Sri Lanka agreed that commitments from the nuclear 
weapon Powers on non-deployment of nuclear weapons should precede - not 
follow - commitments from the Uttoral/hinter and countries. On the other hand, 
a different view was held by Pakistan. In view of the difficulties arising from 
the strategic doctrine of the superpowers, Pakistan suggested easier course first: 
renunciation of the option to produce/possess nuclear weapons by the littoral 
and hinterland States. 
Pakistan became more persistent with its view after the 1974 
underground nuclear explosion by India. Describing the explosion as a threat to 
all countries in the region, the representative of Pakistan warned that it was 
difficult to foresee a reduction, much less elimination, of the military presence 
of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean until the possibility of nuclear threat or 
aggression by a regional State had been ruled out."** 
Pakistan raised the issue of denuclearization or noimuclearisation in 
the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States (held in July 1979). The 
delegation of Pakistan sought inclusion of a sub-paragraph (Para 18(b)) in a 
part dealing with the aspect of prevention of nuclearisation in the draft - Final 
Document. It read: 
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Similarly, the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean should 
agree not to acquire or introduce nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean 
themselves or to allow their introduction by an external power. 
Vehemently opposing the new addition, India pointed out that while in 
sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 18 in the draft Final Document, the nuclear 
weapon States were called upon not to undertake certain activities in the Indian 
Ocean, while there was no prohibition on their activities in the other areas of 
the world. Moreover, there was no certainty that those states would agree to 
comply even with that limited appeal (as they were not participants in the 
Meeting).**^ 
In view of these differences, Kuwait suggested that the issue be 
referred to the Ad Hoc Committee for further consultations, as the Meeting had 
insufficient time. Pakistan, opposing Kuwait's suggestion, passed for a vote on 
the proposed sub-paragraph in case attempts at consensus failed. In that case, 
India threatened to seek vote on other paragraphs already approved by 
consensus. A face saving way out was ultimately worked out by an insertion in 
the footnote recording India's reservation on Pakistan sponsored sub-paragraph 
in the Final Document issued by the Meeting. 
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Chapter - II 
India's Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era 
India's response to the post-Cold War developments should be 
examined in the context of India's reaction to the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, It may be recalled that the Soviet Union was one of the major 
powers with which India had close economic cultural and technological 
relations. After the conclusion of Treaty of Peace & Friendship in 1971, 
India had signed several defence deals with the Soviet Union which had 
been the largest arms exporter to India. India recognized the break-away 
states like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan of the former Soviet 
Union without delay and tried to establish diplomatic contacts with Russia's 
political leadership. India tried to forge with them the same level of close 
relationship which it had with the Soviet Union. In this effort it tried to take 
into account the new developments in international scenario. This type of 
realism between India and erstwhile Soviet Union states was not out of the 
international context. 
The second issue which has lost its ideological appeal in the post 
Cold War era' was the end of bipolar system. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union US emerged as the sole global power, India's response to it, 
both at international and regional levels, became more important. India's 
reaction to Gulf crisis is the case where India took up non-political stand in 
the United Nations Security Council. It provided refueling facility to the US 
aircrafts in Mumbai. Even after the Gulf crisis, India's position on West 
Asia remained in favour of the US in the UN Security Council. India's drift 
in its US policy came when India agreed for joint naval exercise with it. 
This shift can be regarded as one where India was exposed to new 
technological development. The strains in Indo-US relations on the issues of 
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Super 301 and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are more out of policy 
disagreements rather than the simple issue of bilateralism. 
The disappearance of power blocs in international relations has 
created serious problems for bloc states. The importance of Pakistan in the 
US strategy in comparison to India can only be seen in this perspective. 
Now with the non-existence of blocs, the security needs of various states can 
be sole objective of foreign policy requirements. The growing distance 
between the United States and Pakistan on several issues has proved that a 
new thinking has come up, where old oppositions have changed and a new 
look has to be given to various foreign policy needs. This requires more 
mature action from foreign policy makers, both in India and US. 
India has shifted its stand on Israel during the last few years, having 
established full diplomatic relations with it. This change in India's attitude 
can be seen more in the light of the developments in West Asian politics. In 
this region that various Arab States have come to terms with Israel. India's 
own stand, therefore, has changed. This kind of maturity was needed in view 
of our foreign policy needs. India's growing relationship with Israel will 
give India a new opening and certain technological advantages in bilateral 
relations. Before establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, India had 
taken sufficient diplomatic care with result that her move has not been 
misunderstood by her Arab friends. Reviewing the bilateral relations in the 
new international setting is a welcome sign. 
India's own needs have to be viewed in the light of new changes 
and their implications in the regional context. India's own regional setting 
has to be defined in terms of realities in South Asia. This is the region which 
can be addressed as Indo-centric and India's size constantly keeps the 
pressure on other states of South Asia^.With changes taking place in 
international relations and external intervening factors in south Asia have 
been reduced, the Indian role assumes special significance. India's response 
to the new situation has to be directed at two clear cut areas, namely, the 
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economic, where the regional cooperation and facilities for mutual trade 
have been on the increase and, secondly, the political, where differences are 
more serious. It is in this field that India faces major challenges in South 
Asia. The tense relations with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal created 
complications. Indo-Pakistan relations in the post-Cold War period have 
remained tense and there is no letup in this tension. The ever growing anti-
India and terrorist activities by Pakistan in Kashmir have increased the 
tension between the two countries and reduced the chances of mutual co-
operation, 
India's attitude towards China during this phase has to be viewed 
with a certain amount of realism. China's own international problems and its 
own requirements in international relations have demanded new openings. 
The search for new role in Third World countries has yielded ample 
opportunities to China to develop cooperative relationship with India in 
particular. Keeping this in mind, India and China began a dialogue on border 
issue. Increased mutual trade and contacts between the two powerful Asian 
states have commenced. However, the outstanding issues between India and 
China cannot be resolved easily, as India suffers from certain limitations. 
Recently, economic grouping and economic diplomacy have been 
on the rise, India's contribution in these groupings is significant. With the 
liberalization of Indian economy, the thrust for investment and trade is 
natural. The emergence of South-South cooperation, integration of European 
economic system and creation of new economic blocs are recent 
development. The Indian response to these developments has been positive 
which is obvious from the fact that India tried to forge trade cooperation 
with South Asian countries on priority basis. India has intensified its effort 
at international level and helped the group of fifteen to develop. India has 
made efforts to forge bilateral trade relations with various countries, 
particularly with Russia, United Kingdom and Germany. 
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India's response to post-Cold War developments is more ad hoc and 
tentative. This kind of response is mainly because India is passing through a 
phase of international crisis, where leadership is weak and its ideological 
commitments are minimum. For a proper response to international changes, 
India's foreign policy debate will have to pass through the phase which 
needs more intensive debate and dialogue among the various sections who 
have been involved in the debate and decision-making at domestic level. 
The end of the Cold War has led to the end of threat to India from 
the Cold War context of US-Soviet power rivalry. As an Indian scholar has 
described it, now there is no longer any overarching schism or strong 
systemic dualism .The nature of new global context which has emerged has 
been subject to different interpretations. They are no longer in existence but 
the end of the primary axis of the Cold War struggle has affected the other 
axes. The important emerging problems for conflict-in post Cold War era 
includes : (1) social struggles against Third World dictatorship; (2) periodic 
struggles against bureaucracies in communist world; (3) struggle within 
advanced countries for greater social and economic egalitarianism; (4) 
struggles by Third World elites through their states for greater advantage 
vis-a-vis influential Third World countries, e.g. for the New International 
Economic Order; (5) intra-state conflicts within Third and Second Worlds 
but not entirely absent from the First World, e.g. ethnic conflicts within 
states and between states for ethnic and other reasons.'* 
So far as India is concerned it is faced by the fourth and fifth 
problems relevant for it. One wonders whether nonalignment can be useful 
strategy to deal with these problems. On the other hand, others have seen the 
post-Cold War period in a different way. A.K.M. Abdus Sabur notes that 
"the replacement of bipolar world with a unipolar one resulted in the 
establishment of unprecedented control over international system by the US 
and its allies". He adds, "the great powers virtually united in a single bloc 
have embarked upon a policy of curbing the power and influence of regional 
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powers".^ S.D. Muni feels that, "in the one super-power situation, the US 
naturally enjoys grater initiative, influence and strength to design the 
regional strategic orders in the Third World".^ This greater initiative, 
according to Muni, will create new imbalances and tensions. He also refers 
to ferment in Third World of the release of democratic and developmental 
assertion, ethnic assertion, religious fundamentalism and weakness of the 
Third World political and economic system as providing excuses for US 
intervention^ .This greater American preponderance may not be a curse to 
all regional powers and small powers. They may even benefit some regional 
powers within the framework of America's perceived long and short-term 
geo-strategic interests. However, those regional powers which may come 
into conflict with American goals may suffer also. 
During the Cold War, the American threat to India mainly occurred 
in the Cold War context, with US interested in military alliances against 
perceived communist menace, whereas India preferred the strategy of 
nonalignment. There were other issue areas of tension also, some partly 
resulting from America's alliance with Pakistan. 
In the post-Cold War period, threat from Cold War context has 
disappeared. Similarly, India does not face direct security threat from the 
US, but the continuing US-Pak connection poses a threat. Even in the Cold 
War days the United States was willing to concede the status of a regional 
power to India after the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan was exempted 
from India's sphere of influence. Even if we agree with Gowher Rizvi that 
either of the two super powers have any direct stake in India-Pakistan 
rivalry nor has South Asia ever been an area of high priority for them and 
that either interest arise not from their instinct interest in the subcontinent 
but primarily from their concern about each other during Cold War, the cold 
war and regional concerns messed up.* America as a global superpower even 
in the post-Cold War era has a number of interests - economic and political 
and if Pakistan is willing to act as a surrogate and if in the process Pakistan 
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is strengthened economically, politically and military, the US may pose a 
security risk even if indirectly. Pakistan may be used by the US to counter 
fundamentalism, to counter 'rogue' states like Iraq or for providing route to 
Central Asian republics of former Soviet Union which is a vital region of oil 
deposits. America may also directly come into conflict with India by 
encouraging the movement for complete independence of Kashmir. 
US's global interests may also come in conflict with India's interest. 
For example, America's interest in non-proliferation along with its desire to 
preserve its monopoly in weapons and weapon technology for military as 
well as economic reasons on the stated ground that a capable Third World 
military power could some day come into conflict with India's desire to 
become a self-reliant military power and possess latest military and civilian 
technology which she feels may award off threat from her neighbours. India 
feels that this power is no threat to the US. Therefore, India feels that either 
on moral or practical grounds the US is justified in putting pressure on India 
to sign the NPT or the CTBT or ask for fissile material cut off agreement. 
Further, in order to pursue her objectives the US may use 
sanctions.^ Muchkund Dubey, former Foreign Secretary of India, feels that 
as compared to 1968 the nuclear powers have much greater will power and 
determination. They have carefully worked out the strategy. According to 
Dubey, sanctions are likely to work because, "with the adoption of economic 
reform measures, India's stake in global economy has become higher 
because of the integrated nature of economy due to globalization process, 
sanctions now can be applied to a much wider spectrum of flows and 
transaction - including foreign direct investment, technology transfer debt 
rescheduling and support by "international' financial institutions".'° Thus 
India even in the post-Cold War period is looking for a strategy which can 
increase her capability in unipolar world with US as the only super power 
endowed with what the Chinese describe as 'comprehensive strength'. 
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India's Policy of Non-Alignment 
In the Cold War period, non-alignment had proved to be a useful 
policy to achieve foreign policy objectives both at the global as well as 
regional levels. Although the broad foreign policy objectives remain the 
same, the end of the Cold War has made nonalignment redundant at regional 
levels. The US and India, it was felt, had conflict of interests. India's ability 
to cope with the conflict in objectives was limited by the emergence of 
unipolar world. Apart from nonalignment, other options like closer ties with 
the US; formation of anti-US hegemony group of India, China, Iran; 
alliances with European countries; strengthening of economic capability and 
diversification of relations with the Third World countries; strengthening of 
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC); 
strengthening of the UN and cooperation with Russia were considered. It 
was felt that utility of some of the options was limited in the post-Cold War 
and unipolar environment. Some options may or may not emerge at all. 
Other options like strengthening of the SAARC and the UN diversification 
of relations were worth pursuing although they may not immediately raise 
India's capability to face the post-Cold War situation. Better Indo-US 
relations were desirable and could materialize to some extent but may not be 
in the way we wanted it, for in the post-Cold War unipolar world, the US 
has more options than India. This would lead to some de facto loss of 
independence for India. 
On the other hand, India has no choice it will have to strengthen 
itself economically for creating a long-term impact on world politics as well 
as strengthen itself militarily. It will have to develop some kind of 
deterrence against the US also. There is also no justification for docile 
Indian diplomacy. Thus, if India values independence in foreign affairs, the 
people will have to make sacrifices. India's decision to remain independent 
or get submerged into world structures by the US will also be affected by 
"domestic struggle by contending forces to shape and control the Indian 
state"." 
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A renowned scholars of India's strategy of nonalignment, A.P. 
Rana, wrote in 1991: "With the demise of the Cold War, India has in effect 
lost her foreign policy strategy".'^ On the other hand, some Indian scholars 
still regard the policy of nonalignment as useful for India even 'in the post-
Cold War period. For example, one Indian scholar, Amitabh Matto, writes 
"NAM is needed not just to secure a niche for the developing world in the 
international system but more essentially to articulate an alternative view in 
international relations, to move beyond the abject realism of the Westphalia 
systeni and move towards an international society in which ideas matter as 
much as power". He adds: "Only the NAM has the broad-based membership 
and legitimacy to raise these questions" and create a groundswell that could 
eventually be the first steps towards creating such an international 
society".'^ 
However, as Rana rightly says, foreign policy objectives should not 
be confused with foreign policy. He adds: "Nonalignment as a foreign 
policy and diplomatic instrumentality with a cutting edge in foreign affairs 
has lapsed into history with the Cold War And this is applicable to 
cognate capabilities as well as normative one".^ "* However, India also 
actively participated in the twelve Summit of the Movement of Non-
alignment countries in Durban in September, 2005. India as a founder 
member of NAM stressed on the continued commitment of NAM to its basic 
principles which remained valid in the post-Cold War era. India's vital 
concerns at the summit included disarmament and security in the context of 
nuclear tests in South Asia, shaping the global economic agenda and 
reinforcing the international community's condemnation of terrorism.'^ 
The end of Cold War, the resulting lack of US interest in preventing 
close Indo-Soviet ties, lack of Russian interest in special ties with India and 
her general pro-US, pro-West tilt removed a major obstacle in the way of 
improvement of Indo-US relations. 
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Not only that, an expectation was raised that in the post-Cold War 
period that the US would tilt towards India rather than towards Pakistan. 
The expectation was based on three assumptions: 
1. In the absence of the Cold War, Pakistan's value as an ally decreased 
but India's importance increased due to a number of other factors. 
2. There was a feeling among some Americans as well as Indians that, in 
the post-Cold War period, containment of Islamic fundamentalism 
would replace containment of communism as the chief objective of 
American foreign policy. 
Huntington's theory of "clash of civilizations" was an 
illustration of this type of thinking. Therefore, Pakistan, being a 
theocratic state, could not be regarded as a dependable ally by the US 
in this clash. Some felt that there might be a convergence of US-
Indian interest in relation to this objective. 
3. New economic policy initiated by Narsimha Rao-Manmohan Singh 
for trade and investment for the US industrial and financial interests. 
The US too was looking for markets due to her compulsions and she 
considered India as one of the ten emerging markets. It was also 
expected that in general the US was to find three fourth of her 
markets in developing countries. 
4. Others have made a plea to the US for giving more importance to 
India on the following grounds,^ ^ 
(i) An increasing number of Indians in important occupations 
should persuade the US, a democratic nation and a nation of 
immigrants, to care for India. 
(ii) The US interest in the ideology of democracy, pluralism and 
secularism in the post-Cold war period would become real 
rather than rhetorical. India not only believes in these 
ideologies but has also put them into practice. 
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(iii) India's interest in tiie Persian Gulf, southern tier of the Soviet 
Union, China and Southeast and the US concerns often develop 
and infrequently parallel US interests. Of course, this is a 
doubtful proposition. 
(iv) India and the US share a strong interest in cooperating with 
each other to reduce drug related activities. 
(v) In a world of trading blocs, it was useful for the US to have 
India well integrated with American trading bloc. 
(vi) The US and India could work together to delegitimise and 
perhaps eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. 
(vii) The US could act as a facilitator, and encourage India, Pakistan 
and China to develop confidence-building measures. 
The arguments made above or expectations about better Indo-US 
relations are based on convergence of the Indo-US objectives. It also 
assumes that the stated objectives, but an analysis of official statements of 
the US objectives is also necessary. The following objectives are indicated 
on the basis of statements of President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State 
Christopher: 
First, the US has a sense of assertive self-confidence that it has 
become the foremost political and military power which will be safeguarded 
by political means where possible and by force, where necessary. 
Second, the US wishes to restructure international arrangements; 
which will ensure military superiority of the US, either unilaterally or in 
collaboration with its allies; political-strategic-economic arrangements 
which will provide continuous access to natural resources and raw materials; 
is international economic atmosphere in which the US access to markets 
maximized and secured; long term military superiority and economic 
competitiveness for the US, which will require creation of restrictive 
68 
regimes on military exports, transfer of technology and creation of 
sophisticated tariff and non-tariff barriers to protect the US interests; leading 
role in international stability and security in preventing conflicting situation 
to achieve the aforesaid objectives; restructuring the UN in such a way that 
the majority of members support US objectives. Although some of these 
objectives are occasionally described in rhetorical terms of stability, 
democracy, human rights etc. 
The US Defence Planning Guide for post-Cold War era prepared in 
1992, which discusses the US objectives in South Asia, talks of the 
'discouraging Indian hegemonic aspirations over other states in South Asia 
and on the Indian Ocean'. A constructive US-Pak relationship was 
considered a key stone for achieving stability in South Asia. The Hank 
Brown amendment can be seen as part of this process rather than as an 
attempt to rectily any injustice done to Pakistan. New rationale for better 
relations with Pakistan is always found out. Sometimes, it is the use of 
Pakistan as a moderate Islamic state against fundamentalists or the use of 
Pakistan for safe and dependable trade route to Central Asian Oilfields. The 
Government of Pakistan has willingly obliged the US government in this 
regard till now, may be for its own reasons. Pakistan has obliged the US in 
pursuit of its global objectives by getting a price at the regional level. 
As compared to this, India differed from the US in terms of global 
objectives not only in the Cold War period but in the post-Cold War period 
also. India's views of non-proliferation, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
missile development and deployment, transfer of technology etc. differ 
substantially from the views of the US government when one goes into 
details. Mitchell Reiss describes India as a 'revisionist power'. 
The US ambition to become a dominant world power and India's 
desire to be a revisionist power has potentialities for conflict. There is a 
dilemma for Indians here. In relation to the US which has what the Chinese 
describe as 'comprehensive national strength' there is India which as Rana 
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describes is "more vulnerably exposed to environment around her than at 
any time in the post-independence history".*^ Even if there is 
interdependence between the two, it is asymmetrical. Various suggestions 
have been made: 
(i) A suggestion is made that India can act as a proxy to the US at least 
in relation to those objectives there is a convergence of interests, e.g. 
maintaining stability in South Asia. 
However, natural convergence is one thing, co-option by the 
US for which India is not enthusiastic would t>e another thing. For 
India, with a strong tradition of national pride, well-developed 
sensitivities to unequal treatment with deep roots that go back to its 
colonial experience and recent historical commitment to autarky, it 
would be difficult. 
(ii) Some Russians have stated saying in relation to the US that if there is 
no real partnership in objectives, it is better to stand alone; India may 
consider this advice. 
(iii) Then there will be other US objectives the pursuit of which may harm 
Indian interests, either directly or indirectly as in the case of the Hank 
Brown amendment. 
Others have suggested that economic opportunities given by India 
to the US should be linked to US arms transfer to Pakistan. The suggestion 
assumes that the US opportunities in India are of advantage to the US only. 
It also assumes that the US interest in Pakistan is of secondary importance 
(in spite of various ways in which Pakistan can perform useful functions for 
the US) as compared to the US interest in Indian markets. Present evidence 
indicates that the US interest in Indian markets may not be paramount 
importance. 
Still others have suggested further strengthening of economic 
relations between India and the US. Another suggestion made was India 
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should have withdrawn her ambassador from the US in the wake of the 
Hank Brown amendment. The treatment suggested is similar to the one 
adopted by China in relation to the US because of Taiwanese president's 
visit to the US. Even if this suggestion is consistent with self-respect of 
India and for more dignified Indo-US relations in future, one doubts the 
capacity of the present Government of India to implement it. As a former 
foreign secretary of India, Muckund Dubey, points out in relation to the 
Indo-US nuclear relations: 
"making clear-cut choices on crucial issues goes against the basic 
style of functioning and decision-making by this Government. The pattern of 
behaviour of this Government, describe from the action taken so far by it in 
the nuclear field, reveals that it indulge in platitudes regarding adhering to 
India's traditional policies and in occasional bravado but ultimately 
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succumbs to outside powers under pressure". It is against the background 
of these condition that India's role in the UN in post-Cold War era is to be 
examined. 
India's Role in the Peace-Keeping Operations of the United Nations: 
India's glorious contribution to the Untied Nations peace-keeping 
operations since independence is a saga of dedication and commitment to 
the objectives of the United Nations Charter. This has been reflected 
not in terms of rhetoric and symbolism, but in physically demonstrated 
participation, even to the extent of sustaining casualties to personnel, and 
yet staying with the course. This contribution has been acknowledged by the 
members of the international community, successive Secretary General of 
the United Nations Secretariat, and by fellow peacekeepers from other 
countries of the world. 
As we enter the twenty first century, there are many in India and 
abroad in the international community, who perceive for India a significant 
role in world affairs: which would mean playing a role in the various organs 
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of the United Nations. If we are to fulfill such a role with any degree of 
credibility, it is inventable that India accept its share of the responsibilities 
that go with such a role. 
Given its established professionalism, expertise and competence in 
the field of United Nations peace-keeping, India has a major contribution to 
make, particularly in the context of the fact that notwithstanding the 
criticism of some recent United Nations peace-keeping missions, as and 
when the next crisis arises, the international community, as well as the 
belligerents, will inevitably turn to the world body for assistance in 
resolving it. 
UN peace-keeping is an innovation brought out by the operational 
exigencies of the UN. There is no legal, structure or constitutional basis for 
such activities as UN Charter has no provision for it. Moreover, it is neither 
a purely exercise in pacific settlement of disputes nor completely a 
collective coercive measure rather a unique activity combining some 
features of the both. 
Finally, it is not only a distinct but also a dynamic concept changing 
according to the changed context of global milieu and requisite role of UN 
in that environment. India, which is a primary member of the UN even when 
it was not independent, had always taken keen interest in all the activities of 
the UN; hence its role in this unique activity is inevitable. At present when 
India is making tremendous efforts to play a more important role in the UN, 
through the acquisition of a permanent seat in the Security Council, it 
becomes pertinent to analyse its contribution towards all the UN activities in 
general and its role in peace-keeping in particular. However, during the 
post-Cold War era this concept underwent both "quantitative" and 
"qualitative" change. In the former context, its number has increased 
significantly from 13 operations from 1948-87 to 22 operations during 1988-
1997. 
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Before analyzing India's role, it is pertinent to examine why India is 
actively engaged in the UN peace-keeping activities.'^ First of all, India's 
foreign policy goals require a world order-based on peace and tranquility. 
Because its programme of nation's defence and development could work 
smoothly only in a world order devoid of war. 
Secondly, this concept was devised to do away with Great Powers' 
intervention in disputes of smaller states which serves the goals of India's 
policy of nonalignment. Through this approach India wanted to follow an 
independent foreign policy by keeping away from military blocs. 
Thirdly, since its inception India was in favour of settling of 
disputes through amicable means by using Chapter VI of the UN Charter 
rather than Chapter VII of the Charter. It never liked the idea of using force 
by the UN. Nor did it want to create any kind of imbalance between the 
power and positions of General Assembly and Security Council as it evident 
from its absence on the voting for 'Uniting for Peace Resolution' of 1950. 
Fourth, even before its independence India was always in favour of 
the right of self-determination to the states. Hence, it could not approve of 
any coercive or interventionalist activities taken without the approval of the 
concerned states or being forced upon it under Chapter VII. 
Finally, India has abiding faith in the provisions enshrined in the 
UN Charter. Consequently, it had deep faith in the provisions of Article 1 of 
the UN Charter which specifies the purpose of UN will be: to maintain 
peace and security, and to that end: take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful 
means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might 
lead to a breach of the peace. 
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Thus, the objectives of UN peace-keeping are common with the 
foreign policy goals enshrined by India. Besides, they cherish the long 
tradition and contemporary outlook of India towards international relations. 
Hence, India was keenly associated with such activities of UN since its 
inception. 
Significant role played by India in the UN peace-keeping operations 
is evident from its six fold activities. 
Firstly, India, despite its limitations in terms of militarj' and 
financial fields, took part in maximum number of UN peace-keeping 
operations. Though its participation in all the activities may not always be in 
large numbers, yet its commitments and sense of concerns have always been 
very right. Its involvement and conviction towards these activities can be 
gauged from the fact that even while it was engaged in war with its 
neighbours (1962 and 1965), it supplied troops for such UN activities. By 
going through the detail profile of its contributions from 1947 to 1955, 
during the 23 UN operations, a clear picture of India's participation could be 
ascertained. 
Secondly, India did not only send some soldiers to meet out the UN 
requirements, but also played a key role in many operations. Not only did its 
defence forces perform a collective role in a well disciplined and objective 
manner, but it also provide leadership to some important missions, such as 
Sinai (1956-57), Yemen (1963), Cyprus (1964), Namibia (1989), etc. where 
it provided force commanders. Besides, its officers served as member of 
supervisory commissions, military adviser to Secretary General and 
observers in number of UN activities. More important of them all, Lt. 
General Satish Nambiar was given the full responsibility to lead the UN 
peace-keeping operation in former Yugoslavia (1992). 
Thirdly, the list of important defence and civilian personalities, 
associated with the UN peace-keeping activities, from India, is quite long. 
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To name all of them is not feasile. However, some of the important persons 
who served in the UN peace-keeping along with their assignment were. 
Fourthly, India has not only been associated with such activities in 
implementing the UN directives, but has also helped the global organization 
in developing and conceptualizing the framework of UN peace-keeping. 
Though its active participation in the debates it tried its best to highlight the 
anomalies associated with this concept. Simultaneously, at present it is 
making all out efforts to finalise the norms of this framework in the changed 
context of global order. India's organization of an international seminar in 
January, 1996, which was attended by of Kofi Annan (the then UN under 
Secretary General and present Secretary General), in this context is proof of 
its active concern for UN peace-keeping. 
Fifthly, India has tried to setup a role-model through its activities 
associated with these operation. Though their exemplary courage 88 Indian 
personnel have lost their lives in course of these operations. Among them 
were three doctors who sacrificed their lives while providing medical care in 
Somalia. This led to an unprecedented hue and cry by the opposition 
parties in Parliament. But the then government did not withdraw its 
commitment in between. Besides, peace-keeping is costing India very 
heavily. Approximately, India is spending US $ 16 million per year on such 
activities. Simultaneously, it has increased the UN budget which ultimately 
has hiked India's contribution to UN. But despite its poor economic 
conditions India has cleared all its dues to the UN pool in contrast to the 
major powers that have yet to pay huge share of their contribution towards 
this end.^' 
Finally, not only the past and present role of India was very 
significant, but it is even concerned about the future responsibilities in this 
context. Visualizing the growing number of peace-keeping operations there 
is always a great need of troops for that purpose. In this regard, due to 
various hazards in such missions, numbers of countries contributing troops 
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have deceased. But India, keeping its long tradition and commitment to 
global peace and tranquility, took an important decision in 1995 to commit a 
Brigade Group to the UN Standby Force arrangement so that peace-
operations would not by delayed due to lack of forces at UN command. This 
activity of India is likely to strengthen UN role of peace-keeping in future. 
India's peace-keeping role is paradoxical; it is a regional belligerent 
but also a global peacekeeper. For more than 50 years of the United Nations 
has been mediating between the two belligerents, India and Pakistan, over 
the dispute of Kashmir. The Indo-Pakistan quarrels over Kashmir continue 
to haunt the South Asian security environment. South Asia was also one of 
the first region where the UN experimented with peace-keeping by 
deploying observers to monitor the cease-fire agreement between India and 
Pakistan in 1948. However, the UN is nowhere near to resolving the 
Kashmir issue, which has only become more complex with growing cross-
border terrorist activities and a serious nuclear race between India and 
Pakistan. The support of the two nations for the UN presence in Kashmir 
differs fundamentally. The underlying disagreements between the two 
countries concern the mandate and functions of the UN Military Observer 
Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Pakistan strongly views the 
conduct of the UN plebiscite as the road to peace in Kashmir, but India no 
longer supports nor recognizes the presence of the UNMOGIP. New Delhi 
consents to that presence only because the UN wants it.^ ^ India is strongly 
opposed to third party mediation of the Kashmir dispute, unlike Pakistan, 
which has sought to internationalise the issue. This is contrast of India's 
more than eager support for UN third party mediation or peace-keeping 
operations in external conflict. 
Among the many Third World peace-keepers, India has been 
singled out as having one of the longest and most consistent records of 
participation in UN peace-keeping operations.^^ India's participation in 
external peace operations began in the late 1940s when New Delhi made 
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representation in the first UN observer mission to Palestine. Following this, 
Indian soldiers became part of the first UN peace-keeping force deployed in 
the Gaza in 1956, Since then India has been consistently participating in and 
contributing troops to UN peace missions worldwide. As of December 2005, 
the country participated in 41 UN peace missions with a record of at least 
50,000 Indian soldiers having donned the blue helmet in pursuit of global 
peace and security.^ '* 
In addition to its participation in UN peace missions, India has also 
demonstrated a capacity to launch its peace-keeping operation. This can be 
seen in the late 1980s when the Indian peace-keeping Force was created and 
deployed in Sri Lanka to manage the ethnic conflict and to contain the 
aggression and violence of Tamil Tigers who had been fighting for a 
separate state in the North.^ ^ However, India's experience in Sri Lanka was 
perceived more as an intervention reflecting departure from the traditional 
parameters of peace-keeping, and it solved nothing. 
Notwithstanding this, India has continued to participate in active 
representation in extra-regional peace operations under the aegis of the UN 
flag. Now Delhi has adopted a pro-active approach to the UN peace-keeping 
as parts of its new foreign policy orientations in the post-Cold War era. The 
phrase 'proactive' commitment is used to demonstrate India's unreserved 
willingness to respond to the growing demands and challenges of UN peace-
keeping in the post-Cold War era. While this is reflected in its consistency 
and size of participation, India's pro-active commitment can be seen in its 
capacity to make large and simultaneous troop commitments in more 
operations than in the past. Along with this, India's willingness to take risks 
and sustain its commitment in hazardous operations has demonstrated its 
reliability as peace-keepers. 
However, it is argued that India is politically motivated to 
participate in UN peace-keeping operations. The key source of its 
motivation is related to its ambitions for 'great power recognitionL.in a ,,y 
highly competitive and unpredictable global system. •  r -:----" 
India's commitment to UN peace-keeping operations has moved to 
a new level in the post-Cold War era. In 1992, the Narsimha Rao regime re-
affirmed India's commitment to UN peace-keeping operations by asserting 
that it 'will pro-actively support UN peace-ventures in the future'. In 1997, 
in his address to the UN General Assembly, former Prime Minister I.K. 
Gujral, said that 'as a country which places very great store on the UN's 
capacity to contribute to international peace and security [and peace-keeping 
activities]... India has vital interests in the UN'.^^ 
India's new level of commitment is reflected in its actual 
participation in post-Cold War UN peace-keeping operations. Its level of 
participation has increased significantly in line with the overall growth in 
the number of peace operations in the post-Cold War era. India has 
participated in 23 peace mission in about 15 different locations around the 
globe. India's highest level of participation has been in the early 1990s. In 
fact, the period 1990-94 has been one of the most active and assertive eras 
of UN peace-keeping in the post-Cold War era. India participated in 
different capacities in 12 out of the 18 new UN peace missions established 
during that time. Of the 18 new missions, seven were UN peace-keeping 
operations, and India made large troops-commitments in five of them 
(compared with the two during the Cold War). Some of the UN peace-
keeping operations that it participated in the early 1990s have been in 
Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Mozambique. 
Since the mid-1990s, India has also participated in a number of UN 
peace-keeping operations; namely in Angola, Bosnia - Herzegovina and 
Sierra Leone. India has also made high level troops contributions in some 
old peace-keeping operations that have been functioning since their launch 
during the Cold War. This can be seen in 1999 when deployed a large Indian 
infantry battalion as part of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (first 
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established in 1978). In addition, India has participated in recent peace-
keeping operations launched in some of the old troubled spots like the 
Congo, where it has contributed military observer and troops of the UN 
Organisation Mission in the Congo, which has been established to 
implement the Lusaka agreement signed in July 1999. 
However, there is an ongoing debate among some scholars about 
India's pro-active participation in post-cold War UN peace missions. 
According to the Indian defense analyst Srivastava, India must adopt a well 
defined policy for involving itself (in UN peace-keeping) keeping in mind of 
internal, external, and global defence tasks^ .^ It is argued, that although 
India, like the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, should 
participate in UN mission abroad where they serve its national interest, it is 
important for it to exercise some reservations in terms of over-stretching its 
military defense and reassessing its priorities and needs at home vis-^-vis its 
global ambitions.'"' 
On the contrary, former military leaders like Indar Jit Rikhye think 
that India should move away from its 'inward approach' and see itself as 
part of the greater international effort and participation. He argues that 
India has the capacity to handle both its internal matters and to pursue its 
external goals at the same time. In fact, India has demonstrated this capacity 
when, despite its military confrontations with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 
1965, it maintained its troops commitment to the missions in the Sinai and 
the Congo. Moreover, India has the capability and capacity to contribute 
because it has the third largest military in the world, and these forces should 
be put to good use for maintaining international peace and security. 
Therefore, a pro-active role is supported, and perhaps a further increase in 
its level of participation in UN peace-keeping operations. 
One of the major strength of India's participation in UN peace-
keeping operation has been its ability to provide manpower support. India 
has on several occasions outnumbered the troop contribution of some of the 
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major powers and even other traditional peace-keepers. For example, in 
1994, India emerged as the third largest troop contributor in the world. Its 
share represented 7.93% of the 75,000 troops deployed during that year.^ ^ 
This was much higher than some of the major powers such as United States 
(1.34%), the United Kingdom (5.11%) Russia (2.02%), and also other G-7 
countries, for instance, Canada (3.5%) and Italy (1.12%)." In 1998, the total 
number of UN troops was 14,347. Of this, India's share amounted to 6.41%. 
This was bigger than the contribution of some of the old peace-keepers like 
Canada (2.07%), and the Scandinavian countries, namely Norway (1.07%), 
Sweden (1.46%) and Finland (5.49%), as well as The Netherlands 
(1.18%).^" 
India has also made large troop-commitment to recent peace-
keeping operations. For example, India's participation in Sierra Leone in 
1999 was one of the biggest in terms of troop size and reinforces the 
consistency in its willingness to support peace-keeping operations. In fact, 
the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) has been one of 
the largest peace-keeping operations undertaken by India in the late 1990s. 
Of the 13 participating states that have been providing a total of 13,000 
military troops, the Indian contingent (3151) in Sierra Leone was the second 
largest following Nigeria (3226). Hence, as of October 2000, India was 
ranked as the second largest troop contributor to UN peace missions' 
worldwide. 
Second, in most cases, India has had no reservations as to where it 
deployed its troops under the auspices of the UN, New Delhi, to some 
extent, has developed a policy to go where the UN flag goes. Former Indian 
Prime Minister Narsimha Rao supported the idea of participating in distant 
locations by stating that 'the international peace-keeping forces should be 
selected from regions and areas far removed from where they are to be sent 
for undertaking credible operations'.^^ India has emerged in various UN 
peace-keeping missions in 15 locations world wide. It has provided military 
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observers in Iraq/Kuwait (1991), El Salvador (1991), in the second mission 
in Angola (1991), Liberia (1993), And the Congo (1994). It has also made 
large troop-commitments to peace-keeping operations in Cambodia (1992), 
Mozambique (1992), Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), to the third mission in 
Angola (1995), Lebanon (1998) and Sierra Leone (1998). This also 
represents a change from its past involvement, which has heavily 
concentrated in the Middle East. The change has in fact taken place in line 
with the overall geographical expansion of UN peace mission in the post-
Cold War era. 
However, India has also expressed reservations against some 
specific peace missions and has, consequently, decline to provide support. 
For example in 1992, India refused to be part of the UN Protection Force in 
former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR). A primary reason for this was the heavy 
political involvement of the major powers and European states and also 
external player like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 
J.N.Dixit, India's former foreign Secretary, asserted that, 'in our judgement, 
first of all European powers had a pernicious finger in the Yugoslav pie. To 
go and command a force which would have been subject to contradictory 
political influence, European politics and the involvement of NATO... we 
thought it was good for India'. Moreover, India has always worked on the 
premise that it will assign its military for external use provided it functions 
under the auspices of the UN. This explains why India was hesitant to 
participate as part of UNROFOR. Nevertheless, India sent its top-ranking 
officer, Lieut Gen. Satish Nambiar to head the mission as the force 
commander of UNROFOR. 
Another example of India's reservations is its initial hesitation to 
participate in the UN operation in Somalia. India was not part of the first 
phase of the operation led by the United States in 1992 to enforce peace with 
a view to creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian 
relief aid. New Delhi declined to deploy ground troops as part of this US led 
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Unified International Task Force (UNITAF) for two reasons. First, India 
was critical of the initial deployment of UNITAF because it had not met the 
condition of 'request and consent^ ^ by the host government. Second, India 
'does not subscribe to the "Lead Nation" concept'. Although, New Delhi 
decline to contribute troops, its participation came in other form India 
contributed a naval task force, under the command of Commodore Sampat 
pillai. The force comprised of three Indian Naval Ships (INS), namely INS 
Deepak, Kuthar and Cheetah to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance.''^ However, India is willing to assist in the settlement of global 
conflicts, at the same time it aims to steer a middle path as part of its non-
alignment. 
India's decision to contribute ground troops came about in 1993, 
following the take over of UNITAF by the UN, which also marks the second 
phase of the operation. The decision to deploy Indian ground troops came 
after much deliberation and debate based on a ground survey and study by 
two Indian delegates who visited Somalia early in 1993. The team 
constituted representatives, one each from the Ministry of Defense and the 
Foreign Affairs, and an ex-ambassador, who headed the mission. Following 
this visit, the Indian government was convinced that it was not possible to 
seek the consent of the host-state since there was no functioning government 
in Somalia. Only then did New Delhi consented to contribute ground troops, 
butaspartofUNSOMII. 
A recent example of India's reservations on peace-keeping relates to 
the UN peace mission in East Timor. In spite of UN request India declined 
to participate as part of the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor.'*^ This is 
mainly due to its reluctance to support peace mission designed to serve the 
cause of ethnic separatism, which is also an issue of tension between India 
and Pakistan in Kashmir and domestically, within Indian states like Punjab 
and Assam. Although these example show that India, to some extent, 
maintain some kind of selectivity in its participation but, this is not reduced 
to its over all level of capacity in post-Cold War UN peace missions. 
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Third, India has demonstrated the capacity to make multiple troop-
commitments at any one time. Given the fact that the UN launches peace 
mission as and when the need arises, there has been an increasing overlap of 
demands for ground forces. India has made simultaneous troop 
commitments in various UN peace-keeping operations. For example, during 
the period 1992-94, India made large troop commitments in Cambodia 
(1373), Mozambique (940), Somalia (5000) and Rwanda (800). 
Fourth, India has also been catering to the growing demand for new 
types of ground personnel to carryout many of the civilian-based peace-
keeping functions and duties. New Delhi- has responded to this by 
incorporating civilian elements in its troop commitments. For example in 
Cambodia in 1992, India was one of the 80 peace-keeping countries that 
contributed a total of 21,000 troops to execute new peace-keeping roles. It 
contributed two infantry battalions (1 Assam and 4 JAK Rifles), 1373 
troops, a field ambulance unit and military observers. In addition, India also 
contributed civilian personnel such as electoral supervisors, police monitors 
and civilian staff officers. India also contributed de-mining training units to 
provide instructions to other national contingents. India's capacity to 
contribute large troops commitments and a variety of manpower support 
shows its willingness to respond actively to the new demands of UN peace-
keeping in the post-Cold War era. 
There is no point in making large and varied troop commitments 
without being a 'reliable' ground force. Reliable troop-contributors in terms 
of their willingness to take risks and capacity to sustain their commitment in 
dangerous operations over prolonged periods are most needed in managing 
intrastate peace-keeping operations of the post-Cold War era. In March 
2000, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan convened an expert panel, headed 
by Ladkhar Brahimi, a former Algerian Foreign Minister, to conduct a new 
major study on peace-keeping. One of the recommendations of the Brahimi 
report was that peace-keepers in post-Cold War peace operations must be 
willing to take risks and have 'staying power'.'" 
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India has demonstrated its 'staying power' in many of the peace 
missions launched during the Cold War. In Sinai, India deployed its troops 
for 11 years from 1956. Nevertheless, what makes India's present 
contribution significant is its 'staying power' in the present - day operational 
environment that are harsh, dangerous and risky. In traditional peace-
keeping operations, peacekeepers were deployed in a relatively calm and 
predictable environment. Today, we fmd peacekeepers being deployed 
thinly across an entire territory where there are no clear cease-fire lines and 
no peace to 'keep'. In such environments, peacekeepers can be exposed to 
high level of danger and even possible attack from heavily armed and un-
identified belligerents. In spite of these risks, India has maintained its 
commitment until the end. In Somalia, for example, India demonstrated it 
staying power and the capacity to sustain its commitment in harsh and 
heavily militarized operational environments. 
The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) can be regarded as one 
of the most dangerous and risky operations undertaken in the post-Cold War 
era. In fact, some national contingents, particularly the US and Pakistani 
contingents became targets of General Aideed and his warring factions. The 
incident of 5 June and 3 October 1993 resulted in the loss of 24 Pakistani 
lives and 18 American lives in Central Mogadishu. India suffered severe 
setbacks in Somalia. Within four months of deployment, in April 1993, 
India had already suffered seven casualties. Ten days later on 1 September, 
three Indian doctors were also killed in a rifle grenade explosion in Baidoa. 
The loss of 10 Indian Jawans in Baidoa led to a great uproar in the Indian 
Parliament. The Opposition in the Rajya Sabha tabled a motion for the 
immediate withdrawal of Indian troops from the UN peace-keeping force in 
Somalia.'*^ 
The Indian government, however, continued its active involvement 
in Somalia based on the premise that it was their onus to fulfill their 
responsibility to the international community at large. As expressed in the 
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Tribune, 'the killing of the soldiers should not provoke the Indian peace-
keepers to follow the US example. The virtue of patience in such difficult 
situations cannot be over-emphasized'."*^ It is also noted that the cry of 
'American life in danger' is heard once too often, which only makes the 
peace-keepers to become more vulnerable when operating in such volatile 
operational theatres. 
In The Hindu, it was pointed out 'what contributed anarchy to the 
operation [in Somalia] was the American over-reaction to events on the 
ground. In contrast, Third World soldiers through their low profile are 
proving successful in helping to bring life back in Somalia.'*'* The Indian 
military contingent was quite successful in controlling the level of violence 
in the area of its deployment; that is, in Baidoa (South of Mogadishu). 
Instead of reacting immediately in the event of an attack, a major tactic used 
by the Indian forces was a 'wait and watch' approach. In other words, the 
Indian officers did not return fire once the first shot was heard from the 
factions. The Indian troops, instead of exchanging fire, took time to study 
the situation and to identify the parties that started the shooting. As 
Brigadier Bhagat asserted [the Indian soldiers in Somalia] have come to 
assist them, not to suppress them further. 
Despite all dangers, India was one of the few troop-contributing 
nations to have retained its original strength in the Somalia operation. The 
deteriorating security situation in Somalia led to several withdrawals by 
many troops-contributing states. In the course of 1993, Belgium (950 
troops), France (1100 troops), Sweden (150 medical officers) and the United 
States (1400 military logistics personnel and 1350 troops) decided to leave 
Somalia. This infact brought the UNOSOM II force level down to 22,000. In 
March 1994, Italy, Germany, Turkey, Norway, Greece, Kuwait, Morocco, 
Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Arab 
Emirates also withdrew their contingents. Due to the massive withdrawals, 
the Security Council agreed to reduce the UNOSOM II force level to 15,000 
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before the operation was to be closed down in November 1994. India, along 
with Egypt, Zimbabwe, Malaysia and Nigeria, stayed on until the mission 
was drawn to a close. 
On the contrary, India's early withdrawal from Sierra Leone (2000) 
reflects in its lack of 'staying power' after all. Its decision to withdraw came 
at a time when the violence in Sierra Leone was becoming rampant. At one 
point UNAMSIL has coming under intense threat as the rebel groups 
captured UN peace-keepers and held them hostage. Subsequently, the UN 
was mobilizing greater support from member states to attempt to rescue the 
hostages and contain the increasing violent activities. India's decision to 
suddenly withdraw the UNAMSIL might lead to suggestions that it was 
probably taking a precautionary measure to avoid the risk of its troops being 
captured by Foday Sankoh's rebels. However, India's withdrawal from 
Sierra Leone has been driven primarily by political factors rather than the 
unwillingness to take risks in the operation. 
International image could be a primary source of motivation for 
India's active participation in UN peace-keeping operations. It is argued that 
India's participation in Sierra Leone in 1999, for example, was mainly 
motivated by the desire to reinforce its global image and 'great' power 
identity.'*^ India's desire for global recognition and 'great power' status in 
world affairs is no secret. Indian leaders from the outset have always sought 
'to corner a leading role for India in the international arena'.''^ Hedley Bull 
argues that one basic criterion that defines 'great powers' is to be recognized 
by others as having certain 'special rights and duties' in the international 
system.'*^ In other words, 'great power, recognition is linked to the 
fulfillment of global responsibility such as maintenance of international 
peace and security. Thus, participation in UN peace-keeping operations 
helps to shape its image positively by demonstrating India's 'good 
citizenship' and its commitment to global responsibilities. 
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While international image-building could have motivated India's 
new level of commitment to post-Cold War UN peace-keeping operations, 
India is also sensitive to the kind of image that is projected through its 
participation in UN peace operations. Being one of the traditional peace-
keepers, India is keen not only to maintain its long-standing record of 
participation, but also lead peace operations. Although such appointments 
may be a rare opportunity, the idea of leading peace operations is closely 
linked to strengthening global image. Hence, appointments in peace mission 
matter greatly for India. For example, in Sierra Leone (2000) India had 
announced its decision to withdraw from the UN peace-keeping operation. 
This decision came after the Nigerian military's demands to dismiss the 
mission's Force Commander, India's General Jatelay. The bickering 
between Gen. Jatelay and his Nigerian deputy General Mohammed Garba, 
caused a long-standing stalemate and personal rivalry. It began following 
the major crisis in May 2000, when Foday Sankoh's warring faction, the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), captured and took 500 UN peace-
keepers hostage. Nigeria blamed India's incompetence for the debacle. 
India's General Jetlay, who had unflattering opinions about Nigerian high 
command, accused his deputy of having secret connections with the RUF. 
He sent a secret memorandum allegedly 'accusing Nigeria of deliberately 
seeking to sabotage the peace mission and colluding with rebels in illegal 
diamond deals'.''^ The memo, which was published in a British newspaper, 
infuriated Nigeria. The friction between the two commanders worsened to 
the point that the Nigerian deputy made derogatory remarks about Gen. 
Jetlay and demanded his resignation. Kofi Annan had to interfere directly 
because the clash between the two commanders was affecting UNAMSIL's 
ability to control the violence in certain parts of Sierra Leone. Human rights 
groups were also critical of the ability of UNAMSIL to control a new wave 
of violence coming from RUF.'*' Hence, Kofi Annan re-called the two 
commanders to New York and attempted to reconcile their differences. 
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Despite several attempts, the differences between the two commanders 
could not be reconciled and Annan was left with no option but to fire one of 
his commanders. 
There are several reasons why the choice was India's Gen. Jetlay. 
First, the UN could not antagonize Nigeria, given the fact that it was the 
largest contingent in Sierra Leone, although the difference in troop 
contribution between India and Nigeria was only 75 soldiers. The dismissal 
of the Nigerian commander would have affected the participation of other 
African peace-keepers. Of the 13 troop contributing states, about three-
quarters were from the region itself and, since the West has remained totally 
uncommitted to UNAMSIL, the UN could not risk losing the African peace-
keepers.^" Second, before the arrival of the UN peace-keepers, Nigeria had 
led a West African peace force that fought against the RUF during the 9 year 
civil war in Sierra Leone. This experience would be an advantage for 
UNAMSIL if Nigeria stayed on since it is more familiar with the conflict, 
the ground situations and the region as a whole. 
So, as of December 2000, India was replaced by Kenya as the Force 
Commander of UNAMSIL. But the UN indicated that it still wanted the 
Indian contingent to serve as part of UNAMSIL. India, however, as 
determined to pull its troops out completely. Several reasons have been 
advanced for this withdrawal. India has defended its withdrawal by saying 
that it wants to maintain its good relations with Nigeria. At the same time, it 
asserts that it is simply making room for the routine rotation, which gives 
other member states a chance to participate.^' Another argument put forth by 
New Delhi is that the UN has been seeking to mandate UNAMSIL under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter because the ground situation has been 
deteriorating so rapidly that there might be a move to enforce peace in Sierra 
Leone. This would conflict with India's policies on peace-keeping. But it 
should be noted that it did not take such factors into consideration when it 
willingly participated in the UN's peace-enforcement operation in Somalia 
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(UNOSOM II) had independently launched an operation of a similar kind in 
Sri Lanka during 1987-89. 
Finally, India's decision to withdraw from Sierra Leone might be 
seen as nothing more than a 'face-saving' measure. The dismissal of General 
Jetlay means that India loses its opportunity to lead UNAMSIL. This may 
perhaps, be a major blow for a country that has been participating in UN 
peace-keeping operations since the 1950s. The dismissal may leave a black 
mark in its peace-keeping history and may even be detrimental to India, 
given its disease to impress the international community and to realize its 
greater global ambitions. So, India has pre-empted the dismissal by 
indicating its desire to withdraw from the mission and therefore, save face. 
The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, Salim Ahmed, 
requested India to reconsider its decision to withdraw. But India was 
determined to pull a lot of Sierra Leone, rather than going on record as 
having been downgraded from commanding the mission to an ordinary 
peace-keeper. 
Maintaining its international image, therefore, might be proposed as 
a fundamental determinant in India's peace-keeping role. But not only does 
India see its role as an ordinary peace-keepers, it also values highly any 
leadership role that it has assigned. 
India's aims to demonstrate its credibility through its participation 
in the UN peace-keeping operations. Indeed, India has been operating in a 
new global system where the defining qualities of a 'great power' have 
changed. From India's point of view, 'great powers' are made not just by 
their material capacities, but also by their dispositions; that is, by their 
willingness to articulate a vision for a preferred world and to accept the 
burdens of shaping that vision." At some levels, India's strong support for 
UN peace-keeping in the post-Cold War era demonstrates its willingness to 
share the global burden and responsibility in creating a safe, secure and 
peaceful environment. At the same time, India has become more vigorous in 
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UN peace-keeping because it has been confronting competition from other 
nations that have similar global ambitions. 
A third source of motivation for India's increased level of 
participation in post-Cold War UN peace missions could be that it provide 
opportunities to improve relations with other countries at bilateral or 
multilateral levels. As one Indian scholar notes, there is a 'blend between 
the larger goal of peace-keeping and India's narrower goal of improving 
bilateral and multilateral relations'. This can be seen in the recent 
establishment of a Joint Working Group (JWG) by the United States and 
India to expand their cooperation in peace-keeping and other activities of the 
UN. The two parties have agreed to 'deepen mutual understanding and 
cooperation'^'' and to enhance the effectiveness of the UN's military 
interventions in various conflict zones. The Indo-United States JWG, which 
marks India's first isntitutionalised bilateral dialogue, aims to focus on 
various issues such as logistical support, training preparation and command 
structure. 
However, India hopes to achieve very different results from its pro-
active support for the UN. Above all. New Delhi expects the UN to respect 
it domestic capacities and not to interfere in its domestic affairs, particularly 
Kashmir. India's consistent position all along has been for a bilateral 
resolution to the Kashmir conflict. In the words of former Foreign Secretary 
J.N. Dixit, India's: 
'[Pro]active support to the UN, especially to the permanent 
members of the Security Council in [UN peace-keeping], will enable[it] to 
demand a quid pro quo that the UN should not interfere in matters of vital 
interest to [India] like Jammu and Kashmir' .^ ^ 
However, India's commitment to post-Cold War peace-keeping 
operations has taken shape in pursuit of its political interests. It is not naive 
to assume that states making active and direct contributions in many UN 
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peace missions at the field level also desire to play some influential role in 
the UN's decision making body on security matters. In addition to the 
financial benefits, although India is still owed about given an opportunity 
for high-level representation and participation in the decision-making circle 
within the UN Secretariat, New Delhi has, on various occasions, been 
explicit about its desire of playing a role in the upper management of the UN 
body. India's approach to the UN peace-keeping activities has been part of 
an 'interim measure to retain and enhance its role in the UN activities... and 
ensure proper high level representation for India in those branches of the UN 
Secretariat which deals with peace and international security are factored 
into UN decision-making'." Moreover, at the 2000 Session of the Special 
Committee on peace-keeping operations, India strongly supported the view 
that troop, contributing nations not only be consulted, but that they 
participate in the council decisions as well. Despite India's great desire to be 
included in key UN decision-making circles and its failure to realize this 
ambition, it has continued to participate in external peace missions without 
any serious reservations. 
Administrative, budgetary and financial issues, in the United Nations 
peace-keeping operations: 
Discussions relating to the financial situation of the United Nations 
were accorded highly priority in the Fifth Committee of the UN General 
Assembly following statements made by the Secretary General that the 
organization is facing an unprecedented crisis with practically no usable 
reserves and overwhelming debts to member states. Unfortunately, the Open 
Ended High level Working Group on financial situation achieved no result 
even after prolonged negotiations and consequently, the Secretary General 
continued to resort to borrowing from the pace-keeping accounts to finance 
routine and regular operations of the UN. 
With further anticipated decrease of peace-keeping budget, the 
Secretary General will find it increasingly difficult to take recourse to this 
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action in the coming years. In all the debates on this issue, India called upon 
Member States in arrears to pay their contributions in full, on time and 
without condition and emphasized the need to work on arrangements that 
will lead to the clearing of financial backlog thereby ensuring smooth flow 
of funds in the'future. 
The question of financing UN peace-keeping operations has been 
engaging the continuous attention of the world community. As a major troop 
contributing country, India is vitally interested in this matter. While India is 
receiving current payments for participation in peace-keeping operations, 
there has been a considerable delay in reimbursement of past dues 
particularly reimbursement relating to contingent owned equipment 
provided by us. India has intensified its efforts with the UN Secretariat to 
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reach settlement of its claims. 
Following part payment of arrears by the Russian-Federation and a 
few other countries, the UN paid India $ 7,861,391.60 during 1998. The UN 
owes India approximately $ 45 million.^ * The rate of reimbursement remains 
extremely slow and the hope of receiving payment is nearly non-existent 
unless the United States which owes the UN more than $ 1.3 billion pays its 
arrears both for the regular and peace-keeping budgets. 
On the substantive issues on which the Fifth Committee focused its 
attention including Secretary General's reform proposals. In the context of 
the budget consideration for 1998-99, India's stand has been generally 
positive towards various proposals to introduce reform in the current 
procurement and asset management policy and procedures and on 
strengthening the internal and external oversight mechanism. 
India's Role in the United Nations in Post-Cold War Era: 
In the post-Cold War era, India's role along with other like minded 
nations has remained to create a democratic world order in spirit as India has 
been firm believer and supporter, faith for a world free of animosity and 
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battered, unfettered by deprivation of any kind, and devoted to the perpetual 
quest for human happiness. The world and the people need peace, security 
and development. Therefore, the Indian quest in the coming year must have 
an assist in trying to make this dream a reality. This was the fundamental 
principle of India's foreign policy to supports world peace and peaceful 
settlements of international disputes, India is opposed all forms of violence, 
and aggression. It has full faith in the ideals of UN and has always been 
cooperating with the UN in all its socio-economic and political activities. 
India supports disarmament and advocates a nuclear weapon free world and 
is aware of its security concerns and wants to protect its National interests 
within the parameter of international peace and security. It has always been 
advocating in the reduction of conventional weapons and total ban on 
nuclear weapons.^ ^ 
As part of its new UN policy, India has been actively participating in 
UN deliberations on areas such as environment management, human rights, 
sustainable development, population and women, and disarmament. For 
example, India represented the interest of many non-aligned countries in the 
UN Conference on Population and Sustainable Development and on Women. 
However, India was not successful in influencing some of the policies and 
outcomes in this conference due to the lack of 'political cohesion among the 
members of NAM' on policies relating to women and population.^ *^  India also 
led a high powered delegation to the Rio de Janeiro 'Earth Summit', where it 
played an active role in discussions and meetings ensuring that the 'summit' 
safeguarded the ecological and economic interest of the developing 
countries'.^' 
The above efforts of the UN have significantly contributed at least to the 
growth of awareness of many important issues which had been considerably 
neglected for a long time in the past. There are two kinds of problems 
confronting the world body. One set of problem is global issues such as 
environment, population, development and fatal diseases. They are beyond the 
93 
capacity of any single nation. The UN with its unique global role is crucial to 
progress for the sustainable solution of these problems. The second kinds of 
problem are ethnic conflicts that have erupted in the post-Cold War Era. It 
seems so vast that many people feel no need to act. But the alarming situation 
demands that the problem must be solved and the UN is essential to progress 
on both issues. Naturally people now have doubt and wonder whether the UN 
can hopefully be able to tackle such problems effectively. For this it is 
necessary that the UN has to maintain right balance between inaction and 
intervention, prudence and over reactions. 
The question with wonder and fear now before every nation is whether 
the US is the only world power left to decide the fate of a particular country, 
which even, it targets for fulfilling its own selfish ends, or it alone should be 
the responsibility of establishing a just world according to the terms and 
conditions set by it. If it is so, then this trend of unilateralisation is likely to 
pose the biggest threat to the security challenges of the new millennium. If Iraq 
today, tomorrow Syria, Saudi Arabia, North Korea or any other sovereign 
country for that matter is likely to be the victim of this trend of American 
unilateralism. The approach and the power of the world organization has been 
side lined - Iraq War II brings a death blow to the world body, which the USA 
has delivered to be as "basket case". 
The aftermath of World Trade Center tragedy brought some new threats 
along the security concerns for the whole world. At the same time it provided 
an opportunity to the US to tackle such problem as per his desire in the guise of 
tackling terrorism. It was followed by anti terrorism operation speedily 
bringing with the cleaning separation against the Taliban regime to the bearing 
of ftindamentalist organisations suspected to be behind these terrorist activities. 
In the guise of elimination of terrorism, the new threat of unilateralism and self 
righteousness of USA is definitely going to set a precedent that the evil enemy 
of this world is, be when even Washington close to Sodinate. 
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India took an active part in setting the agenda for the UN on the 
foregoing issues and influencing projects and policies which were discussed at 
the UN itself and at the various international conferences organized by the UN. 
By mid 1994, the Ministry of External Affairs was engaged in intense 
preparations for: (i) the February 1994 meeting of the Human Rights 
Commission; (2) the Copenhagen meeting on human development; (3) the 
international conference on Loomen in Beijing; and (4) the 50^ Anniversary of 
the UN General Assembly Summit session.^ ^ 
In the ultimate analysis, despite the idealism articulated, despite the 
optimism generated by the end of cold war and despite the expectations of a 
more peaceful atmosphere prevailing internationally, the UN still remains 
subject to considerations of super power strategy and real politik. This is 
ambience in which India will have to fashion its approach and structure its role 
in the UN and its allied agencies in the coming years. Secondly, the existing 
desperation that while specialized ministers would interact with various 
specialized agencies of the UN such as United Nations Children's Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF), International Labour Organisation (ILO), World Health 
Organisation (WHO) or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the 
overall formulation of policy and coordination of India's participation in the 
activities of these agencies is subject to political assessments of Ministry of 
External Affairs and of the guidance of the Prime Minister. 
India has a creative and leading role to play in ensuring the 
democratization of the UN and in dealing with these controversial trends 
affecting the functioning of the organisation, in effectiveness. In this regard it 
will depend on our networking and coordination of policies with other 
developing countries, aimed at generating collective and unified presumes for 
the UN reforms of the majority of its membership. 
For a number of years, the philosophical attitude in India's UN mission 
was "we live and learn". After several years of low-key stance, India has begun 
to reassert itself at the UN." 
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An important factor in India's new stand is that its relations with most of 
its immediate neighbours have seldom before been so good. India is upto date 
in paying its men in UN forces and has said it is not in the "business of making 
money" out of peace-keeping operations and the UN dues of $ 58 million to it 
will not deter it from paying its troops defining sovereignty and domestic 
jurisdiction, accommodate the growing impulse of human rights. 
In the changing global context of the Post-cold war era, multiferism civil 
problems imputing on international arena demanded UN's attention. At the 
same time the Security Council, once crippled by the Super Power statement is 
being seek by major powers as an effective means of taking international 
measures to prompt action and resolve conflicts having bearing on international 
stability.^ '' The UN has definitely taken a challenge as manifest with the 
declaration of "Agenda of Peace and Development of Peace" troops which, did 
not find a place in the charter. 
The Clinton Administration waged a multipronged offensive to keep the 
UN under its control. On the one side, it continued to threaten member 
countries that unless they behaved well (supported the US in the UN and 
outside), they stood to provoke American displeasure and hostility. The US 
wants to keep the UN financially weak and dependent on its financial 
contribution in the form of its dues. It has created immense difficulties for the 
UN and under-mined its capacity to function by not paying its arrears both for 
budgetary and other expenses of the organisation to the time of tone than one 
billion.^ ^ 
While India's stand irrespective of financial constraint was that its 
Mission Head, Parakash Shah said, "India has paid to fiill amount of all its 
soldiers out of its own funds despite the fact that it created a deficit in its own 
budget". He also said that the UN owned money to India as far back as the UN 
operation in Congo. In a major diplomatic initiative, Prime Minister H.D. 
Dewegowda announced India resolved to continue to recognize the Rabbani 
regime in Afghanistan and pledged India's political, diplomatic and moral 
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support to it. India was deeply aware of vital need for reconstruction, and of 
rebuilding the social and economic infrastructure of Afghanistan, which had 
been almost completely destroyed as a result of continued strife. 
In September 1995, the Indian Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherji, 
declared that "democracy and transparency cannot stop at the portals of the 
UN". Of course, one recognizes that power realities and questions cannot be 
wished away and must be reckoned with.^ ^ It is, however, argued that in spite 
of considerable efforts made by the UN for the protection of human rights, its 
records have been dismashed and more has to be done if the UN is to strick to 
its determination to "save the succeeding generations from the scourage of 
war". 
The World Conference on Human Rights held in Viana in 1993, 
highlighted the enhanced international commitment to re-interpret the 
traditional norms, defining sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction and to 
accommodate the growing impulse of human rights. 
In the changing global context of the Post-cold war era, multiferism civil 
problems need immediate attention of the UN for sure and certain solution of 
these problems acceptable to almost every nation of the world community. At 
the same time, the Security Council, once ampled by the super power statement 
is being seen by major powers as an effective means of taking international 
measures to preempt and resolve conflicts that have bearing impact on 
international stability. 
The UN has definitely taken it as a challenge which is manifested with 
the declaration of "Agenda of peace and Development of Peace Troops" which 
did not find a place in the charter. 
The Clinton Administration waged a multi-pronged offensive to keep 
the UN under US control. In one hand, it continued to threat member countries 
that unless they behaved well (supported the US will in the UN and outside), 
they stood to provoke American displeasure and hostility. The US wants to 
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keep the UN financially weak and dependent on its financial contribution in the 
form of its dues, so that it could not be challenged everywhere on its biased 
policy. 
It has created immense difficulties for the UN and undermined its 
capacity to function by not paying its arrears both the budgetary and other 
expenses of the organization to the tune of more than one billion. 
With Ghali at the helm of the UN and elevation of Ms, Albright as the 
US Secretary of State, it was feared that the UN's independence and activism 
would be in danger. The US inspired by its success in torpedoing Ghali re-
election bid, mights be tented to further consolidate its group over the UN. But 
there are few redeeming features. The "Unipolarity" of the world is already 
under strain. The US claim that "its leadership is indispensable to the world" is 
not without challenges. Besides the determination of Paris to contain the 
influence of the US in European affairs, the emerging axis between Russia and 
China may result in countervailing the American domination. Further, while 
the US domination of the UN in the Post-cold war years has been well 
pronounced, it has not been a total surrender by the UN. In December 1995 the 
General Assembly condemned Israel for its rule over the holy city of Jerusalem 
by 133 to one veto. While Israel was the only country to vote against the 
resolution, 13 countries including the US abstained from voting.^ ^ 
Being inspired by the success of the "UN troops" in the war against Iraq 
in 1991 in the desert war, George Bush, the President of the United States, 
declared his support for a new world order whose main elements would be 
collaboration between the US and Russia both inside the United Nations and 
outside it, to maintain international peace and security, for an active role to be 
played by the UN.^ ^ 
The world confronts a new American approach to world affairs during 
the Bush Administration in January 2002. The Indian response to the 
tumultuous development, since then has been along unexpected line. While the 
98 
liberal opinion in the Europe, the Middle East, and Asia remains extremely 
critical of the Bush Administration's policies, India's reaction has either been 
muted or supportive of the new line of Washington on key global issues a clear 
cut deviation from its earlier stand. Perhaps this was the first occasion that even 
the staunchest of the traditional American allies challenged the Bush 
Administration's policies. India, which on the basis of its past record was 
expected to lead the charge against the United States in various international 
forums, has often ended up on the side of Washington. 
Post Iraq war, no doubt is left that Washington is prepared to mobilize 
all the resources under its own command as the world's richest economy and 
advance society and is exercising the political will to pursue objectives that 
until recently world have been considered outlandish. This has raised the 
spectra of 'neo imperialism' in the world even as for many in the US imperial 
so longer a world with negative connotations. This development has led to 
representing a political American role in the world that is at once assertive, 
beings and progressive. Although, questions have been raised, in the wake of 
American difficulties in handling the post war situation in Afghanistan and Iraq 
and about the' competence and credibility of American imperialism'. Still there 
is no doubt about the new power of the United States and its ability to exercise 
it in the pursuit of its political objectives.'^  
Social Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues 
India participated actively in the discussions on human rights issues 
in session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Economic and 
Social Council and the General Assembly. There was a special significance 
to the discussion of human rights issues as December 10, 1998 marked the 
50'*^  anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Special commemorative sessions were held by the General 
Assembly and several other UN bodies to mark the occasion. Special events 
were also organised in India, where a series of activities overseen by a 
National Committee under the Chairmanship of Minister for Home Affairs 
was organized to mark the occasion. 
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The year also marked the five-year-review of implementation of the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at the conclusion of 
the World Conference on Human Rights held in 1993. The adoption of the 
Declaration on Human Rights Defenders by the General Assembly at its SS"^** 
session was a significant development. 
In the discussions on human rights India called for constructive, 
balance and cooperative approach to human rights issues, emphasizing the 
universality, indivisibility and inter-relatedness of all rights and inter-
dependence of democracy, human rights, development and international 
cooperation.^' It was necessary to depoliticize any consideration of human 
rights and pursue measures and approaches which can lead to concrete 
results in the promotion and protection of human rights everywhere. 
India also critically examined the 'rights-based' approach in relation 
to human rights in general and right to development in particular, as also 
shortfalls in the international community's response to the challenge to 
human rights posed by terrorism, extreme ideologies, and market force in an 
era of globalisation and the implications of recent scientific advances for the 
right to life, etc. 
India pointed to the persistent neglect of economic, social and 
cultural rights that had led to a human rights paradigm that was partial and 
where even the recent interest in economic, social and cultural rights was 
modeled on civil and political rights. It was stressed that 'legitimate 
concern' for human rights should also be reflected in efforts to eradicate 
poverty from a human rights perspective and in a spirit of solidarity and 
brotherhood. 
The 54'** session of the Commission on Human Rights was held in 
Geneva from March 16 to April 24, 1998. India participated actively in the 
Commission's deliberations. The resolution of tolerance and pluralism 
initiated by India was able to attract 58 cosponsors during the session. 
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demonstrating the widespread support to that the theme commanded among 
the members and observers of the Commission, and was adopted by 
consensus.^ ^ 
The resolution on the Right to Development, where again India 
played an important part, was presented by the group of Non-Aligned 
countries in the Commission and was adopted without a vote in the 
Commission, though similar consensus did not prevail at the time of 
adoption of a resolution on the Right to Development in the SS"^** session of 
the General Assembly. Following adoption of the resolution, the Chairman 
of the Commission has appointed Dr. Arjun Sengupta, well-known Indian 
economist as the independent expert of the Commission of the Right to 
Development. 
The election of Soli Sorabjee during the 54"^  Session of the 
Commission on Human Rights to the special Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and protection of Minorities was followed by the election in 
September Justice P.N. Bhagwati, Human Rights Committee of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. With these, eminent 
Indian continued to serve with distinction as members of important human 
rights bodies, including Shanti Sadiq Ali as member of the Committee on 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination; Abid Hussain as Special Rapporteur 
on the freedom on Expression; Kapil Sibal on the working Group of 
Arbitrary Detention and Soli Sorabjee as Special Rapporteur on Nigeria.^ ^ 
India hosted the Seventh Asian Pacific Workshop on Regional 
Cooperation for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in New 
Delhi in 1999. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and former 
President of Ireland, Robinson visited New Delhi and addressed the opening 
session of the workshop jointly with the Minister of External Affairs. The 
Workshop adopted a set of agreed conclusions and decided to enhance 
capacity building by focusing on four areas of national plans of action, 
human rights education, national institutions and strategies for the 
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realization of the right to development and economic and social and cultural 
rights, agreed at the 1998 Tehran Workshop. Robinson met with several 
Indian leaders and non-governmental organizations active in the field of 
human rights, during her visit. 
India maintain its position in support of the advancement, 
empowerment and human rights of women in the Commission on the status 
of women as well as the General Assembly, highlighting the initiatives taken 
by the Government in implementing the Beijing Platform of Action, 
particularly with regard to the girl child, mainstreaming the gender 
perspective in policies and programmes of the government, and increasing 
the participation of women in decision-making through continuing efforts to 
guarantee one-third of all seats in the national Parliament and state 
assemblies for women by legislation. India co-sponsored a number of 
women centered resolution in the Commission on Human Rights and in the 
General Assembly, including a resolution first moved by the Netherland in 
1997, on 'Traditional and customary practices injurious to women's health.^ '* 
India played an active role in the 49* session of the Executive 
Committee of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees held in 
October, 1998. The importance of international solidarity and burden-
sharing, the need to take into account the economic and social consequences 
of massive flows into the developing countries and India's own policy 
towards refugees were highlighted during the session. India called for 
effective and durable solution to refugee crises and stressed the need for 
involving developing countries in evolving such solution as refugee 
problems affect the developing countries most. It also highlighted the 
imperative of international cooperation for dealing with refugee problems. 
The 36 Session of the Commission on Social Development was held in 
New York from February 10 to 20, 1998, India was represented by Member 
Secretary, Planning Commission. The priority theme of the session was 
"Promoting social Integration and Participation of all people, including 
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disadvantages and vulnerable groups and persons". India participated 
actively in the deliberation as the theme was of special interest to India, and 
assisted in the negotiation of agreed conclusions adopted at the end of the 
session. 
India actively participated in the first Humanitarian Affairs Segment 
of Economic and social Council (ECOSOC) held in July 1998. The agreed 
conclusion adopted at the end of the Segment fully reflect our concerns, 
namely that assistance must be undertaken at the request of recipient 
countries, who should also play a major role in planning the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance. India also played a major role in the drafting of 
resolutions relating to humanitarian assistance during the General Assembly. 
The small drafting group which excluded India and which used to negotiate 
the resolution on Afghanistan, including Special Assistance to War Stricken 
Afghanistan, was disbanded this year. 
Environmental and Sustainable Development Issues 
The Sixth session of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable 
Development was held in New York from April 20 to May 1, 1998. The 
Indian delegation was led by Suresh P. Prabhu, Minister of Environment and 
Forests. The Indian delegation emphasized the importance of transfer of 
environment mentally sound technologies on concessional and preferential 
terms as well as the provisions of predictable and adequate financial 
resources in achieving the objectives of economic growth and sustainable 
development. 
The Fourth Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Buenos Aires from 
November 2-13, 1998. The Indian delegation was led by Minister of 
Environment and Forests, Swesh P. Prabhu. There was renewed pressure for 
developing countries to accept voluntary commitments on Green House Gas 
Emissions but this was successfully resisted India, as Coordinator on Kyoto 
103 
Protocol Mechanisms on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, played an 
active role in ensuring that the concerns of developing countries were 
adequately addressed. A Work programme on Mechanisms leading up to the 
sixth session of the Conference of Parties has been agreed upon. 
The Second Conference of Parties to the UN Convention to the 
Combat Desertification was held in Dakar, Senegal from November 30 to 
December 11, 1988. The Indian delegation emphasized the need for the full 
operationalisation of the Global Mechanism which is scheduled to be 
revived, as provided in the convention, at the third conference of parties. 
India's nominee has been included in the adhoc panel on traditional 
knowledge set up by the Committee on Science and Technology.^ ^ 
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Chapter - III 
India and Nuclear Disarmament 
The use of nuclear weapons against Japan during the Second World 
War has shown the disastrous effects of nuclear energy employed as a 
means of destruction. After the war was over the international community 
began to launch initiatives aimed towards checking the nuclear proliferation 
and elimination of nuclear weapons. The problem of nuclear non-
proliferation has been one of the issues which dominated the international 
scene for more than fourty years. There are four major nuclear non-
proliferation measures available in the world, namely, the Partial Test Ban 
Treaty (PTBT), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ), and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). The motive is to examine India's response in relation to these 
measures. Before proceed further, it is necessary to take an account of 
India's position in the nuclear test ban negotiations which emerged 
following the end of the Second World War and which also prepared ground 
for the conclusion of the PTBT. 
In 1946 though India had not attained independence, an interim 
government under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru was established. In 
September 1947, just one month after its independence, India's 
representative, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, simple referred to disarmament in the 
following words: "There is an uneasy awareness that things are perhaps 
moving towards some new and annihilating disaster and not enough is being 
done to check the trend".' However, it was in 1948-49, at the third Session 
of the UN General Assembly that she clearly expressed her views on the 
problems of disarmament. Thus, the Indian representative, Vijayalakshmi 
Pandit, speaking in the general debate on 25 September 1948, described the 
problem of atomic energy control and disarmament as "one of the most 
no 
important items" and "momentous questions" for discussion. She regretted 
that the efforts made by UN Atomic Energy Commission had proved 
fruitless, that it was facing a deadlock and that no progress had been made 
on the question of disarmament. She asserted that the threat of war could not 
be banished from the world unless the present race for armament was 
abandoned. She expressed the hope that the deliberation between the United 
States and the Soviet Union would result in reconciliation and disarmament. 
She also emphasized for outlawing of biological and chemical warfare. 
Thus, in its first major response to the issues relating to 
disarmament, India identified three important points - the stress on the 
abandonment of the arms race, the necessarily of continuing negotiations 
with a view to reach an agreement and the banning of the weapons of mass 
destruction and they have constantly figured in the subsequent India's 
attitude or posture on disarmament. 
On the issue of atomic energy control India expressed its keen 
interest, as an under-developing country, in its utilization for peaceful and 
beneficial purposes. India possessed large deposits of atomic raw materials 
and was aware of the important part that the peaceful utilization of atomic 
energy could play in the economic development of the country. India was, 
therefore, not willing to accept the Baruch Plan in its entirely and to entrust 
to the International Atomic Development Authority (lADA) the ownership 
and distribution right over all its resources of atomic raw materials. There 
was no guarantee that the international control system would operate 
impartially and would not discriminate against or work to the disadvantage 
of the smaller power. India stressed that it could not agree to an international 
ownership and distribution of only those materials capable of generating 
atomic energy while other materials such as oil, remained render private 
ownership and without any international control. In these circumstances, it 
was quite natural for India to oppose the Baruch Plan. It was, therefore, an 
indication on the part of India that it was not prepared to surrender its 
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sovereign rights for the development and utilization of her vast atomic raw-
materials to an outside authority. 
In November 1952 the United States exploded its first hydrogen 
bomb and in August 1953 the Soviet Union, which tested its first atomic 
device in 1949, followed suit. Soon the issue of nuclear test ban became a 
matter of international concern. India not only showed its genuine interest to 
work for disarmament but also initiated efforts toward it. According to 
Nehru, the Disarmament Sub Committee of the UN was formed "as a result 
of India's initiative in the General Assembly in 1953".^ India brought up the 
issue of nuclear test ban to the UN in April 1954 when it demanded that 
there should be a cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. It was the first 
country to raise such an issue before the UN.'* The Indian proposal was 
made against the backdrop of an American nuclear test of 15 megaton 
thermonuclear bomb (which was part of the series of nuclear test called 
operation castle in Namu Island of Bikini Atoll in March, 1954. At the UN 
General Assembly in December 1954, India repeated its proposal for a total 
cessation of nuclear testing but did not put it to vote.^ India and other non-
nuclear weapon states continued their efforts at the UN to focus the attention 
of the world on the issue of nuclear test. On 1 December 1955, India 
introduced a draft resolution in the First Committee of the UN General 
Assembly requesting the States to initiate negotiations for suspension of 
"experimental explosion of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and report 
progress to the Disarmament Commission at an early date".^ 
India's proposals to the UN in regard to the cessation of nuclear 
tests were not given careful consideration by the major powers. Its proposal 
of April 1954 on the suspension of nuclear tests was put in cold storage for 
years. Nehru's appeal to the leaders of the United States and the Soviet 
Union in regard to the cessation of test was cold-shouldered by the powers 
concerned, the United States in particulars.^ 
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The Soviet Union was the first among the great powers to propose 
suspension of nuclear tests. Its disarmament proposal of 10 May 1955, 
which substantially accepted the 1954 Anglo French Plan for the abolition 
of nuclear weapons, gave priority to nuclear test ban at the first stage of 
comprehensive disarmament plan. In 1956, the Soviet Union suggested that 
partial measures, including an immediate stop to tests, should go ahead 
independently of general disarmament. 
The shift in the approach in the disarmament negotiations, from 
comprehensive to partial measures or step by step approach was given 
recognition by the United Nations. The General Assembly debates showed 
that "partial measures were considered as a first step of disarmament in 
existing political condition.^ It was the general belief that by such partial 
measures, confidence would gradually be strengthened and thus 
comprehensive disarmament would be facilitated. On the other hand, while 
the Western countries, particularly the United States, wanted to treat nuclear 
test ban as a part of the general disarmament plan with an emphasis on the 
verification system, India wanted to treat it as an independent issue, one 
which should be considered on its own merit. In his speech in Lok Sabha on 
2 September 1957, Nehru, while emphasizing "comprehensive" settlement 
regarding disarmament said that "the fact that we have a partial agreement 
does not rule out a comprehensive agreement; it is a step towards that; it 
produces the atmosphere and the confidence to go further. Therefore, we 
have always suggested that a partial agreement is better than no agreement, 
provided that it is a step towards the larger agreement".^ 
The year 1957 was the peak year of nuclear testing. Non-nuclear 
weapon states like Canada, Japan and Norway continued with their efforts to 
have a break-through in reaching an agreement regarding nuclear tests. The 
first important break-through came with the Soviet proposal on 4 June 1957 
for a moratorium on nuclear test for 2 to 3 years, which was welcomed by 
the West."^ In March 1958, Moscow unilaterally declared that it would 
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discontinue test but reserved its position if other powers continued to test 
those weapons. The UK and US resumed testing in April 1958 initiating 
thereby the most intense test programme that had occurred until then. The 
Soviet Union resumed testing in October 1958, Due to deteriorating Political 
climate, there was stalemate in the negotiations with the Disarmament 
Commission throughout 1958, though UK suspended nuclear testing from 
September 1958 and the US from October 1958. 
In 1959 the UN General Assembly accepted General and Complete 
Disarmament (GCD), a programme forwarded by the Soviet Union as the 
objective in disarmament negotiations by adopting a resolution co-sponsored 
by 82 countries, including India. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on November 
1960, Nehru declared: "Surely what we want is full and complete 
disarmament". Inevitable, it can only be reached by phases, but the objective 
of general and complete disarmament must be kept in view." 
In 1959, India took the initiative at the UN General Assembly to 
discuss the question of nuclear test and co-sponsored a twenty one power 
draft resolution to appeal to the nuclear weapon states meeting at Geneva, to 
continue the suspension of nuclear tests. On 29 December 1960, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a three-power resolution of Australia, India and 
Sweden, and a twenty-six power draft resolution requesting the nuclear 
weapon states to continue the negotiations and voluntary suspension of 
nuclear tests. 
In March 1962, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee 
(ENDC), which was formed in that year, constituted a sub-committee of the 
US, USSR and UK to consider the question of nuclear tests. In April 1962 
the sub-committee considered a joint memorandum of eight non-aligned 
member nations of ENDC, which included India, regarding nuclear test ban. 
This group (Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and 
UAR) very quickly seized the initiative in the negotiating process in the 
very first week of their presence, and continued active participation ever 
since. 
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After protracted negotiations for over years between the US, USSR 
and UK, which started from 1958 at Geneva, a Partial Test Ban Treaty 
(PTBT) was initiated on 25 July 1963 and signed at Moscow in August 1963 
which banned nuclear test under the water, in the atmosphere and in the 
outer space. 
India welcomed the Treaty, speaking in the ENDC on 20 July 1963, 
the Indian representative, A.S. Mehta, not only welcomed the Treaty 
'warmly and enthusiastically' but also praised the negotiating skill and 
statesmanship of the representatives of the three participating Powers. He 
recognized that the PTBT was a measure to halt the spread of nuclear 
weapons to non-nuclear powers, to which he attached particular importance. 
He at the same time expressed 'deep concern' at the Chinese attitude in the 
matter. Again, in his statement of 29 August 1963 in the ENDC, the Indian 
representative spoke highly of the Moscow Treaty, which, he said, had been 
widely acclaimed throughout the world as 'an event of historic importance' 
and "a significant first step towards a relaxation of international tensions 
and promising move towards purposeful measures of world peace and 
disarmament".'^ 
Although India welcomed the PTBT, but it pointed out the defects 
of the Treaty. In his statement on 30 June 1966, India is representative in the 
ENDC, V.C. Trivedi, pointed out that the "PTBT had remained 'doubly 
partial' - it was not adhered to by all countries in the first place, and 
secondly, it do not cover underground tests''.'^ 
India's stand on Non-Proliferation Treaty 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force 
since March 1970, has been considered as the principal nuclear arms control 
measures since the Cold War period. India has consistently been opposing to 
signing it in its present form. It did not, however, mean that New Delhi 
opposed Non-proliferation altogether. In fact, in 1965, it put forward the 
following criteria for a non-proliferation treaty.''* 
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(1) An understanding by the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear 
weapon or nuclear weapon technology to others, (2) An understanding not to 
use nuclear weapons against countries do not possess them, (3) An 
understanding through the United Nations to safeguard the security of 
countries which may be threatened by powers having a nuclear weapons 
capability, (4) Tangible progress towards disarmament including a 
comprehensive test ban treaty, a complete freeze on production of nuclear 
weapons and means of delivery as well as substantial reduction in the 
existing stocks, (5) An understanding by non-nuclear powers not to acquire 
or manufacture nuclear weapons. 
The then Indian Minister of External Affairs, Sardar Swaran Singh 
said in the UN General Assembly that "the only practical approach to this 
problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is that both nuclear and 
non-nuclear weapon countries, should undertake simultaneous obligations 
through an international instrument that might be agreed upon".'^ This was 
again reiterated by the Indian representative, V.C. Trivedi and he further 
stated that a treaty on non-proliferation should deal with the problem of 
present proliferation as well as future proliferation.'^ He demanded that the 
draft of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapon "have to be enlarged so as 
to embrace the essential features of the approach taken by non-aligned and 
non-nuclear countries''. He further said, "only then it would be possible to 
obtain a balanced and non-discriminatory treaty, and only then would real 
effective non-proliferation be feasible".'^ The discriminatory character of 
NPT was highlighted by India when its representative, Azim Hussain, spoke 
on the draft of the NDT in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly 
on 14 May 1968.'^ 
The Indian Government's primary objection was that the Treaty did 
not confirm to the principles enunciated in the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 2028, of 19 November 1965.'^ This resolution, which was 
introduced by eight Non-nuclear weapon states including India and which 
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was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 23 November 1965, urged the 
ENDC meeting at Geneva to draft a non-proliferation treaty based upon the 
following principles : 
(1) The treaty should be void of loopholes by which nuclear weapon 
states, or non-nuclear weapon states, could proliferate nuclear weapons in 
any form directly or indirectly, (2) The treaty should strike a balance of 
mutual responsibility and mutual obligation as between the nuclear weapons 
and non-nuclear weapons states, (3) The treaty should comprise an 
incremental move towards general and complete disarmament, particularly 
with regard to the disarmament of nuclear weapons, (4) they should be 
devised a practicable means to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty. 
At some stage India proposed a two-stage non-proliferation treaty. 
The first stage would apply only to the nuclear weapon states and it would 
be designated appropriately as a partial non-proliferation agreement which 
would include (1) not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons 
technology, (2) to stop all production of nuclear weapons and delivery 
vehicles, and to agree on the beginning of a programme of reduction of their 
nuclear weapon stockpiles; and also to incorporate other measures. At the 
second stage, the non-nuclear weapon states would undertake not to acquire 
or manufacture nuclear weapons.^' 
India's main objections to the NPT have been that it is a 
discriminatory or unequal document and there is a lack of balance of 
obligation. While the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) which sign the 
treaty are obliged to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, the Nuclear 
Weapon States (NWS) assume no responsibility to disarm regarding nuclear 
weapons. The one-sided application of the safeguards clause to the activities 
of the non-nuclear weapon states while exempting the activities of the 
nuclear weapon states from inspection, and the denial of Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosion (PNE) by the non-nuclear weapon states demonstrate the other 
area of discriminatory or unequal character of the NPT. 
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The NPT has not only divided the nations of the world into the 
nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots, but also, under it, both the civilian 
and military nuclear technology has become the monopoly of the five 
nuclear weapon powers. This has been described as the most discriminatory 
character of the NPT. 
It is held that a non-proliferation agreement which ignores the 
present proliferation and pre-occupies itself with future proliferation is 
naturally unrealistic, ineffective and therefore unacceptable to those nations, 
including India, which want a non-proliferation treaty to curb both the 
vertical and horizontal proliferation.^^ At the initial stages of the NPT 
negotiations, when the term "Proliferation was discussed, India pointed out 
that all aspects of proliferation" which have been variously termed as 
present and future proliferation, or existing further proliferation should be 
covered by a proliferation treaty.^ ^ What is essential and central to India's 
concept of non-proliferation treaty is that "both these aspects of proliferation 
of nuclear weapons form part of a single whole and the problem cannot be 
dealt with by dealing with only one aspect of it".^ "* The NPT has failed to 
prevent nuclear proliferation in the five nuclear weapon states. It legitimizes 
all the nuclear weapons produced and those to be produced in the future by 
the nuclear weapon powers. Not only that the non-nuclear weapon states 
have no such rights, but also they have been denied the exercising of their 
nuclear option in future. 
India considers the NPT to be invidious in its formulation and 
application. K. Subrahmanyam, a leading defence expert, compares the NPT 
to the Subsidiary Alliance System of Lord Wellesley which brought India 
under the British Control and says that the NPT is "the twentieth century 
version of Lord Wellesley's Subsidiary alliance system".^ ^ 
It is held that India's final decision not to subscribe to the NPT was 
taken in April-May 1967. According to C.S. Jha, the Foreign Secretary of 
India, security consideration was an important factor in reaching that 
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decision. His visit to Geneva and K. Jha (the then Secretary to the Prime 
Minister) visit to Moscow, Washington and London had confirmed in April 
that credible guarantees against nuclear attack and nuclear blackmail were 
not available in the treaty. 
In 1977 the Janta government headed by Morarji Desai came to 
power at the Centre. Morarji Desai's nuclear policy was subjected to 
pressure from international community with an intensity that was absent 
during the Pokhran era. At the Press Conference in New Delhi on 1 
September 1977, the Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, revealed that "both the 
Soviet Union and the United States wanted that we should sign the NPT and 
they have been applying pressure on this for the last few years. Morarji 
Desai, then pointed out in very clear term that when he said: "we are the 
only country who have made a definite statement that we will not have 
atomic weapons at any cost even if the world has it, I do not think any 
country has made that statement and those who are wanting this Non-
Proliferation Treaty to be signed, they themselves have not yet given up 
explosions. They are not giving up atomic weapons. And yet they are asking 
other people to sign. And they maintain their right to do all this. I am telling 
them that unless there is a basis of equality in this matter, it is not possible 
for us to sign it whatever may be the consequences .This can be 
considered as an open and straight presentation of the views of the new 
Government regarding its position on the NPT. Here, what we find is that 
Morarji Desai was not only reiterating India's earlier stance of opposing the 
NPT, but he was also showing a hardened position of India in the matter. 
With renewed vigour, the Janta Government continued India's 
objection to the NPT on the ground of its discriminatory and unequal 
character. Addressing the 32"'' Session of the UN General Assembly on 4 
October 1977, the then Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee said: "We did not 
sign the NPT because it was a discriminatory and unequal treaty. Nothing 
has happened since the NPT was formulated nearly 10 years ago to change 
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our view". In his speech at the meeting of the Indian Federation of the 
United Nations Associations in Chandigarh on 1 June 1978, Vajpayee said 
that "disarmament, to be effective cannot be achieved on the basis of 
measures that are discriminatory or one-sided". He described NPT as 
"discriminatory" and observe that it "places all the obligation on non-
nuclear weapons states and absolves the nuclear power of any 
responsibility", and continued that it was a treaty that "seek to disarm and 
unarm".^ * The discriminatory character of the NPT was also elucidated by 
Morarji Desai in his address to the Special Session of the Un General 
Assembly on Disarmament on 9 June 1978. He declared: "... our objection 
to the Treaty is because it is so patently discriminatory". He further 
observed: "It makes an invidious distinction between countries having 
nuclear weaponry and those devoted to the pursuit of nuclear research and 
technology entirely for peaceful purposes. Paradoxically the Treaty gives the 
former a monopoly of power and confers on them freedom for commercial 
exploitation of nuclear know how, while on the latter it places restrictions, 
which may impede development of nuclear science. Along with the Partial 
Test Ban Treaty, the NPT has placed the nuclear military powers in a 
position which enables them to continue with the utilization of nuclear 
energy for military purposes while telling others; "Thus far and no 
further".^ ^ 
Although India opposed the NPT, it has always been attempting to 
be at the forefront in the struggle for nuclear disarmament. No other country 
was perhaps on articulate as India during the period 1954-63 on the question 
of nuclear weapons testing. At least since 1956 it had drawn the attention of 
the community of nations in the various UN forums to the dangers of any 
wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, and since 1959 India had been 
regularly voting in favour of UN General Assembly resolution on the non-
spread of nuclear weapons. Indeed, India's commitment to work and support 
nuclear disarmament had been consistently upheld by all these successive 
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governments at the Centre. At the Special Session of the UN General 
Assembly on Disarmament held in June 1978, India, along with other non-
aligned countries, made two major initiatives devoted to disarmament. These 
were adoption of measures or code of conduct necessary to prohibit the use 
of nuclear weapons and a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing pending 
the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
India and Nuclear Weapons Free Zone: 
Another important aspect of India's approach in relation to the issue 
of nuclear non-proliferation has been its opposition to the establishment of 
nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia for which Pakistan has been 
pleading since 1974 in the UN forums. The concept of Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone (NWFZ) originated first from the erstwhile Soviet-bloc when the 
Soviet Union in 1956 proposed for the creation of a zone in Europe free 
from nuclear weapons. In October 1957, Adam Rapaecki, Poland's Foreign 
Minister, proposed a plan for a nuclear weapon free zone for Central 
Europe, which became to be known as Rapaecki Plan.^° 
The proposal of nuclear weapon free zone by the Soviet bloc 
countries were not acceptable to the United States as (a) they might interfere 
with the overall approach to disarmament, (b) they should first be acceptable 
to the local powers, (c) they would endanger the security of US allies, and 
(d) they are uninspected and uncontrolled moratorium. 
Literally speaking, the concept of nuclear weapon free-zone means 
that countries constituting a region in the non-nuclear world should agree 
not to resort to nuclear proliferation and declare their regions free from 
nuclear weapons. Such countries, in return are promised by the nuclear 
weapon states a guarantee regarding non-resort to nuclear threats. 
Following the Indian nuclear test in May 1974, Pakistan raised the 
issue of nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia in October of the same year 
in the UN General Assembly. However, the idea of a nuclear weapon-free 
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zone was mooted by Pakistan much before the Indian explosion took place. 
In the 16'^  Annual Session of the UN Atomic Energy Conference held in 
Mexico in September 1972, Pakistan put forward a proposal to denuclearise 
South Asia by signing a treaty between South Asian Countries.^' The 
proposal were reiterated by Bhutto while inaugurating the Karachi Nuclear 
Power Plant in November 1972.^ ^ However, the Indian explosion of 1974 
merely provided Pakistan with an opportunity to vindicate its stand on 
apprehensions regarding its security and this is one of the main reasons why 
most authors see Pakistan's proposal for nuclear free zone in the light of the 
Indian explosion. 
Pakistan felt that the entry of India into the nuclear club meant a 
threat to its own national security. Pakistan wanted to put a blanket ban on 
India's further activities. According to T.T. Poulose, Pakistan 'mechanistic 
insecurity syndrome suddenly became active when she saw in India's 
Pokhran explosion the image of nuclear weapon power in Asia.^ ^ Pakistan 
earlier used Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and Islamic conference 
forums to raise the issue of the dangers of India's nuclear explosion and 
thereafter used the United Nations forum to confront India."^ '* 
India's response with regard to the Pakistan proposal of a nuclear 
weapon-free zone in South Asia was that the initiative for establishment of 
such a zone should come from the states of the region. India emphasized that 
there should be prior consultations and agreement among the states of the 
region, which was absent in Pakistani proposal. India also held that South 
Asia could not be considered a distinct zone, as it was an integral part of the 
Asian and Pacific region which was surrounded by nuclear weapon states or 
countries belonging to their system of alliances. 
India opposed the Pakistani proposal both from the conceptual and 
security perspectives. Conceptually speaking India found it difficult to 
accept the idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone because the idea was an 
extension of Non-Proliferation Treaty. Apart from NPT, the nuclear weapon 
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free zone is another measures devised by the nuclear weapon states to 
prevent nuclear proliferation in the non nuclear world. NPT has 
legitimized nuclear weapons in the hand of nuclear weapon states, and one 
of the fundamental principles of India's approach in relation to nuclear non-
proliferation has been to oppose the legitimization of nuclear weapons in the 
nuclear weapon states. India realized that like NPT, the nuclear weapon free 
zone will legitimize nuclear weapons in the hands of nuclear weapon states. 
C. Subrahmanyam, the then Indian Defence Minister, said: "Once the 
nuclear weapon- free zone is accepted, it would legitimize nuclear weapons 
in the hands of nuclear weapon powers and will bring an end to the struggle 
to achieve nuclear disarmament". 
Another conceptual aspect of India's position in relation to the issue 
of nuclear free zone was that India wanted to look at such issue from a 
global perspective. Explaining India's views on regional denuclearesation. 
Ram Dhan told the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 18 
November 1977: "Regionalization of the concept of the world free of 
nuclear weapons will be not only inconsistent with our global approach to 
this question but it will also divert from universal to a sub-regional or 
regional concept. In our opinion, regional nuclear weapons free zones will 
not help to combat the nuclear threat to the world at large^ .^ In his inaugural 
speech in the workshop on Disarmament in New Delhi on 27 March 1978, 
the then Foreign Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, disapproved the concept of 
nuclear free zone of South Asia and instead declared: "The whole world 
should be rendered free from nuclear weapons". He further observed: 
"Nuclear weapons free-zones of merely regional character will not diminish 
the nuclear threat to the world; on the contrary, such a step would provide an 
advantage to the nuclear weapon states particularly as these weapons, with 
their delivery systems, are inter-continental in nature. Therefore, we now 
remain, as in the past, opposed to the declaration of South Asia, or for that 
matter, any artificially restricted area, being declared as nuclear weapon free 
zone.^ ^ 
123 
Former Prime Minister Morarji Desai, while opposing vehemently 
the concept of nuclear weapon free zone, also demanded for global approach 
to nuclear nonproliferation. Addressing the special session of the UN 
General Assembly on Disarmament on June 1978, he said that the problem 
of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, "can only be solved in a 
total manner keeping in view the whole of the globe and not the regions into 
which, presumably as a matter of political convenience or strategy, some 
countries seek to compartmentalize the world". He further said: "It is idle to 
talk of regional nuclear free zones when there would still be zones which 
could continue to be endangered by nuclear weapons. Those who has such 
weapons lose nothing if some distant area is declared non-nuclear. The 
nations without nuclear capability who imagine that their inclusion in such 
zones afford them security are suffering from a delusion". He further added 
that "there cannot be a limited approach to the question of freedom from 
nuclear threats and dangers, but the whole world should be declared a 
nuclear free zone". 
K. Subrahmanyam appreciated Morarji Desai's approach towards 
the issue of nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia. According to K. 
Subrahmanyam, he (Morarji) "formulated for the first time the rationale 
behind India's policy opposing nuclear weapon-free zone.''^ He was able to 
appreciate that the acceptance of nuclear weapon-free zone is one part of the 
world and nuclear guarantee from nuclear weapon powers, in fact, amounted 
to accepting a protectorate status and the legitimacy of nuclear weapon of 
nuclear powers. India's objective is to ensure the elimination of all nuclear 
weapons from the world hence New Delhi cold not accept the legitimacy of 
the nuclear weapons in the hands of a few nuclear weapon powers. This was 
an improvement on the earlier stand adopted during Indira Gandhi's 
period.'^ 
The fundamental security reason behind India's rejection of the 
Pakistani proposal was the China factor. It is well known that the Pakistani 
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proposal aimed only at South Asia thereby leaving China outside the 
proposed nuclear weapons free zone plan. This was perceived in India as an 
instance of Pakistani collaboration with an external power to countervail 
India. It has been asserted that the security to Indian from nuclear China 
with its Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capabilities is more real 
than the alleged Soviet threat to Europe as there has been a war between 
India and China in 1962 and there has been no war between US and USSR. 
Jasjit Singh, a leading defence expert, has pointed out that the Pakistani 
proposal for a South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone has not only 
completely failed to address "to Indian security needs a concern", but sought 
"to keep India permanently disarmed in a nuclear environment". "*' 
In 1979 when India began to express its concern over Pakistan 
developing its nuclear weapon potential, the latter came up with a three 
point proposal. They were: (1) establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone 
in South Asia, (2) a joint declaration by all South Asian states renouncing 
the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, and (3) acceptance of 
international or bilateral inspections.'*^ India rejected the proposal. The then 
Indian Foreign Minister, A.B.Vajpayee, said that India could not accept 
General Zia's proposal about "denuclearization of South Asia because the 
problem of nuclear non-proliferation is wider question and is not one solely 
concerning India and Pakistan. He said "if the nuclear weapon states 
deployed weapons, what is the use of having nuclear weapon free zone in 
South Asia? First, let the non-proliferation treaty be fair to all nations".'*'' 
India considered that the continued deployment of nuclear weapons 
by the nuclear weapon states was not only within their territories but also in 
the territories of non-nuclear weapon states made the whole concept of 
nuclear weapon-free zone meaningless. The nuclear weapon powers, 
particularly the Superpowers, have transferred physical possession of 
nuclear weapons to certain non-nuclear weapon states. Such transfer of 
nuclear weapons are generally made to their allies, while the nuclear weapon 
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powers formally retain the title to ownership of these weapon. Non-nuclear 
weapon states which are in possession of nuclear weapons have come to be 
characterized as "crypto nuclear weapon states".'*'* Such a crypto nuclear 
weapon state can become part of a nuclear weapon-free zone by virtue of the 
facts that it has not carried out a nuclear explosion and is, therefore, a non-
nuclear weapon state according to the NPT. In December 1979, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) decided to deploy 572 new American 
nuclear missile in the Western Europe. Although the NATO decision was a 
result of the strategic, technological and political factors evolving in the 
West,'*^  the deployment of the nuclear weapons in the non-nuclear weapon 
states in such manner really made a mockery of the concept of nuclear non-
proliferation. At the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament 
(UNSSOD-ll) in 1982, India, while opposing the nuclear weapon-free zone, 
argued that such a zone became unrealistic and the movement and 
deployment of nuclear weapon free states were in various regions of the 
world by the nuclear weapon states were fundamentally irreconcilable with 
the very idea of nuclear weapon free zones, India's Foreign Minister said 
that his country could not subscribe to the "legitimization of the possession 
of nuclear weapons by a few powers by agreeing to live under their 
professedly benign protection in the guise of the nuclear weapon-free 
zone."*^  The stand was reaffirmed in the subsequent session of the General 
Assembly when India said that "undue stress" was being laid on peripheral 
and partial disarmament measures like nuclear weapon free zone, the 
proposal for which had become an "annual and pointless ritual" serving to 
introduce "unnecessary discordant notes to the process of regional 
cooperation."'*^ 
In the 40"" session of the UN General Assembly, Eric Gonsalves, the 
Indian representative, said India had backed the proposals in other areas 
because they enjoyed the support of the states concerned. "We have at the 
same time expressed reservation about the efficiency efficacy of such partial 
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nuclear disarmament measures, particularly in the context of new well-
authenticated nuclear findings."'** In the next session also India maintained 
that "no area of the region can be isolated from the consequences of a 
nuclear conflict". 
In October 1985, President Zia of Pakistan enlarging his earlier 
vision of 1979 initiatives proposed to the UN General Assembly to (1) 
declare South Asia a nuclear weapon-free zone; (2) sign the Non-
Proliferation Treaty simultaneously; (3) sign a bilateral nuclear non-
proliferation treaty; (4) agree to an international inspection team visiting and 
inspecting each of the two countries; and (5) renounce mutually the use of 
nuclear weapons. This proposal was regarded by India as tantamount to 
accept the NPT in one form or other. India reiterated its well-known 
principled stand on the NPT and rejected the Pakistani proposal. 
In 1987, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammad Khan Junejo 
proposed a nuclear test ban by India and Pakistan. India's response was 
negative. Such proposal including 1985 Zia's five-point proposal were 
described by India as "insincere and non-serious" in view of Pakistan's 
nuclear weapon-related activities.''^ 
Though India and Pakistan remained diametrically opposed to the 
proposal of nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia, the two countries have 
been able to agree, as a part of the confidence-building measures, on not 
attacking each others nuclear facilities. The agreement was proposed by 
India in December 1985 and the accord was signed in December 1988. In 
January 1991, the agreement came fully into effect with each side releasing 
to each other a list of covered facilities.^" 
Pakistan's attempt to free South Asia of nuclear weapons again 
surfaced in 1991. Since 1974, nuclear weapon free zone has been "the sheet-
anchor of Islamabad's nuclear diplomacy".^' Nawaz Shariff, the then Prime 
Minister of Pakistan in a speech delivered at the National Defence College, 
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Rawalpindi, on 6 June 1991, came up with a seven-point proposal "to 
resolve the issue of Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia". The core of the 
proposal was that the United States, the Soviet Union and China should 
consult and meet with India and Pakistan to discuss and resolve the issue of 
nuclear weapon on the basis of proposals already made or of new ideas that 
may emerge. 
India rejected the Pakistani proposal arguing that Islamabad had 
presented an old proposal in a new form. It reiterated the country's global 
approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation. There was however, near 
consensus among the defence analyst, academics and columnists as well that 
dialogue on the nuclear issue should have been welcomed by the 
government of India, although most of them were highly critical of Nawaz 
Sharif s proposal.^^ 
The timing of the Pakistani proposal was very significant in view of 
the fact that a year before, in 1990, the US had stopped giving of its 
economic and military assistance to Islamabad as the latter engaged in 
nuclear weapon programme. Jasjit Singh questioned that the seriousness on 
the part of Pakistan about its proposal. He said: "how far is Pakistan 
genuinely serious about it, is highly debatable", and emphasized that 
Pakistan made the proposal when it came under pressure from the US on its 
nuclear weapon programme. '^' Pakistan wanted to convey a message, 
through the proposal, that it was interested in the promotion of nuclear non-
proliferation. The principal motivation behind its proposal was obviously to 
check the tide of the US pressure on Islamabad and to enable the Bush 
administration to find ways and means of restoration of aid. It is not 
inconceivable that Pakistan policy makers calculated that eVen if US aid was 
not resumed at least the pressure on Pakistan would recede and Washington 
would press New Delhi to participate in the proposed conference.^^ 
China supported that five nation summit proposal as it had done 
before with regard to similar proposal made by Pakistan. Unlike during 
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earlier period there was a growing appreciation in the United States about 
the relevance of China factor in any effort to bring about a last solution to 
the nuclear issue in South Asia. This new development can be observed in 
the congressional, bureaucratic as well as in the academic circles in the US. 
A well known American scholar, Mitchell Reiss, observes: "Any non-
proliferation policy for South Asia must account for the delicate balance 
interests among the key actors - India, Pakistan, China, the US Congress, 
and the Clinton Administration.^^ 
Though China backed Pakistan's proposal it could not be considered 
as reflecting the totality of the Chinese views on the proposal. In August 
1995 two US Congressmen who were visiting India and Pakistan expressed 
doubts about the possibility to China agreeing to participate in the proposed 
five-nation conference on nuclear non-proliferation in south Asia. To a 
question on China's willingness to join the Conference, Arlen Spector, one 
of the two Congressman said: "I don't know what China's response to our 
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offer will be. It is possible that may not be interested". China's stand in the 
past was that it was not keen on attending a conference where the US had a 
dominant role. It had taken that it could participate, but would like to make 
it clear that it is not part of South Asian nuclear issue. India, on its part 
found this position untenable it that the Chinese nuclear capability has been 
a factor in Indian threat perception. It did not see the objective of peace in 
the region being served without the full participation of the Chinese. 
However, India objected to China's participation as an overseer and 
moderator because it viewed China as a main security concerned and, thus 
insisted that it should enter as India's equal.^ ^ 
The United States, on the other hand, became interested in 
convening a five-nation summit and Washington intensified its diplomatic 
activity to persuade India to participate in the proposed conference. 
According to K. Subrahmanyam, the US interest in pushing the five-nation 
conference to apply pressure on China using the Indian concerns about the 
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Chinese arsenal.^° India, however, rejected the concept of the proposed 
conference and instead proposed to hold bilateral talks with the United 
States on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Till the beginning of 1994, 
three rounds of bilateral talks between the United States and India were held 
on regional security and non-proliferation but nothing concrete emerged out 
of these talks. The United States tried to transform the bilateral talks into a 
multilateral conference to be comprised of the five nuclear weapon states: 
Japan, Germany, India and Pakistan. But New Delhi seemed to have shown 
no genuine interest in it. 
India's Stand on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: 
After more than two years of multilateral negotiations, the much-
talked Comprehensive Test Bank Treaty (CTBT) has been adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in September 1996. The CTBT which perhaps is 
considered as the "oldest item on the agenda of nuclear arms control and 
disarmament" ^ ' has banned "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other 
nuclear explosion". 
The CTBT though aims to encompass all the states of the world, 
affects directly the threshold states not party to NPT- India, Pakistan and 
Israel. The CTBT makes no difference to other non-nuclear weapon states 
that have already sign NPT. Since they have all agreed not to acquire any 
nuclear weapon or explosive devices, there is no need for them to have 
another agreement requiring them not to test non-existent nuclear devices. 
They are already committed under NPT to indefinitely abstain from nuclear 
tests. In view of Pakistan not having any independent view on either the 
NPT or the CTBT, and in view of Israel having supported the CTBT besides 
having close ties with the US even upto the extent of possibility of getting 
nuclear weapon design from Washington. India remains, it now appears, to 
be the only power left amongst the threshold states on whom the CTBT is 
addressed to. 
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According to John D. Holum, Director of the US Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the principal aim of the CTBT and Fissile 
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) was to maintain the American 
technological lead and cap the nuclear programme of threshold states like 
India." 
India has firmly and finally refused to sign the CTBT in its present 
form. There is a national consensus on the issue of rejection of the CTBT 
cutting across the wide spectrum of political parties of all hues. On 20 June 
1996, Arundhati Ghosh, India's representative at the Geneva talks on CTBT, 
made it clear that the draft-treaty was not acceptable to India. It was not 
doing anything new to end the existing five-nation nuclear monopoly, or 
taking any step to a comprehensive nuclear disarmament.^ "' Opposing the 
draft treaty, the Indian representative said: "Let me make one thing 
extremely clear. India will not sign this treaty unless its concerns are not 
taken on board.^ "* India rejected the CTBT on three major counts. First, 
adherence to it would affect India's security interests; Second, India's 
demand for a clear commitment on the part of the five nuclear weapon 
powers to total nuclear disarmament within a fixed period was not included 
in CTBT; and Third, it was not truly a comprehensive treaty but only a 
nuclear test explosion ban treaty which allowed certain types of nuclear 
weapon related tests to be conducted by the technologically more adept 
nuclear weapon states. 
India also objected to the Entry into Force (EIF) clause in the CTBT 
that would require New Delhi, along with 43 other countries to sign and 
ratify the pact for it to enter into force. Regarding India's objection to the 
EIF clause, Arundhati Ghose said it is "unprecedented in the history of 
international treaties that a sovereign nation is required to sign a treaty 
against its will under implied threats".^^ Voicing her strongest objection to 
Article XIV which dealt with the clause, she said, "insistence on this 
language in the treaty text by a small number of countries leaves us with no 
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choice but to state that India cannot agree to the transmittal of this text in 
any form... to the CD (Conference on Disarmament) by the Ad-Hoc 
Committee". She added that it was not India "who is damaging credibility of 
the CD by this action but those who insist on the conclusion in the text of 
provisions which are repugnant to international law",^ ^ 
Addressing at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on 
CTBT on 9 September, 1996. India's Permanent Representative maintained 
that the decision to include the provision of EIF in the CTBT was perceived 
by New Delhi as an "attempt to restraint a voluntary sovereign right and to 
enforce obligation on India without its consent". He remarked that such a 
provision is "unprecedented in multilateral negotiating practice and runs 
contrary to customary international law which holds a treaty does not create 
obligation for a third state without its consent".^ ^ Earlier, at Geneva, India 
made it clear that it would not accept or allow any language in the treaty that 
would affect its sovereign decision on whether or not it would sign the 
treaty. K. Subrahmanyam argued that the EIF clause of the CTBT "is not 
about the treaty but about India's sovereignty".^* According to Jaswant 
Singh, the introduction of the EIF clause was "a mixt deterioration in India's 
security environment".^^ 
At one stage India softened its stand on CTBT was willing not to 
block the proposed CTBT at Geneva provided its objections on the EIF 
clause of the text was suitably amended. The proposed amendment, which 
was presented by India's Permanent Representative, Arundhati Ghose, at 
Geneva to the Chairman of the Conference on Disarmament, Jap Ramaker 
on 30 July 1996 reads: "The treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the 
date of the deposit of the instruments of ratification by 65 states and no less 
than two years after its opening for signatures".^" A South Block source said 
"If the way of Chemical Weapons Convention was agreed upon by the 
international community is any guide, our amendment is the best course for 
those who are so eager to conclude the CTBT, We never wanted to be a 
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treaty wrecker in the past, nor do we want to be now. Our only plea is that 
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please leave India out of this". 
According to Indian diplomats, the most significant point in this 
amendment is that the CTBT can come into force the moment it gets the 
consent of 65 countries, irrespective of whether these include the nuclear 
threshold states or not.^ ^ India was prepared to allow the treaty to be adopted 
by the international community except that it would not sign it because of 
national security considerations. The EIF clause was brought in at the last 
moment to prevent India going nuclear once and for all. However, India 
proposed amendment was not acceptable to the nuclear weapon states who 
played decisive role in the CTBT negotiations. 
The CTBT does not prohibit non-explosive nuclear testing. Over the 
past decades, the technology related to the nuclear testing has evolved to 
such a level that, for some nuclear weapon states, "nuclear weapon test 
explosions", i.e., testing in the traditional way, are no longer on activity 
indispensable to their current objectives regarding nuclear weapons.^ '^ What 
nuclear weapon states seek is the way to maintain them in good condition 
without testing them in the traditional manner, the nuclear weapon states 
wish to continue obtaining, through other means, the benefits and data that 
testing once provided. Testing becomes important only if one wants to 
continue to improve bomb designs or so into the production of large number 
of weapons. The quality of nuclear weapons, i.e., their reliability and safety 
in storage, must be confirmed through testing before production a begun. 
While the negotiations for a CTBT were in progress the United States and 
France signed an agreement which allow the two to share for the first time a 
large amount of computer data drawn from simulated explosion of nuclear 
weapons. It was obviously meant for qualitative improvement of their 
nuclear weapons. The US also has arrangements with the UK and China to 
cooperate in simulation explosion technology.'^ Besides, the US has 
invested several million dollars for supercomputer to help design and test 
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new nuclear weapons in simulation technique. Thus, as the CTBT does not 
ban non-traditional and explosive sub-critical testing and computer 
simulation technique, qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons by the 
nuclear weapon states will continue. The result is that the CTBT will not 
prevent vertical proliferation and there is every reason to believe that it 
would set the framework for a new qualitative arms race. The failure of the 
CTBT to check vertical proliferation is certainly against the letter and spirit 
of the mandate directed by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on 10 
August 1993 to its Ad-Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test. But under which 
the latter was directed to negotiate "a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty 
which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in all its aspects".^^ The "comprehensive" character of a 
nuclear test ban to prevent nuclear proliferation "in all its aspects" (i.e., 
vertical and horizontal, qualitative and quantitative), as envisaged in the 
mandate of the CD, is manifestly absent in the CTBT of the present form. 
The CTBT, therefore, remains more partial and discriminatory rather than 
universal and comprehensive as it should have been as enshrined in the 
mandate of the CD. 
India's position is that it does not oppose the principle of a CTBT 
but the text in its present form. New Delhi has been pressing for a universal 
and non-discriminatory approach in dealing with the measures of nuclear 
non-proliferation. It has been observed that India's "long-standing support 
for the comprehensive test ban is in keeping with its position that arms 
control measures should be universal and non-discriminatory rather than 
regional and selective". 
In India's view a treaty on nuclear test ban which would be 
comprehensive in character should have three essential characteristics 
namely: (i) it should cover all states including the five nuclear weapon 
states; (ii) it should extend the prohibition on the testing of nuclear weapons 
to the underground environment as well; (iii) it should do so for all times.^' 
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In June 1994, India demanded that no test should be carried out 
under the pretext of safety purposes.'* In January, 1996, criticising the plan 
to conduct "sub-critical" tests, the India's representative at the CD said: 
"We must ensure that the CTBT leaves no loopholes for activity, either 
explosive based or non-explosive based, aimed at the continued 
development and refinement of nuclear weapons". In July 1996, India 
insisted that a "genuine" CTBT should ban all forms of nuclear testing 
including "cold testing" in laboratories.*" At the Special Session of the UN 
General Assembly convened in September 1996 to debate the CTBT, 
Parkash Shah, India's Permanent Representative, pointed out that CTBT 
"will not end nuclear testing; it will not stop development and qualitative 
improvement of nuclear weapons. Instead it will only further sustain the 
present nuclear hegemony".*' The then Indian Foreign Minister, I.K. Gujral, 
declared the CTBT as not "comprehensive".*^ He said that the treaty sought 
"to perpetuate a discriminatory and highly unequal status quo for all times to 
come.*^ Disputing the US President Bill Clinton's statement before the UN 
General Assembly that the CTBT banned all nuclear tests, he said: "It does 
not. It bans only one type of test. CTBT is neither comprehensive, nor does 
it ban, nor does it lead you anywhere".*"* 
The CTBT, besides failing to check qualitative improvement of 
nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states, has no provision to prevent 
transfer of nuclear weapons materials and technology from nuclear weapon 
states to non-nuclear weapon states. The treaty has no verification provision 
to monitor such transactions. 
India, apart from insisting the fact that the CTBT in its present form 
is not comprehensive, also stressed that the treaty has failed to address the 
issue of nuclear disarmament. The then Indian Foreign Minister, said: "We 
are in favour of CTBT but at the same time it must reflect the overwhelming 
world view favouring elimination of nuclear weapons with a time frame".*^ 
India's approach that the CTBT should include a time-bound nuclear 
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disarmament plan with commitment from nuclear weapon states has been 
rejected by the latter declaring that the CTBT is not only meant to stop 
nuclear testing and is not a vehicle from nuclear disarmament. It may, 
however, be recalled that the Ad-Hoc Committee of the CD was directed by 
the latter on 10 August 1993 to negotiate a CTBT which would effectively 
contribute not only "to the prevention of proliferation of the nuclear 
weapons in all its aspects" but also to "to the process of nuclear 
disarmament".^^ The issue of nuclear disarmament, therefore, cannot be 
considered as alien to the concept of the CTBT. The then India's Foreign 
Secretary, J.N. Dixit, has stated that at the time of cosponsoring the 
resolution on CTBT in the UN General Assembly in December 1993 to 
endorse the CD's decision, the US and another nuclear weapon states had 
assured India that disarmament will be an important goal of the CTBT 
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negotiations. 
Interestingly, India was the first country to raise the issue of the 
CTBT before the UN as early as 1954. It has been argued that the rationale 
of India's concept of a CTBT which Nehru proposed to the UN General 
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Assembly in 1954 has linked to elimination of nuclear weapons. As 
Jawaharlal Nehru pointed out: "the objective of India is disarmament and we 
regard arms control as a means to achieve it. It is a step in that direction".^' 
The reason why Nehru's appeal had no effect on the then nuclear weapon 
power was that if test ban had been enforced then, it would have been 
disarmament measure.^ ^ 
India has for a long time been an ardent supporter of nuclear 
disarmament which is a strategic goal for New Delhi. Nuclear disarmament 
will be a major factor to enhance international peace and security. 
Addressing at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on 9 
September 1996, India's Permanent Representative, Parkash Shah pointed 
out that Indian security interests, as well those of all states, can be 
safeguarded only in a world free of nuclear weapons.^' Jasjit Singh has 
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observed that India's strategic and security interests are served better if there 
are no nuclear weapons that can impinge on India's security calculus.^ ^ 
Nuclear disarmament, therefore, is not only a moral/ethical principle for 
India and a necessity for international peace and security, but an imperative 
for national security. In the US, competent people like former US Defence 
Secretary and senior military commanders in the report of the Committee 
chaired by General Andrew Good aster have already argued that US security 
will be enhanced with total elimination of nuclear weapons.^ ^ 
Before the advent of the present CTBT, the NPT could have been 
used by the international community as a means to promote nuclear 
disarmament. The NPT itself contains provision (Article VI) that requires 
multilateral negotiations 'in good faith' to achieve cessation of the nuclear 
arms race and nuclear disarmament. But, the disarmament provision of the 
NPT has remained unimplemented so far since the treaty came into force in 
1970. On the other hand, while seeking permanent extension of the NPT in 
1995, the nuclear weapon states, especially the US, went out of their way to 
ensure that no commitments were made with regard to disarmament, and this 
has influenced Indian thinking for the elimination of nuclear weapons.^ '* 
The NPT Conference did adopt a declaration of principles on non-
proliferation and disarmament on 11 May 1995 along with the indefinite 
extension decision under which the nuclear weapon states agree to work 
towards the "ultimate" goal of eliminating these weapons. But briefing 
reporters on the same day the US delegation made it clear the document did 
not amount to a legal obligation on the US to abolish nuclear weapons.^ ^ 
Thomas Graham of the US delegation said the declaration on disarmament 
principles was meant to express the concern of the parties and was 
"designed not to be a condition" for the indefinite extension.^^ 
After the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in 1995, 
thereby legitimizing the possession of nuclear weapons by the five states, 
there is no other appropriate multilateral attempt left, except the CTBT, to 
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deal with the issue of nuclear disarmament. In this scenario, the importance 
of the CTBT to be used as a means for nuclear disarmament has been 
increased. Jasjit Singh writes: "Since the NPT is not allowed to be vehicle 
for disarmament, disarmament linkage in the CTBT became even more 
important".^ ^ "The issue is no longer CTBT. The issue is total 
disarmament"'*, he insists. 
It may be stressed that the issue of linkage between nuclear 
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation is not a new one. At the ENDC, 
the eight non-aligned states including India has raised this issue in the 
second half of 1960s, but was opposed by the two Superpowers. As it 
happened, in spite of India's insistence, the linkage issue between nuclear 
disarmament and the CTBT has been rejected by the nuclear weapon states. 
The then Indian Foreign Minister, I.K. Gujral, observed that "the text of the 
CTBT does not reflect any meaningful commitment to the cause of the 
global peace or eliminating the world of all nuclear weapons". Arundhati 
Ghosh, India's Permanent Representative in Geneva, describing the CTBT 
as "discriminatory" declared: "We are not signing it because nuclear weapon 
states do not want to give up nuclear weapons".^' 
As the CTBT in its present form does not initiate the process of 
global nuclear disarmament which would safeguard the security interests of 
all states including India and as there are countries around India continuing 
their nuclear weapon programmes, overtly and covertly, India has not 
pursued its national security policies. This has also to be seen in the context 
of the stated policy of the US to "cap, reduce and eliminate" India's nuclear 
capabilities.'*^*^ 
It is in the context of safeguarding India's security concerns that 
the issue of India's nuclear options arises. I.K. Gujral said in the 
Rajya Sabha on 11 July 1996 that the CTBT is not in the interest of India's 
national security.'*" Making a detailed statement on CTBT in both houses of 
Parliament on 15 July 1996, he said: "Our nuclear policy is intimately linked 
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with our national security concerns"'°^, India, he observed, is "deeply 
conscious that other countries in our region continue their weapon 
programme, whether openly or in a clandestine manners."'"^ Indian position 
of maintaining nuclear option, in the absence of global nuclear disarmament 
for its security has been emphasised by Parkash Shah, India's Ambassador in 
the UN when he addressed the Special Session of the UN General Assembly 
on CTBT on 9 September 1996. He said: "Our security environment has 
obliged us to maintain the nuclear option. We have exercised unparalleled 
restraint with respect to our nuclear option. Countries around us continue 
their weapon programmes either openly or in a clandestine manner". He 
added that in such an environment "we cannot permit our option to be 
constrained or eroded in any manner as long as nuclear weapon states 
remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear 
arsenals".'"'* 
India, since the time of the NPT negotiations, has been insisting that 
there should be complete disarmament or freedom for every state to keep the 
nuclear option of security considerations.'°^ Indeed, by not signing the NPT 
India has kept its nuclear option open for many years. By not signing the 
CTBT India is keeping open its option regarding the kind of nuclear 
deterrent that India wants to have. There are two kinds of nuclear deterrents. 
The first is the one that is compatible with the CTBT, that does not require 
testing; and the other alternative nuclear deterrent will call for testing. 
However, leading defence analyst felt the existing posture of India's 
nuclear option as inadequate with the changing time, and also confusing. 
According to C. Raja Mohan the key to successful nuclear diplomacy lies in 
putting an end to the "indeterminate nature" of India's nuclear option, and 
he suggested for the exercising of nuclear option. Brahma Chellaney, 
criticising the state of India's nuclear posture, said: "India has practically 
turned its nuclear option into a harmonizing ideology that a tool for self-
defence", and, "opposition to discriminatory treaties and cartels has been 
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mistaken as an end in itself, not a means to an end".'°^ For a quite a long 
time India remained indecisive about its nuclear option and has been 
reiterating to keep it open from time to time. In this regard, K. 
Subrahmanyam has argued that very few countries believe that the Indian 
Government says without adequate supporting explanation and in the 
process the country's credibility is damaged. 
India's conducting of nuclear tests in May 1998 at Pokhran and the 
subsequent announcement by New Delhi that it has become a nuclear 
weapon state clearly indicated that, at long last, India has exercised 
its nuclear option. India however did not show to sign the CTBT 
unconditionally offered to negotiate CTBT on its own terms. The Principal 
Secretary to Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra, in a statement, inter-alia, said, 
"India would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the 
undertakings in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But this cannot 
obviously be done in a vacuum. It would necessarily be an evolutionary 
process from concept to commitment and would depend on a number of 
reciprocal activities. Commenting on the issue of signing the CTBT, Prime 
Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, in an interview, said: "We have indicated our 
readiness to discuss certain provisions of the Treaty on a reciprocal 
basis". "^ ^ The post-Pokhran Indian attitude on CTBT was again articulated 
by A.B. Vajpayee in his address to the UN General Assembly on 24 
September 1998. He observed: 'India, having harmonised its national 
imperatives and security obligations and desirous of continuing to cooperate 
with the international community is now engaged in discussion with key 
interlocutors on range of issues, including the CTBT. We are prepared to 
bring these discussions to successful conclusion, so that the entry into force 
of the CTBT is not delayed beyond September 1999".'°* this is the first time 
an Indian Prime has articulated to the global community at the UN that India 
which has long been projected as an intransigent state on nuclear matters, 
would now be willing to enter a cooperative dialogue with key interlocutors. 
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There is little doubt that this change of attitude has come because of the 
confidence that the May tests have induced and certitude that India is now a 
nuclear weapon state which is able to address its deeper WMD (Weapons of 
Mass Destruction) insecurity based on its own capabilities. A.B. Vajpayee 
also said that India would participate in the negotiations on a treaty that will 
prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices but was quick to announce that India would 
participate in them to "ensure a treaty that is non-discriminatory and meet 
India's security interests", and reiterated India's proposal, first mooted at 
the IZ"' non-aligned Summit in Durban earlier in the same month, to 
convene an international conference in 1999 to discuss the phased 
elimination of all nuclear weapons before the end of the millennium. The 
Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee was indicating that though India was 
prepared to move forward an arms control measures its adherence to such 
measure aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation would critically depend on 
two factors. First such an adherence would have to be part and parcel of its 
endeavour, carried out several decades, to create a nuclear weapon-free 
world, and second, it would have to address India's security concerns. 
In the post-Pokhran II scenario, in spite of international reactions 
and sanctions, India has not suggested any immediate signing of the CTBT 
but has drawn attention to its desire to continue cooperation with the global 
community in discussing a wide range of nuclear issues. Apparently, India 
insisted to regard its announcement of moratorium on nuclear tests as a part 
of its "cooperation" and "consideration" (or reconsideration) on certain 
provisions of the CTBT. Brajesh Mishra, the Principal Secretary to the 
Prime Minister, 'offered to convert India's moratorium on further nuclear 
testing into a formal obligation' through negotiations with "key 
interlocutors" on the CTBT.'"^ Prime Minister Vajpayee, in his UN General 
Assembly speech on 24 September 1998, said that by announcing a 
voluntary moratorium on further underground nuclear test explosions. "India 
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has already accepted the basic obligation of the CTBT".'^° Jaswant Singh 
also writes: "The basic obligation of the CTBT are thus met to refrain from 
undertaking nuclear test".'" 
Besides offering to participate in the CTBT and in the negotiation of 
the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), India also started to 
engage in a dialogue with the United States on non-proliferation issues. The 
dialogue between the Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh and the US 
Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbolt which started after the Indian 
nuclear tests, concluded in January 2000 after a year-and-a half discussion. 
Though the details of the talks between the two interlocutors were not 
revealed, what is important is that it was during the course of these talks that 
Washington agreed to India's need to have a minimum nuclear deterrent "at 
the level it chooses, even if New Delhi signs the CTBT"."^ It may be noted 
that the question of India's credible minimum nuclear deterrent remained 
one of the contentions issues between the two sides since the beginning of 
the dialogue. The US had not accepted the idea that India needs to have 
minimum nuclear deterrent and, in fact, demanded that New Delhi should 
specify in concrete terms its requirements for minimum nuclear deterrent-
number of nuclear weapons, delivery system, and plans for longer range 
missiles. The spokesman of India's Ministry of External Affairs, rejecting 
the American demand, said that "the nuclear deterrence is entirely a matter 
of top secret assessment by the country after taking into account possible 
threat perceptions"."^ There could not be any "fixity" about it, he further 
added. The Prime Minister, A.B, Vajpayee, probably referring to 
Washington's insistence on knowing what New Delhi considered its 
minimum deterrent, had also said that no country can be expected to 
disclose its security plans."'* The Indian analysts believed that the latest 
American position on India's minimum nuclear deterrent may be the first 
indication that the US was willing to tentatively consider India's claim to 
nuclear weapon status. 
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Many of the Indian analysts have asserted that in 1996 India 
opposed the CTBT mainly on security grounds, and now, this stand has 
served no meaningful purpose in India's nuclear diplomacy in the post-
Pokhran II era. Jasjit Singh argues that the basis of most of the Indian 
objections (to the CTBT) has undergone substantive changes after May 1998 
and stressed that having acquired nuclear weapon in a demonstrated and 
credible manner, "We would have the capability to protect ourselves against 
a nuclear threat"."^ According to K. Subrahmanyam, India at the 
Conference on Disarmament in 1996 declared, for the first time in an 
international forum, that the nuclear issue was a vital national security issue, 
and this was a "radical departure from all previous stands".*^^ C. Raja 
Mohan has maintained that "India's principal objection to the CTBT was 
based on its security considerations - that the treaty would have closed 
forever India's option to test nuclear weapons. India wanted to keep that 
option open, and hence, was unwilling to join the treaty". Now, what has 
been suggested by a section of strategic community in India is that the 
nationale of security considerations as a factor for not signing the CTBT by 
New Delhi has lost its merit after India became a nuclear weapon state. C. 
Raja Mohan has argued "... some of India's key objections such as the 
scope of the treaty (CTBT) and its own national security consideration are 
now met by India's own testing of five nuclear devices", and stressed that 
India has "nothing to lose in terms of security by signing the treaty".^ ^* K. 
Subrahmanyam has stressed that the Pokhran II has made Article XIV (entry 
into force) of the CTBT meaningless from the Indian point of view as India 
has declared itself a nuclear weapon state, and added that "the national 
security considerations no longer stands in the way as India has equipped 
itself with what our scientists say is equivalent to what 50 tests would have 
provided"."^ 
In fact, a section of scientific Community close to India's nuclear 
establishment seemed to have supported the view that after Pokhran II, the 
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issue of national security is taken care of with India becoming a nuclear 
weapon state, and for which no further tests are required, A.PJ. Abdul 
Kalam, scientific adviser to Defence Ministry and R. Chidambaram, 
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, who are believed to have played a 
key role in the Pokhran II, have said: From the scientific and technical 
angle, no further nuclear tests are necessary and subscribing to the CTBT 
1 Oft 
would not create difficulties for one nuclear status". A.PJ. Abul Kalam 
further observed: "Mr. Chidambaram and I reviewed the post-Pokhran 
situation from a point of view of both a scientist and a technologist. The 
nuclear tests of May 11-13 this year and May 1974 have given us the 
required data. Besides, the tests have also enhanced our design and 
simulation capability. Many of our institutions have supercomputers and 
simulation is not difficult. We believe that subscribing to the CTBT will not 
affect our status as a nuclear weapon state".'^' 
Though it is possible to assume that the security issue has been 
resolved by India's conducting of a whole range of nuclear test and 
subsequent transformation into a nuclear weapon state, no definite indication 
has been shown by the Indian government that it is ready to give accord to 
the CTBT. A section of analysts also continued to oppose the CTBT and the 
signing of India to it. Arundhati Ghose, who was India's Chief negotiator at 
the CTBT talks in Geneva during 1996, continued her opposition to the 
CTBT in the aftermath of May 1998 tests arguing that the CTBT is 
discriminatory, a corollary to and a control mechanism of the NPT, and 
stressed that "India cannot and should not accept control regimes that would 
be indefinite in time and would jeopardize our decision making 
autonomy".'^^ The former Indian Foreign Secretary, A.P. Venkateswaran, 
opposed signing the CTBT arguing that the inspection and verification 
clause of the treaty "will be misused to bring further pressure to bear on us, 
to yield to the dictate of the major powers".'" A major technical argument 
against signing the CTBT came from A.P. Iyengar, former Chairman of the 
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Atomic Energy Commission who said that many nuclear tests will be needed 
to try out different weapon design and to protect a few of them. "Clearly, if 
India is to develop a credible nuclear deterrent, it cannot sign the CTBT" , 
he observed. 
However, by all accounts, it seemed that the Indian Government 
was not prepared to go ahead with the signing business unless it was based 
on national consensus. The opposition parties have argued the government 
not to sign the CTBT without evolving a national consensus. In a meeting 
with the opposition leaders on 7 December 1998, the Prime Minister, A.B. 
Vajpayee sought to evolve a consensus on the CTBT, and argued the 
opposition parties' cooperation in this regard. "We shall be governed by 
your views"'^^ the Prime Minister told the opposition leaders. 
Within the influential Indian strategic circle a strong viewpoint was 
generated urging the government that while making India's intention to 
accede to the CTBT clear, it should keep a close watch on the US and 
Chinese reactions to the CTBT ratification and not to rush for signing the 
treaty unless ratified by these countries. The rejection of the CTBT by the 
US Senate in October 1999, dealt a heavy blow to the US non-proliferation 
calculations. Yet, the US still continued to hope that New Delhi would sign 
the CTBT unconditionally. The US envoy to India, Richard Celesta, said 
that India may follow the US example by signing the nuclear test ban treaty 
"but not move forward to deposit it with the United Nations until they see 
what action is taken by America, Russia, China, Pakistan and perhaps, 
others. The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, commented that India 
and Pakistan had agreed "in Principles" to sign the CTBT. Though India did 
not offer a negative response to such an observation, New Delhi seemed to 
have maintained that the timing of the signing could not be dictated from 
outside and any decision to finally sign the CTBT would be taken only after 
evolving the broad based possible national consensus on the issue. 
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The Congress, the main opposition party, said that it will support 
the CTBT only if the Vajpayee government gets a commitment from the 
nuclear weapon states that they will eliminate weapons of mass destruction. 
In fact, the Congress had been urging the Government to do some "hard 
bargaining" and not to succumb to the US pressure on the CTBT.*^^  The 
Left Parties which charged the government of 'surrendering' to the US 
pressure on the issue of the related to the signing of the CTBT on the floor 
of Parliament before it takes final stand on it. On the whole, most opposition 
parties cautioned the government against taking any hurried decision on 
signing the CTBT. 
But, the possibility of India giving accord to the CTBT in its present 
form is getting increasingly complicated. There has developed a feeling in a 
section of Indian opinion that the CTBT has become a 'dead letter' after the 
US Senate failed to ratify it. In the US itself, during the Clinton period, 
sharp difference developed between the administration and Senate 
leadership on whether 'CTBT is dead or alive' without directly pointing to 
the 'changed' US position in regard to the CTBT, New Delhi has made it 
implicity known that it would be difficult on its part to sign the nuclear test 
ban treaty in the absence of a conducive global environment. India has made 
such an indication when Defence Minister George Fernandes, after his 
speech at Japan's premier think-tank National Institute of Defence Studies, 
Tokyo, told reporters that 'a positive international environment has to be 
created for India to accede to the CTBT". Possibly, defining of 'a positive 
international environment' may well have to be a key factor to be taken into 
account in building national consensus on the issue of signing the CTBT. 
The nuclear tests of May 1998 have transformed India from a 
nuclear threshold state to a nuclear weapon state or state with nuclear 
weapons. The emergence of India with a changed nuclear status has 
prompted to ask a question as to whether or not India has violated the 
existing non-proliferation regime. But the non-proliferation regime cannot 
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be considered to have been violated by India simply because India was not 
party to the NPT. Only four states (India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba) were 
outside the NPT. Out of these four nations which have accepted to the NPT 
of them, India and Pakistan have declared themselves nuclear weapon state. 
Israel was known to be a nuclear weapon state even as the NPT was being 
finalized in 1968. Only Cuba remains as a non-nuclear weapon state outside 
the global nuclear order. All non-nuclear weapon states have treaty (NPT) 
obligation to remain non-nuclear. Any such country now acquiring nuclear 
weapons could do so only either violating the NPT through clandestine 
processes or by withdrawal from the NPT. The India and Pakistan tests 
cannot be cited as precedents by other since they all acceded to the treaty 
while India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba kept out of it. But, India has been 
maintaining that the NPT, which is the key pillar of the non-proliferation 
regime, is discriminatory as it legitimized possession of nuclear weapon by a 
few states, denying others not to acquire similar capabilities. It is this 
hegemony order of the NPT that has been "challenged directly" by the 
Indian nuclear tests. Ironically, the violation of NPT was taking place in 
India's neighbourhood when China, a member of the NPT since 1992, 
transferred nuclear weapon technology to Pakistan. The breaking down of 
the non-proliferation regime in India's neighbourhood was one of the 
reasons of why India went nuclear. Though India is neither a party to the 
NPT nor a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), it remained 
committed to a non-proliferation. This was reflected by its effective system 
of export controls on nuclear materials and related technologies. Prime 
Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, said that "India's conduct in this regard has been 
better than some countries party to the NPT".'^^ During the course of 
nuclear dialogue between India and the US that followed India's nuclear 
tests. Washington even appreciated India's nuclear export control regime. 
During the Cold War period India's approach towards nuclear non-
proliferation was largely based on "nuclear rejectionism" by which India 
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opposed most of the global nuclear arms control arrangements, India's 
nuclear rejectionism was built around the principles of global disarmament, 
equity and non-discrimination. In the post-Cold War era the non-
proliferation order has been 'expended', 'tightened' posing serious 
challenges to India. The US has indicated its strong resolve to promote the 
non-proliferation order. 
Some analysts have suggested that in order to deal with the 
emerging global nuclear scenario India 'must' shift its emphasis from 
disarmament to arms control and participate in arms control processes.'^* 
But, it has been pointed out that in order to involve in any arms control 
process, it will be necessary to recognize the reality that India is a state with 
nuclear weapons; acceptance of reality would only facilitate the institution 
of arms control and restraint regimes. The response, however, of the five 
nuclear weapon states to recognize India's nuclear states has been 
circumspect. 
It is clear that India cannot be recognized as a nuclear weapon state 
within the existing framework of the NPT. It has been suggested that instead 
of amending the NPT, a protocol to the NPT could be attached where 
countries like India will commit to the obligations of the NPT but as a state 
with nuclear weapons. The US vehemently rejected India claim for a nuclear 
weapon status. Washington ruled out to amend the NPT to recognize India 
(and for that matter, Pakistan too) as nuclear weapon states and said that 
under international law New Delhi could not claim such a status. Reacting to 
the American Position, some Indian analysts observed that international law 
does not define a nuclear weapon state and the NPT does not apply to India; 
'so only a common sense definition would apply: a state which has nuclear 
weapons is a nuclear weapon state'. Arundhati Ghosh says "India is what 
India is - a nuclear weapon state".'^^ But India's stand on its nuclear status 
was clearly and firmly stated by the Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, when 
he in a statement issued on 27 May 1998 in Parliament said: "India is a 
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nuclear weapon state. This is reality that cannot be denied. It is not a 
conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an 
endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers. It is India's due, 
the right of one-sixth of humankind". 
Though India went nuclear it reiterated its commitment to strife for 
the establishment of a nuclear weapon free world. India did not conceive 
nuclear weapons as something which is indispensable for all times. The 
Preamble to Indian Nuclear Doctrine states that the use of nuclear weapons 
constitutes "the gravest threat to humanity and to peace and stability in the 
international system".''''^ Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, while presenting a 
statement on the evolution of India's nuclear policy in Parliament on 27 
May 1998, said: "our leaders reasoned that nuclear weapons were not 
weapons of war, these were weapons of mass destruction. A nuclear-
weapon-free-world would, therefore, enhance not only India's security but 
also the security of all nations. This is the principle plan of our nuclear 
policy".''^' It was with a view of creating a world free of nuclear weapons 
that India was at the forefront of sponsoring the resolution passed 
unanimously by the UN General Assembly on 19 November 1965 which 
sought a nuclear non-proliferation treaty to be based on the principle of 
balance of obligations between the states which possessed nuclear weapons 
and those that did not. Under this arrangement the nuclear weapon states 
were to give up nuclear weapons, and the non-nuclear weapon states would 
not acquire such capabilities. 
After India became a nuclear weapon state it has taken some 
significant initiatives in the direction towards nuclear disarmament. In 
August 1998, India proposed a draft convention on the prohibition of the use 
of nuclear weapons at the conference on Disarmament. It may be recalled 
that in 1978, India proposed negotiations for an international convention that 
would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. But that was the 
time when India had not "exercised" its nuclear option. Reiterating the issue 
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of prohibition of the use of nuclear arms even after it became a nuclear 
weapon state indicates that New Delhi is committed to nuclear disarmament. 
India's permanent representative at the CD, said that "such a convention 
could contribute to the lowering of nuclear threat and to the climate for 
negotiation leading to nuclear disarmament, as was achieved with the other 
two weapons of mass destruction".'^^ India was one of the view that such a 
convention could form the "bedrock of security assurances by being 
comprehensive, legally binding and irreversible. New Delhi's stand on no-
first use of nuclear weapons against nuclear states and non-use of nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear states was also formally conveyed to the CD. It 
may be noted that India offered no-first-use agreement not only with 
Pakistan but "as also with other countries bilaterally, or in a collective 
form". In October 1998, while delivering the Fourth Field Marshal Cariappa 
Memorial Lecture, Jaswant Singh, India's Principal negotiator with the 
permanent five nations on nuclear issues, urged all nuclear weapon powers 
to adopt the twin doctrine of no-first-use and no-use-against-a-non nuclear 
state as the first major step towards universal disarmament.'^^ 
The Indian proposal the United Nations (which was subsequently 
adopted by the world body) for the nuclear weapon states to take concrete 
step to reduce the risk of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear 
weapons marked a new and realistic stage in India's nuclear diplomacy. 
Sharad Pawar, speaking on behalf of the Vajpayee government at the 
Committee for Disarmament and the Security at the UN headquarters on 13 
October 1998, sponsored a resolution asking the nuclear weapon power to 
take steps for reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons. He was 
referring to the practice of maintaining nuclear weapons on 'hairtrigger 
alert', a technical term meaning a state of readiness for immediate 
deployment, which will have catastrophic consequences for mankind. 
During the Cold War, countries working on the principle of first use of 
nuclear weapons were ready to launch nuclear weapons within second part 
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of 'launch on warning strategy'. Though the Cold War divide has 
disappeared, the nuclear doctrine has remained intact. He asked the 
international community to take a fresh look at the nuclear doctrine and 
work towards a globally negotiated no-first-use nuclear agreement. It has 
been pointed out the India's doctrine of no-first-use make its weapons 
stockpile less susceptible to accidental use than that of the big five. In 
November 1998, the Indian resolution was endorsed by the UN Committee 
for Disarmament and Security. Introducing the resolution at the Committee, 
the Indian Ambassador to Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, said the 
"operational considerations" still accorded to nuclear weapons after the Cold 
War was dangerous and constituted a risk to humanity. Expectedly, the 
resolution was opposed by the US, Russia, France and UK. China abstained 
Indian diplomats lashed out at the "hypocrisy of the nuclear weapon states 
and their allies", While constantly lecturing to the rest of the world on 
nuclear restraint and non-proliferation, they are unwilling to reduce nuclear 
accidents could affect the entire world. In December 1998, the UN General 
Assembly adopted the Indian-sponsored resolution demanding that the 
nuclear weapon states take urgent steps to reduce the risk of an accidental 
nuclear war. The resolution which was passed with an overwhelming 
majority called for taking 'necessary measures' to prevent proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear disarmament with the ultimate aim 
of eliminating nuclear arms. It may be noted that in February 1990, India 
and Pakistan signed the Lahore Declaration by which the two countries 
agreed to take 'immediate steps' for reducing the risk of accidental or 
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. 
India has conceived that nuclear disarmament will have to provide 
not only its security objectives (and enhance security of the rest of the 
world) but also will serve as the only durable, non-discriminatory and 
comprehensive non-proliferation order. No doubt, in pursuing its national 
security policy New Delhi will have to engage with the global arms control 
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measures as interim steps, but not as objectives. As Jawaharlal Nehru said: it 
is important to seek agreement on arms control measures especially when 
we have a situation in which disarmament has become a complex problem. 
But arms control is not disarmament and to make it an objective is to 
random the hope for disarmament. We cannot accept that. We have always 
stated we will support any arms control measures they create conditions for 
achieving disarmament".'^ '* India will to pursue its demands for nuclear 
disarmament more vigorously, hopping global Public support. Now that 
India itself has become a nuclear weapon state, its disarmament proposals 
will probably carry more weight. 
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Chapter - IV 
MAJOR ISSUES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
(A) Gulf Crisis 1990-91 
The developments associated with Iraq's overnight invasion/occupation 
of Kuwait in August 1990* and the successful military action under the 
authorization of the United Nations to restore Kuwait's sovereign statehood 
could be considered as epochal in more than one respect. The episode signified 
a new era in world politics; and it invigorated the United Nations in the cause of 
international peace and security. On the other hand, Iraq's unlawful action 
generated within the United Nations not only prompt moral disapproval by the 
international community in unison, but also extra-ordinary political will on the 
part of some major Powers (mainly for reasons that their vital interests were at 
stake) to set right the Iraqi wrong by employing all necessary means. In the 
process, the Gulf conflict brought the United Nations closest to the most 
vigorous application ever the Charter framework for collective enforcement of 
international peace and security. On the other hand, the overall effect of the Gulf 
conflict gave rise to the growing apprehensions about the sidelining (instead of 
strengthening) of the World Organization, in conjimction with the dramatic 
diminution of restraining forces (like the Soviet Union, the nonaligned, etc.) 
within the United Nations political processes. 
As for India, the events in the Gulf during 1990-91 could be considered 
as one of the most challenging episodes in the annals of the administration of the 
country's foreign policy through the United Nations. India could not be 
indifferent to the developing situation, for vital political, economic and strategic 
interests of the country were involved. On a large plane too, India's traditional 
policy of striving to strengthen the persuasive (not coercive) powers of the 
United Nations with a view to settling international problems had never been put 
to test as strenuously as during the Gulf conflict. Nonetheless, India did not, 
notably, enjoy as much leverage as it would have liked to for furthering its 
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objectives, because the timing of the Gulf events unfortunately coincided with 
unfavourable developments that occurred both within and outside the country. 
How well did India attempt to uphold the legal/moral principles at stake and at 
the same time advanced its national interests, while conducting its policy on the 
question in the United Nations? The present chapter seeks to explore this 
question as an exercise to understand contemporary challenges before India's 
diplomacy in the United Nations. 
Sandwiched between two turbulent areas (South Asia on one side and 
the Middle East on the other), the Gulf region with its oil wealth and major sea-
routes is of geopolitical importance to India. Indeed, India had historically 
maintained close political, economic and cultural relations with the countries in 
the region. In line with its nonaligned foreign policy, India actively opposed the 
intrusion of cold war contentions (as manifested in the Baghdad) into the region 
in 1950s; therefore, India was pleased to welcome many of the countries of the 
Gulf into the fold of the Nonaligned Movement. India, also, deeply regretted the 
first Gulf war between Iraq and Iran (1980-88) and strove for restoration of 
peace through bilateral means and also through the NAM and the United Nations 
mechanisms. The Gulf region is also critical for India to check the rise of what is 
known as "Islamic fundamentalism" — a major problem in many of the Islamic 
countries with dangerous portents for stability in South Asia. 
The economic content of India's interactions with the Gulf region has 
increased appreciably in recent decades. India receives nearly 80 per cent of its 
crude oil import requirements from the oil producing Gulf countries. India has 
built up important economic/commercial tie-ups worth millions of dollars with 
the countries in the region. Several thousands of Indian nationals are employed 
in the Gulf countries, and the regular remittances from those workers 
strengthened India's foreign exchange reserves position. 
With reference to Iraq and Kuwait —the principal regional parties to the 
conflict under study - India has equally cordial relations with both. Both Iraq 
and Kuwait supplied to India 8.75 million tones of crude oil in 1990 (out of the 
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total import requirement of 24.28 million tones). Iraq as well as Kuwait had been 
major trading partners of India. The former accounted for over 60 per cent of 
project exports during the years 1981-90 with a value of 5,000 crore rupees. 
India's exports commodities (like tea, spices, chemicals and engineering tools) 
to Iraq for 1989-90 were valued at Rs. 126 crores.^  Politically too, India and Iraq 
have developed more or less the same view on issue like peaceful nuclear 
energy, the question of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, colonialism and 
racism, etc. More notable was Iraq's consistent support to India on the Kashmir 
question especially within the Organization of Islamic Conference. 
India's linkages with Kuwait are no less important. During the years 
1981-90, Kuwait was the single largest donor to India: it gave 220 crore rupees 
from out of the total of 466 crore rupees from the region.'' India's exports 
(commodities like rice, gems, jewels, fruits, vegetables and engineering tools) to 
Kuwait increased significantly in three years — from 92 crore rupees (1986-87) 
to 198 crore rupees (1989-90). 
About 2 lakh Indians were working in Iraq and Kuwait (172,000 Indians 
constitute the largest alien community next to the Palestinians in Kuwait). They 
remitted approximately 700 crore rupees each year in foreign exchange. 
It was no wonder that, in view of the above multifarious linkage and 
interests, the situation arising from Iraq's overnight invasion and complete 
annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 left India with "agonizing choices".'* For, 
on the one hand, the aggressor has been a dependable political and trade ally and 
on the one hand, the conflict involved cardinal principles of international 
conduct, viz. respect for each others sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity, settlement of disputes through peaceful means, etc- the very principles 
India held dear to its heart. Moreover, Kuwait too was no less significant in 
economic and political terms for India. Therefore, India's policy towards many 
issues concerning the Gulf conflict had to defy strait-jacketed, simplistic 
characterizations like "credentials in doubt and credibility impaired".^  The 
conflict was a complicated challenge, and India's complex policy had to weigh 
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contending considerations so much so that neither its vital interests were 
sacrificed nor were the principles of international law brushed aside. 
India's actions, reactions and interactions on the Gulf conflict between 
Iraq and Kuwait could be divided, for the sake of an organized discussion, into 
two phases. The dividing point between these phases roughly was the military 
action in January 1991 by the coalition forces to evict Iraq from Kuwait. The 
basis for phase-wise division appears convenient also in the light of India's 
assumption, coincidentally, of elected, non-permanent seat in the UIN Security 
Council for a term of two years in January 1991. 
In the first phase, India's diplomatic strategy addressed mainly three 
aspects, viz., refraining from condemning Iraqi aggression, seeking from the 
United Nations relief in the context of impact of implementation of sanctions, 
and supporting the cause of a political settlement without resort to war. 
In contrast to the quick and unequivocal condemnation by the UN 
Security Council of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait on 2 August 1990, 
India's reaction was unequivocal and cautions. In a statement issued a day later, 
the spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs regretted the failure of Iraq 
and Kuwait to settle their differences peacefully and hoped, in the context of the 
Iraqi statements, that Iraq would soon withdraw from Kuwait.^  India's cautious 
policy was further adumbrated in terms of opposition to (i) use of force in inter-
state affairs; (ii) induction of outside military forces into the Gulf; and (iii) any 
unilateral actions outside the United Nations framework.' This policy contained, 
at best, an implied rejection of Iraq's use of force; even this disapproval was 
diluted by other rejectionist ingredients aimed against Iraq's adversaries. One 
may surmise that India's non-condemnation stance was guided by the pragmatic 
considerations of protecting the lives and property of Indian nationals in Kuwait 
- the objective of which could not be realistically served without the cooperation 
of President Saddam Hussein's regime. Moreover, India did not perhaps wish to 
contribute to further hardening of stances, with a hope that better sense would 
prevail on Iraq in course of time to reverse its actions. 
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It may be noted here that what Iraq did to Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was 
undoubtedly unprecedented in the post-second World War history. Viewed 
against the categorical stance of the UN Security Council, India's "low-key and 
reasonable" posture of non-condemnation of Iraqi aggression and its plea for 
"earliest possible" withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait stood in stark contrast. India 
was reminded of this deviation by Kuwait as well as by the United States. 
Kuwait politely registered its disappointment over India's stance during a visit 
by the emissary of the Emir of Kuwait to New Delhi in the first week of 
September, He noted,* 
We expect our good friend, India, to play a more positive role, ... 
strongly condemn the brutal Iraqi regime's invasion and complete occupation of 
peaceful Kuwait... take part in the attempts to isolate Iraq and exert pressure on 
it to abide by the Security Council. 
Presumably the United States, too, emphasized the need for India to be 
part of the world opinion; Indian External Affairs Minister, I.K. Gujral, after his 
visit to Washington sometime in the later part of August, noted India's wish to 
be "in step with" the world conmiunity on the Gulf crisis.' 
Consequently, India's view as regards the aggression became much 
more critical of Iraq. For instance, Gujral stated while participating in General 
Debate in fourty-fifth session of the General Assembly,'" 
The crisis has arisen from Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It follows that Iraq 
must withdraw its forces form Kuwait as demanded by the Security Council. 
India does not recognize Kuwait's annexation, Kuwait's independence must be 
restored. 
He also toned down India's opposition to induction of outside forces to 
mean only permanent foreign military presence in the Gulf, Gujral 
acknowledged, during a visit to the United Arab Emirates, the of right of the 
Gulf States to take necessary steps (like inviting foreign military presence) to 
defend themselves.'' 
165 
Impact of Sanctions 
Indeed, India was in step with the international community insofar as 
implementation of punitive sanctions imposed by the Security Council against 
Iraq and the occupied Kuwait were concerned. 
In what could be described as the first ever step of its kind, the Council 
imposed, at the initiative of the Western countries and their allies, the broadest 
set of punitive sanctions of economic nature against Iraq and occupied Kuwait. 
This action taken under the mandatory provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter 
required all Members States to prevent import, export or transshipment of all 
commodities and products including to/from Iraq or Kuwait and to prohibit any 
transfer of funds, supply of military equipments and weapons. The Council, 
however, exempted from sanctions foodstuffs and medicines to be supplied 
"under humanitarian circumstances".'^  
Soon reports reached about the serious shortage of food and medicine in 
Iraq/Kuwait. India was very much concerned, because nearly 12 lakh Indians 
were stranded in the conflict zone. India attempted to deliver essential supplies 
to its stranded citizens but its vessels were stopped by the navy of the United 
States, which had enforced unilaterally interdiction of all ships approaching 
Kuwait or Iraq. It was against this backdrop that India, along with Philippines, 
approached the Security Council for permission to deliver humanitarian supplies 
for its nationals stranded in the area of conflict. The United States first 
questioned the veracity of the reports about shortage of food and then doubted if 
the supplies would not be pilfered by the Iraqi authorities before they reached 
the targeted populations. 
In the Security Council, Cuba's move to disallow any attempt to hinder 
access of civilian population and the foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait to food 
and medicines failed to secure necessary support.'^  The adopted text set out a 
time-consuming process for clearing delivery of foodstuffs and medicines. The 
resolution empowered the Council (and the conmiittee established by the 
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Council to supervise implementations of sanctions by Member States) to 
determine the existence of the need for humanitarian supplies.''* only after the 
adoption of the resolution, India was authorized to deliver foodstuffs to its 
nationals stranded in Iraq, Kuwait. Nonetheless, Cuba reflected India's 
sentiments where it pointed out the lapse of valuable time for cleaning India's 
request, whereas the Security Council was taking one precipitate action after 
another with extra-ordinary sense of urgency. 
With regard to the larger question of implementation of sanctions, India 
as a dutiful Member of the Organization complied with the decision of Security 
Council.'^  India did so at the tremendous cost of its economy. The impact of 
implementation of sanctions on the already fragile economy of the country was 
said to be more serious than anticipated, especially in relation to import of oil, 
remittances, and repatriation. India brought to the attention of the Security 
Council the fact that, because of ban on import of oil from Iraq or Kuwait, it had 
to suddenly look for alternative sources of supplies to the tune of one-third of its 
import requirements. Delay or uncertainly in that regard would retard the 
country's industrial growth. Furthermore, the sharp rise in oil prices had severely 
handicapped India's ability to finance import of oil. As against the budgeted 
amount of US $ 3.5 billion (6,400 crore rupees) for import of 24.28 million tones 
in 1990-91 at the pre-conflict rate of $ 17 per barrel, increase of one dollar per 
barrel would mean additional cost to its exchequer to the tune of $ 222 million 
(400 crore rupees).'^ At one point of time, the barrel rate of oil crossed $ 28, 
which meant and additional gross financial burden on India to the tune of $ 2.4 
billion (4,400 crore rupees) which was quite unbearable to its fragile foreign 
exchange reserve position. 
The next major area of serious impact of sanctions concerned foreign 
trade - where the loss was estimated, for the year 1990-91, at $ 265 million. 
Besides the yearly inflow of remittances by Indian working in Iraq / Kuwait to 
the tune of $ 389 million had completely vanished. Again, India had to 
undertake the biggest ever airlift in the aviation history (a total of 477 flights) of 
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its stranded nationals to safety of home — each flight carrying 300 passengers 
had cost Rs. 75 lakh. Repatriation of those evacuated would cost $ 720 million. 
India exercised its right, under the terms of Article 50 of the Charter, to 
consult the Security Council with regard to solution of its special economic 
problems arising from the implementation of sanctions. Then Council which was 
otherwise prompt imposing sanctions took nearly three months to respond to 
India's request for relief The Council's brand of relief was tantamount to 
virtually no relief. For, the Security Council's sanctions conmiittee merely made 
an appeal to all States to provide on an urgent basis immediate technical and 
material assistance to mitigate India's hardships. Not surprisingly precious 
little was forthcoming in pursuance of the appeal, a joint memorandum 
submitted by India and twenty other most seriously affected countries, too, was 
of no consequence.'* 
It was in this context, India was right in describing its experience as 
"both frustrating and disappointing". India's External Affairs Minister protested 
in the General Assembly, thus'^ : 
The consideration of our case took place after long delays and it resuUed 
only in a call on Member states and United Nations specialized agencies to give 
attention to our problems. A lesson we should draw from this experience in that, 
in future, a mechanism should be devised for the automatic commencement of 
action under Article 50 in the event of the imposition of sanctions. 
Also, India strongly favoured the Secretary-General's suggestion to 
supplement Article 50 by "appropriate arrangements creating obligations to 
assist concretely the disadvantaged third State or States".^ ° 
India's Prime Minister, P.V. Narsimha Rao, subsequently raised the 
matter in the historic Security Council Summit meeting held in January 1992. He 
commented.^ ' 
While implementing its resolutions in good faith, it is incumbent on the 
Security Council to anticipate all the consequence of its decisions. Some 
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consequences may be unintended, but they can affect those whom they are least 
intended to affect. 
One constant strand of India's policy was its preference for peaceful 
solution to the problem. As India's External Affairs Minister observed once: 
"while we recognize the complexities of the solution, we hope there will be a 
political solution in the interest of all",^ ^ India's conception of a role to 
contribute to such a peaceful solution was devoid of a high-profile posture. As 
Iraq was reportedly not receptive to India's offer of good offices, it rule out any 
role of a "self-appointed mediator" and preferred rather to wait for a feel of the 
ground. Hence, a series of visits to Moscow, Washington, Belgrade, Dubai, 
Baghdad and much criticized visit to occupied Kuwait, The Minister for External 
Affairs wrote to his counterparts in China, France, USSR, United Kingdom, and 
the United States proposing an international conference under the UN auspices 
to defuse the conflict.^ ^ He reiterated the idea while he was in Dubai. It may be 
noted here that, whereas the UN Security Council demanded unconditional 
withdrawal and restoration of status quo ante, India seemed willing to leave the 
principle of withdrawal to the process of negotiations. 
It is pertinent to refer to Iraq's attempt to link its withdrawal firom 
Kuwait with the Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories including the 
Palestinian homeland. Obviously, it was a clever move on the part of the 
President Saddam Hussein to reap propaganda/political benefits from a situation 
of disadvantage. The move was intended to shift the focus away from Iraq's 
wrong-doings and mobilize the Arab opinion against the United States and 
Israel. India tended to favour initially a comprehensive approach to solve the 
problem, in a way accepting the linkage of the Kuwait and the Palestine problem 
not exactly in the manner Iraq desired, but in a sequential manner. Later on, as 
Iraq continued to insist on prior acceptance of its demand for settlement of all 
aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but India became more firm to reject any 
linkage of the Kuwait conflict with other long-standing questions. The Minister 
of External Affairs spokesperson was quoted as nothing that^ '* : merely because 
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there was no movement in regard to one issue, there was no reason to stall 
movement towards progress on the other. 
At one point of time, Prime Minister V.P. Singh, in a state of 
helplessness, indicated: "Our perception is that there has to be collective action 
at UN. That is the forum we have to look for a solution".^ ^ 
In the meantime, matters reached a point of no return with the Security 
Council setting a specific date (15 January 1991) by which Iraq was required to 
withdraw voluntarily. In case of Iraq's failure to do so, the Council invoked in a 
curious way of the Chapter VII authority of the UN Charter and authorized 
"Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait... to use all 
necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all 
subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in 
the area".^ ^ What "all necessary means" meant was a subject of divergent 
interpretations. While the United States interpreted the resolution as the last 
chance for Iraq to peacefully withdraw, and contended that "all necessary 
means" including use of force if necessary. '^ Many countries including India did 
not think so. A senior official of the Ministry of External Affaks was reported as 
stating that whereas India supported resolution 678 (1990), India was not 
convinced that the resolution authorized use of force.^ ^ In any case, India made it 
clear that it did not believe in the use of force for the resolution of the problem, 
with reference to the feverish war preparations by the pro-Kuwait coalition led 
by the United States. India's External Affairs Minister, in a meeting of the 
Parliamentary Consultative Committee attached to his Ministry, ruled out 
deployment of the Indian forces "under any circumstances".^ ^ India advised 
restraint and accommodation to Iraq and the United States. 
However, during the months of November-December, India was too 
preoccupied with internal political development to undertake any major 
diplomatic initiative. Perhaps, it realized that stakes were so high for both parties 
that not much room was left to manoeuvre an honourable way out. 
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Various initiatives by the European Community, France, the Soviet 
Union, and the UN Secretary General were futile to persuade Iraq to announce 
withdrawals before 15 January 1991. Once the deadline lapsed, the conflict took 
a new, more serious turn with the launching of military action led by a US-led 
coalition on 16/17 January 1991. It was a setback to India's desire for a peaceful 
settlement; at a higher plane, in the words of the Secretary-General, it was a 
"startling failure of collective diplomacy".^ ^ 
In the changing situation, India's diplomacy was confronted with a 
grave challenges - especially so because India began its two year stint in the 
Security Council in January 1991. 
India's Prime Minister lost no time in recording his "deep distress" at 
the outbreak of the hostilities.'" India, as were many nonaligned countries, was 
anxious about the "simple and straight forward" , goal of the military operation, 
viz. to get Iraq out of Kuwait, to restore legitimate authority in Kuwait and to 
"restore peace and stability to the area".^ ^ But the scope and severeness of the 
operations-extending to Iraq and civilian targets therein — caused a great deal of 
anxiety about the motives of the countries leading^the operation. Therefore, the 
urgency of bringing to an end the hostilities immediately. India worked towards 
bringing about immediate ceasefire and revival of negotiation process-subject to 
the acceptance by Iraq of the requirement on immediate withdrawals from 
Kuwait. The tactics it employed towards that end ranged from concerting with 
nonaligned, like minded countries to bring pressure on the warring parties, to 
take initiatives by itself or supporting initiative by other counfries. 
The principal element of India's diplomacy in the Security Council was 
to find a basis for early ceasefire. As such India welcomed Iraq's offer on 15 
February to negotiate on the Security Council resolution 660 (1990) "with the 
aim of reaching an honourable and acceptable solution, including withdrawal". 
Describing the offer as a "window of opportunity", India proposed a three-
pronged action plan envisaging (i) that the Council should explore the basis of 
peaceful implementation of resolution 660 (1990); (ii) immediate cessation of 
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hostilities to provide a congenital environment; and (iii) that the Secretary-
General be authorized to explore the possibilities of peaceful settlement. '^' 
The Soviet Union launched a diplomatic initiative on 18 February and 
informed the Security Council that the President Saddam Hussein accepted its 
four point plan (i) Unconditional acceptance of immediate withdrawal from 
Kuwait under resolution 660 (1990), following which other resolutions would be 
deemed as rescinded; (ii) Total withdrawal of the Iraqi troops in 21 days after 
ceasefire came into effect; (iii) exchange of prisoners of war within three days of 
the commencement of the ceasefire; and (iv) monitoring of ceasefire and 
withdrawals by UN peace-keeping forces?^ The United States found the Soviet 
plan unsatisfactory. 
The main American objections were that the withdrawal schedule did 
not confirm to the immediacy envisaged in resolution 660 (1990); that what 
looked like unconditional acceptance of resolution 660 (1990) was infact 
conditional insofar as cancellation of the rest of the resolutions of the Council on 
the subject was concerned including resolution 662 (1990) that nullified Iraqi 
annexation of Kuwait. 
The United States took the counter-offensive and issued a charter of 
four tough demands: viz., (i) Iraq must begin instantaneous withdrawal it in 
respect of Kuwait city in 48 hours and from the whole of the Kuwait in one 
week; (2) Release of prisoners of war to the third country nationals in 48 hours 
of the commencement of withdrawal; (3) Iraq must be removed from all Kuwait 
oil installations; and (4) Any breach of the above demands by the retreating 
Iraqi forces would be instantly and sharply punished. The American Permanent 
Representative declared that the only way to avert the impending 
commencement of the ground war was the immediate and unconditional 
acceptance by Iraq of the Charter of demands. At that stage, India intervened to 
suggest that in case the United States and the Soviet Union were unable to 
narrow down differences in their respective plans, the non-permanent members 
of the Security Council could be authorized to some way out. The suggestion 
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was favourably received by the Soviet Union, Ecuador, and Yemen. However, 
the delegate of Egypt registered a descending voice. In view of the impasse, the 
USSR indicated its intention to work for an integrated solution on the basis of 
both the American and Soviet plans. 
In the meantime, the coalition forces launched a massive ground 
offensive, as planned, on 24 February, thus mounting pressure on Iraq to 
surrender. Battered heavily on battlefield, Iraq completely yielded to the Allied 
demands in accepting unconditionally resolution 660 (1990) and all other 
relevant resolutions. Consequently, operations were suspended with effect from 
28 February 1991. 
Once Iraq surrendered, the United States and its allies sought to further 
tighten screws on a defeated Iraq. A 7-Power draft was introduced in the Council 
on 2 March outlining numerous preconditions for a ceasefire, viz., rescinding of 
annexation of Kuwait, acceptance of legal liability for the losses and damages 
resulting from invasion/occupation of Kuwait, release of the detained Kuwait 
nationals and third country nationals return of all Kuwaiti property seized by 
Iraq.^ ^ India welcomed Kuwait's liberation. However, it abstained in the vote on 
the text which was adopted and it expressed reservations on the ground that the 
resolution did not incorporate permanent and formal ceasefire; that the procedure 
to verify Iraq's compliance with whatever it was required to do was vague and 
Secretary-General should have been associated with the process; (3) the 
resolution kept open the possibility of resumption of hostilities; and, (4) finally, 
the continuation of sanctions even after the liberation of Kuwait was beyond the 
original intent of the move. 
Agreeing that suspension of hostilities was a significant step towards 
restoration of peace, the Indian Permanent Representative pointed out that 
deficiencies of the text could have been corrected.''^  He noted: 
We feel that with sufficient time to consider the draft resolution,,.. with 
a more active and prolonged dialogue, we might conceivably have reached a 
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more consensual draft that could have addressed some of the grave and urgent 
issue in a more positive and purposeful manner and helped in achieving the rapid 
and durable restoration of peace and security in the area. 
India supported four of the seventeen unsuccessful amendments 
introduced by Cuba. As Cuba pointed out, resolution 686 (1991) reflected the 
Security Council's abdication of its fundamental responsibility i.e. establishment 
of ceasefire. Instead of conforming to the standard practices of bringing about an 
unconditional ceasefire, resolution 686 (1991) established some pre-conditions 
for ceasefire. China, too, abstained on the text, because some suggestions it 
made were not accepted by the sponsors. In China's view, the Council should 
play "a positive role in establishing a formal ceasefire and in seeking a practical 
formula for a political solution" within the framework of the relevant resolutions 
of the Security Council. 
After Iraq accepted the terms of resolution 686 (1991), there followed a 
series of month-long informal consultations on setting out further, more 
elaborate terms for a formal ceasefire. Those consultations - in which India also 
took part led to the "mother" of all UN Security Council resolutions as a 
diplomatic slap in the face of Iraq's claim earlier to wage to mother of all wars 
against infidels. The draft was, in the words of one of its sponsors, a 'complex 
and detailed' one, comprising in its operative part nine sections and thirty-four 
paragraphs. The controversial provisions concerned, (1) United Nations 
guarantee to the inviolability of Iraq-Kuwait boundary as agreed upon in the 4 
October, 1963 Baghdad Agreement; (2) destruction of Iraqi chemical, biological 
weapons, and ballistic missiles with a range of more than 150 miles, under 
international supervision; (3) destruction, or rendering harmless of nuclear-
weapons-usable material under the International Atomic Energy Agency's 
verification; (4) creation of a Fund to pay compensation for any direct loss, 
damage or injury resulting from Iraq's illegal actions; and (5) prohibition of any 
Iraqi support to any form of international terrorism.^ ^ The United States would 
have liked the text to be more harsh, but the veto power bearing Permanent 
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Member like China, France and the Soviet Union insisted on toning down of the 
original text. India was credited with bringing about two changes in the draft in 
the course of negotiations. At the instance of India, a provision was inserted for 
withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq after the deployment of the UN 
observers (paragraph 6). Likewise, paragraph 20 provided for exemption, from 
continuous enforcement of sanctions, supply of food-stuffs and essential goods 
for civilian use. 
The Security Council's guarantee of the border was without any 
precedent and, therefore, the Security Council should have left the questions of 
Iraq's liability to the World Court. Yet, India voted in favour when the text was 
put to vote, because it welcomed a formal, definitive cease-fire contained in the 
text. China and Zimbabwe, too, voted in favour whereas Ecuador and Yemen 
abstained, with only one negative vote by Cuba. 
India explained its vote in the following interesting words''^ : 
The draft resolution deals with issues which the Security Council has 
never before been called upon to consider. The authors of the draft have assured 
us, bilaterally as well as in course of formal consultations, that they have put 
together the various elements of the resolution in the ftill understanding that the . 
international community is dealing with a unique situation of which there has 
been no parallel since the establishment of the United Nations; hopefully there 
will be none in the ftiture. We have urged to look at the resolution in the light of 
the uniqueness of the situation. 
Indeed, India looked at the totality of the resolution - the way it was 
urged to. It supported the text in the vote. Nonetheless, the Indian delegates 
introduced a note of caveat here and there. India expressed opposition to any 
ftiture attempt by the Council to impose arbitrarily a boundary line between two 
countries. India was supportive in Iraq-Kuwait case because what was involved 
was merely the demarcation of the boundary as per the terms of the 1963 
Agreement. Again, India believed that all non-military sanctions against Iraq 
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should have been lifted, although it was gratified by addition of a provision for 
six-monthly review.'"^  
India followed up its positive stance on Resolution 687 (1993) in course 
of various consequential moves. For instance, India had readily agreed to send 
military observers to form part of the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission. The 
Mission was set up in April 1991 to observe compliance with ceasefire and 
maintain demilitarized zone on the Iraq-Kuwait boundary. However, India 
should have pointed out the danger of instituting a peace-keeping force, 
traditionally a non-enforcement activity, now under the enforcement provisions 
of the Charter.'*' 
Likewise, India had supported the work of the Boundary Demarcation 
Commission which completed its technical work in August 1992 and its 
recommendations were endorsed by the Council.''^  
The Indian government's response to Gulf crisis has been very cautious. 
The Gulf War found India confused and divided between support to Sadam 
Hussein and loyalty to the United States. It was contrary to the Indian tradition 
in such situation, which has taken a principled stand and to play active role in 
diffusion of crisis. 
India has vital national interest in the Gulf region. It has the best 
relations with the Arab countries and has close trade link with them. Several 
lakhs of Indians are working in these countries. But the crisis in Gulf has caught 
India just following the lead given by others. There was no clear articulation of 
what national interests were jeopardized by the war in West Asia. There was no 
clear policy formulated to protect, leave alone, and promote these national 
interests. 
Even India has a good relations with Iraq as well as a good firiend of 
Saddam Hussein, but India did not want to be seen as rewarding aggression and 
decided to join the international consensus in support of UN economic sanction 
against Saddam. The fact that the Soviet Union was working in harness with 
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United States in the first post-Cold War crisis doubtless eased India's decision, 
which also reflected in the improvement of its relations with Washington. 
At the early stage of the crisis, the first official statement on the crisis 
comes one week after Iraq had occupied Kuwait. It merely stated that India was 
in the process of formulating its policy."*^  Iraq was not denounced for its act of 
invasion. Two further statements were lengthier but not more enlightening. 
Parliament, media and intelligentia had all been critical of the government's cold 
response. Critics of the government's low key handling of the crisis in the 
Persian Gulf blamed both the Prime Minister V.P. Singh, and the then Foreign 
Minister, I.K. Gujral, for their failure to play a role and take an initiative in 
defusing the crisis in accordance with India's traditions. I.K. Gujral had 
announced in the Rajya Sabha that the Indian government had deliberately 
maintained a low-profile. India did not 'condemn' the Iraqi aggression against 
Kuwait, not even in annexation, in the beginning. The aggression of a member 
state of NAM by another was a matter serious enough to deserve an immediate 
denunciation than merely a silent or mild disapproval.'*'* 
Congress President Rajive Gandhi regretted that India had 'lost the 
initiative' and expressed that India should have been much more active right 
from the beginning when Kuwait was taken over by Iraq. During the last phase 
of his government, V.P. Singh made an important move by allowing US military 
aircraft on supply runs from the Philippines to the Persian Gulf to refuel at 
Indian airports, Washington appreciated the gesture which, by reducing the 
amount of fuel the planes need to carry, increased Cargo load. Since New Delhi 
did not publicize its decision, the media and most of the politicians were 
unaware that US military aircraft were refueling in India."*^  
When Chandra Shekhar became Indian Prime Minister, his government 
continued maintaining India's support for UN action against Iraq and agreed to 
continued US refueling even after diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis failed 
and the bombing on Iraq began.'*^  By this move of refueling, it was interpreted as 
being a violation of the diplomatic principle of neutrality towards the 
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belligerents in a war to which India was not a party. The government contention 
was that India was not neutral in this war but was very much part of it. As it was 
a war authorized by the UN through the Security Council resolution, which India 
did not oppose. It was obligatory on its part to go by the UN decision. The 
trouble appeared to have been that the US had converted what was supposed to 
be a war by the UN into virtually an American war.''^  
According to the provisions of the UN Charter, under which this war 
was authorized, made it compulsory for any UN member to assist in the war 
when called upon to do so, although, of course, the sovereignty of member 
nations placed some limit upon what could be demanded of them. But granting 
refiieling right did not violate these limits in any way and in fact to refiise the 
Americans to refuel their planes would have violated India's obligations to the 
UN.'^  
This Iraq action was regarded as a most indefensible aggression to 
resist, which was the objective of all peace and justice loving countries. India 
could not contribute any thing in money or material terms. Indian permission to 
refuel American planes was a small contribution to reverse the military invasion 
against Kuwait since Iraq had refused to accept peaceful withdrawal of its troops 
from the Kuwait territory. It was well understand that the UN resolution 
authorized action only for evicting Iraq from Kuwait and not for destroying Iraq 
or its military capabilities or for imposing upon the West Asia region, a regime 
devised by the US for its own purposes. Financially, also it was not going to cost 
much to India as the US conmiand had agreed to pay landing fee and to replace 
the fuel that would be supplied to the American Planes. 
Chandra Shekhar's basically supportive stance drew increasing criticism 
from his main supportive party i.e., Rajiv's Congress Party, which thought that 
by taking a different track it could bolster prospects for new elections anticipated 
in 1991. Rajive felt restless about India's being on the sidelines, playing not role 
in the Persian Gulf Crisis, and calculated that his party would gain at the ballot 
box by adherence to non-alignment, Indian nationalism (i.e., opposing 
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Superpower domination), and Indian Muslim support for Iraq, like other 
countries in Asia, some Indian Muslim sympathized with Baghdad, especially 
after the air attacks against Iraq began in January 1991.'*^  
In a critical letter to the Prime Minister Chandra Shekar, Rajive Gandhi 
charged the government with neglecting India's vital foreign policy interests 
during the Gulf crisis and reducing the nation to the level of a "helpless 
spectator". He argued that the government should "come up with a creative and 
relevant response" to the crisis, so that a peaceful solution could be evolved 
through non-violent means.^ " 
The charged atmosphere exploded the accidental discovery by an Indian 
press photographer that a US military transport was refueling at Bombay airport. 
Once the Indian media revealed that refueling was taking place on a regular 
basis, a political storm broke over Chandra Shekhar's head. With Rajive Gandhi 
taking the lead, the entire Indian political spectrum, except Bhartiya Janta Party 
(BJP), denounced the government's continuing to grant the United States 
refueling rights when bombs were storming down on Baghdad.^ * 
India, though formally aligned itself with UN sanctions, it did not join 
the naval blockade of Iraq. It was refused to send military troops. Several factors 
can be attributed to the low profile policy; First and foremost factor was the safe 
evacuation of Indian national from Iraq and Kuwait. Indian government believed 
that to condemn Iraq for aggression would be risking Indians to harassment, 
humiliation or even worse. It was not easy task to evacuate this huge humanity 
from a war zone. In the greatest airlift in history since the Berlin blockade in 
1949, the government had flown back home or safety all those nationals willing 
to leave the crisis zone. 
Secondly, Indian government wanted to protect its economic interests. It 
made an effort to ensure that the flow of petroleum to India does not dry up as a 
result of the UN sanctions against Iraq. India was getting around 8.5 million 
tones of oil and oil products from Iraq and Kuwait. 
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Thirdly, the Indian government at that movement was too pre-occupied 
with the domestic problems. The delayed reaction might have been the result of 
the Devi Lai crisis which rocked the government at the time, followed by the 
horrendous fall-out of the Mandal Commission's Report. The government was 
evidently taken unawares, as the intelligence agencies once again let it down. 
Fourthly, because of internal and regional situation, the Indian 
government perhaps could not afford to commit itself or involve actively in the 
Gulf crisis. Its armed forces were occupied to help the civil administration in 
tackling the various internal crises like in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and Uttar 
Pradesh etc. Not very cordial relations with the neighbouring countries required 
constant vigilance on the borders. Moreover, India did not like to contribute to 
the naval armade in the Gulf because it was not set up under the UN flag. Above 
all, India's experience of sending troops in Sri Lanka had not been a very happy 
and successful one. 
Lastly, India could not be a 'self appointed' mediator as no sensible 
government would poke its nose unless its interests were directly threatened. 
With the charging betrayal of non-alignment, Rajive Gandhi threatened 
to withdraw Congress support from the government. The Rajive Gandhi who 
criticized US bombing attacks on Iraq in 1991 hardly sounded like the man that, 
as Prime Minister from 1984 until 1989, was eager for better relations with 
Washington. A cornered Chandra Shekhar had no choice but to ask the United 
States to stops refueling. Understanding the political bind in which the Prime 
Minister found himself, Washington agreed quickly, seeing no advantage in 
trying to force the issue. Since the war ended just a day or so later, the loss of 
refueling facilities had little impact on the US supply pipeline. ^^ 
The US pay back for the Chandra Shekhar government's cooperation, 
by playing a positive role in supporting New Delhi's quest for a large emergency 
loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to meet the financial drain 
caused by the Gulf crisis. This 180 degrees switch from the negative stance the 
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United States took when India sought help from the IMF in 1980 was also 
facilitated by the Indian government's promise to undertake major economfc 
reforms. The desire straits in which the Indian economy found itself was another 
factor. 
In the United Nations, after India joined the UN Security Council in 
January 1991 as one of rotating, non-permanent members, New Delhi gained an 
important voice in deliberations on the Persian Gulf crisis. India's weak 
government also found itself like all Security Council members under great 
pressure from the Bush administration to join the consensus for keeping 
Saddam's away from Kuwait. In a show over Security Council votes. Secretary 
of State James Beker announced cessation of US aid to Yeman, after Yeman 
along with Cuba supported Iraq and voted against US favoured resolutions. To 
Washington's annouance, India seemed to be on the side of Yemen and Cuba in 
its initial 1991 vote to oppose proposed reparations.^ '* 
In subsequent vote on 3 April, however, New Delhi changed its 
position, dropping its opposition and voting for the key resolution that spelled 
out the ground rules for dealing with Iraq. This important switch in the Indian 
stance, for which the US government pressed hard, came only after a tough 
internal struggle by Chandra Shekhar government between those who stressed 
good relations with the United States and those who were against the relations 
with US about the precedent of UN infringement of Iraq's sovereignty. 
However, as regard the American reactions to India's stance during the 
crisis, which were contrary to expectations in some quarters, there was no open 
expression of resentment by the Bush administration because it appreciated the 
fact that India with the policy of non-alignment with big Muslim population, was 
under severe compulsion to take a particular line of action. They felt that India 
had been helping them in critical moments, whenever required and they wanted 
to respect their sensitivities at a different juncture to its domestic politics." 
181 
(B)GulfCrisis-2003 
Another major challenge to international security and to the United 
Nations in maintaining international peace and security, in the recent past has 
been the military intervention in Iraq in 2003 by the United States and its allies 
under Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is not possible however, to properly examine 
that intervention and the issues leading up to the intervention in isolation and 
without first having regard to the last decade and a half of conflict. Indeed, in 
considering whether or not the most recent intervention is legal, it is that period 
of armed and political conflict with Iraq that is partly determinative. 
The intervention in Iraq in 2003 has been a matter of considerable 
controversy, both prior to the commencement of operations and since then in the 
light of the failure of arms inspectors to find weapons of mass destruction with 
the Iraqi territory, and allegation of faulty intelligence and misleading public 
statements by State officials. Many issues arise out of war, including the basis 
upon which states may use force against one another; the effectiveness of 
various international instruments governing the non-proliferation and 
disarmament of weapons of mass destruction; the conduct of military operations 
in the field; the role of the United Nations are others in post-war reconstruction 
the accuracy or otherwise of military intelligence used by leaders to justify 
action against Iraq; and the role and relevance of international law in modern 
politics. All these issues are important and have bearing on the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
One of the key issues which has attracted significant attention in the 
legality of use of force against Iraq. Various arguments might be employed in an 
attempt to validate the action against Iraq. It might be argued, for example, that 
intervention was permissible as an act of anticipatory self-defence, in the face of 
intelligence suggesting that Iraq was in a position to launch weapons of mass 
destruction at 45 minutes' notice. This would have to be tempered against the 
subsequent filing of a dossaur by the United Kingdom Parliamentary Foreign 
Affairs Committee on 7 July 2003 on Iraq's weapons, relied upon by Prime 
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Minister Tony Blair in his address to the Parliament on 18 March 2003, was 
incorrect. The contention would also need to reflect upon the legal arguments 
that neither the United Nations Charter, nor customary international law permit 
anticipatory saelf-defence."^ ^ A more controversial position might also have been 
posited: that action was permissible by way of humanitarian intervention, due to 
the dreadful human rights records of Saddam regime. 
Ultimately, however, it is not only one argument that was used by all 
members of the coalition forces. As will be seen through the overview of the 
respective position of coalition States, below, the intervention in Iraq was found 
on the basis that there existed an implied authority from United Nations Security 
Council resolutions to use force against Iraq, and through Iraq's failure to 
comply with UN imposed weapons of mass destruction disarmament and 
verification programme established under those resolutions. This concept of 
implied authority has come to be known as one of "automaticity" and was also 
adopted by coalition States in the 1998 intervention in Iraq under Operation 
Desert Fox." 
The US Military Action in Iraq 
The unilateral and pre-emptive military action by the US against Iraq, 
raises a number of issues that impinge on International Law. Although it can not 
be denied that Saddam Hussein was a dictator and was guilty of violation of 
human rights and had not complied with the UN resolution but certainly he 
posed no imminent threat to the US. He did not declare war on the US and there 
is no evidence that Iraq has nuclear weapons and US forces yet to find large 
cache of chemical and biological weapons. It is very much obvious from the 
above that UN could not have taken action against Iraq under Article 39 as there 
was no "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" by Iraq. 
Under these circumstances, was US action justified under Article 51? Certainly 
not, because the US was neither a victim of aggression nor of armed attack, 
including terrorist attack. The US did not face any imminent threat of danger 
from Iraq. It is true that terrorist attacks constitute a threat to international peace 
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and security but the US was not a victim of Iraqi terrorist attacks. Even President 
Bush has now admitted that there was no evidence to suggest that Saddam 
Hussein's regime was involved in September 11 attacks,^ * Even if for the sake of 
argument, Saddam had link with Al-Qaida, as has been repeatedly pointed out by 
Bush, does that authorize US to use force against Iraq? The Security Council, 
under Resolution 1373 (2001) has accepted that terrorist attacks could give right 
to self-defence but it has neither authorized the use of force nor recognized the 
US right of self-defence against any state. The right to self defence should be 
determined on the basis of interpretation of the UN Charter. Iraq was neither a 
case of premeditated aggressor nor was it an imminent threat to peace. There is 
an element truth in US argument relating to possession of weapons of mass 
destruction, non-compliance with UN resolutions and sponsorship of terrorism 
by Iraq but together they do not make a case for pre-emptive action in defence of 
the majority of members of the Security Council. This was not "a case of 
necessity". Further, the issue does not become "a case of necessity" unless all 
ordinary means of self-preservation are exhausted. It is to be noted that even in 
"a case of necessity" a state does not have unlimited power to use force. The 
means and extent of defence must not be disproportionate to the gravity of the 
original armed attack and the means employed must be strictly necessary for 
repelling the attack. How proportional has been the US response to Iraq's so 
called "threat" is for everybody to see. It is interesting to note that even though 
bush stressed that it was Iraq's violation of UN resolutions, which prompted the 
US action he himself quickly ignored the UN as well as the international legal 
provisions, whenever they came in his way. Iraq is a classical example of force 
prevailing over reason as the US has bluntly violated all principles for which the 
UN stands.^ ^ 
India's Response: 
Studying Indian government's response to the Gulf war 2003 has been 
an interesting case. The current crisis started brewing since September 2002 
when America declared that weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and absence 
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of democracy demand active intervention. The US not only proclaimed itself to 
lead this 21st century but it was also accepted so by almost all other countries. 
However, the trouble started emerging when it was felt that the US was going 
overboard in asserting its leadership to an extent that was virtually subsuming all 
global system, particularly, the UN. Such a stance made it uneasy for other 
sovereign nations to submit their energies to the US efforts. It is a different 
matter to submit to an international community of nations than to a nation. Most 
of the nations, therefore, had to manoeuvre between the real politick of the US 
power, the necessity of the UN and the need to fight against emerging threat to 
world polity. In the case of India, it was on March 2, 2003 that the Prime 
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee asserted that India does not want war and is 
hopeful of a solution through the UN. And since, India has been friendly to both 
the US and Iraq, but it can do is to have a 'Middle Path'. This was the first 
policy posturing by India. Next day, the US ambassador, Robert Blackwill said, 
"US is satisfied with India's stand". '^ But the left parties criticized the 
government severely for taking the 'middle path' CPI (M) termed the stand as 
'serious shift' in foreign policy.^ ^ Party's Parliamentary leader Somnath 
Chatterjee said "what is the Middle path when there is threat of a real war". 
Referring to the reported statement by Blackwill he said it amounted to direct 
interference in India's internal matters. "As if we are waiting for a certificate-
from the ambassador".^ '^  The next few days saw the showdown between the UN 
weapons inspector and the US. Hans Blix, the Chief UN inspector said Iraq's 
cooperation is to be coming active. The US labeled the Blix's report on Iraq as 
"a catalogue of non-cooperation by Iraq". The US wanted to give a halt to this 
grudging game of cooperation; and pressed the need for using force. Since the 
UN Security Council Resolution 1441 disallowed automatic resort to war, the 
US-UK thought of coming up with another resolution. It divided the UN 
Security Council. France and Russia made their position clear to oppose any 
such resolution. Responding to this situation, Yaswant Sinha remarked in Lok 
Sabha on March 7, 2003 that we are at a critical juncture in world history. This 
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calls for the combined wisdom of international community.^ '* At that time the 
dominant interpretation of the events that the government was able to make that 
Baghdad was really complying with the UN resolutions. The Indian Parliament 
also took serious note of the 'Regime Change' policy stressed out by the US for 
Iraq. It was Natwar Singh, the Congress leader who imagined the dangers of this 
policy for the home turf, "suppose after Iraq, the US asks India and Pakistan to 
sit down and talk Jammu and Kashmir what would you do if the regime change 
formula is extended". Interestingly, he also stressed what the world is faced with 
a "horrendous situations" to which the UN Security Council and NAM had no 
answer. The notable point here was that higher rungs of both, the BJP and 
Congress concurred over the in resolvability of the situation and the irrelevance 
of global system and subsystem in front of a trampling unilateral power. During 
this period, situation was really worsening in Iraq. On March 9, 2003 then Prime 
Minister A.B. Vajpayee was briefed comprehensively by the army on the likely 
impact of Iraq war on India. India's defence establishment anticipated resistance 
in Iraq to the US led allied forces. Similarly, the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on External Affairs was told by independent experts that the US war 
on Iraq might not be a short one.^ ^ The committee was told that the economic 
impact of the war on India would be great and was likely to hit the growth rate. 
Iraqi resistance was the dominant proposition in the minds of India's policy 
makers and it influenced the government's decision to go for the Parliamenlaiy 
Resolution deploring the US aggression. Most found India's Middle path 
approach was ambiguous and one that tacitly supported the US aims. Away from 
home, war clouds were getting darker over Iraq. The US and France both were 
stepping up their lobbying for and against the new resolution in UN Security 
Council. March 17, 2003 emerged as a probable date by which clouds would 
burst. The UN pulled out its civilian staff from Iraq-Kuwait border and the 
inspectors virtually halted their inspections barring unavoidable land petrols. The 
inspector were finally pulled out on March 17 within hours of the President 
George W. Bush's 48 hours uhimatum to the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein 
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and his two sons to leave the country. The US-UK due dropped the idea of the 
new Resolution. The UN was sidetracked. The Allied forces around Iraq were 
put on 4-hours notice. The Ministry of External Affairs in India could see the 
war was around the comer. Its press release of the day bemoaned "we are deeply 
disappointed by the inability of the UN Security Council to act collectively, 
specially the failure of the permanent members to harmonise their position on 
Iraq".^ ^ The past experiences of Gulf War 1991 with regard to oil supply and 
evacuation of Indians from the region gripped common man's mind. The issues 
were raked in the Parliament, media and everywhere. Assuring statements flew 
from respective ministers. The government gave the picture that it has done its 
homework well, particularly after the March 12 statement of the Prime Minister 
to both the House of Parliament. In any case this homework was never tested for 
neither the oil supply lines were disrupted or hardly any Indian around 3.5 
millions - living in the region adjoining Iraq was threatened by decapitated 
missile system of Iraq. Around 50 Indians present in Iraq were already advised 
to leave the country well in time.^ ^ 
On March 20, the war drums were beaten. The US launched attack on 
Iraq. Bush telephoned the Prime Minister A.B. Vajpaye and apprised him of the 
situation. Expressing his deep anguish that the UN Security Council was not able 
to reach an agreement, the Prime Minister hoped that the military action would 
be concluded at the earliest. He told Bush of the need to provide humanitarian 
assistance, adding that India was ready to participate in such efforts. Everyone in 
the government was confronted with the stand that they would have on the 
situation. A statement from Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said, "It is with 
deepest anguish that we have seen reports of the commencement of military 
action in Iraq". The then Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani when asked about 
what side he is, averred that "we are concerned about our national interest". 
Arguing from a sort of neutral stand Defence Minister George Femandes said 
"the stand, we have taken per se makes it possible for India to get involved in it 
any way". 
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It was clear that though India was not happy with the commencement of 
war, it decided to take the Middle Path. It had done so to safeguard the national 
interest. Any opposition to the US led war in Iraq and active mobilization against 
the US unilateral move might have elevated India's stature in the developing 
world. Some analysts, however, argued that was there any scope for the 
developing world to do what the UN had failed to do? Perhaps this was the 
realization when India made it clear to Ali Akbar Velayati, that India is not 
about to take any initiative through the NAM or otherwise on Iraq. The XII th 
NAM Summit that occurred in the last week of February at Kuala-Lumpur did 
criticize US for unilateralism and carrying out a regime change in a sovereign 
nation. But nothing substantial come out of it. . . 
Further, the opposition parties had been pressurizing for a resolution for 
long, the demand that was not considered initially. A Resolution condemning US 
invasion of haq would have also usurped the sentiments of common Indians-
protesting actively or not - thereby reflecting the overall expression of India. 
Finally, India adopted the Parliamentary Resolution on 8^*^  and 9* April in Lok 
Sabha and Rajya Sabha respectively. The Resolution 'deplored' the US 
aggression on Iraq 20 days later when the war was in final stage. 
The Resolution was criticized on tactical ground by intelligentsia in the 
country, for it was too late in time and blunted much of the leverage India had 
gained from its policy of middle path. Even at the domestic front, the resolution 
affair had become comic. Not because it was too late but it represented 
somersauh of government's earlier stand of no resolution. Though, the resolution 
opened with words like as an expressing of national interests. It was read by 
most of the magazines as a case of 'national irrelevance'.^^ During the debate 
over resolution in the parliament, there was however a feeling of gratification 
that India endorsed its principle stand of deploring unilateral aggression on a 
sovereign nation. Jaipal Reddy called the resolution "extraordinary' E. 
Ponnuswamy said "I honestly feel that this resolution should have come 20 days 
earlier". Expressing his satisfaction, Raghuvansh Prasad Singh said, "Had the 
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Parliament not passed this resolution it would have been a big mistake". P.A. . 
Sangma highlighted interesting points about the war and India. He said, "first of 
all, the war was not about morals. It was plainly about the national interest of an 
individual country. The war was about commercial interest of a country. This 
war clearly showed the incapability and failure of UN system. The UN had 
failed and something has to be done about it. The lesson that we should learn is 
about the way war has been fought. The entire Iraq war has gone so much on 
high tech, we need to see our defence system itself now. The last point ... is that 
the US will perhaps win the war in Iraq, but winning peace in Iraq is much more 
important". 
The resolution expressed satisfaction for the decision of the government 
of India to commit Rs. 100 crore in cash and kind to the UN including 50,000 
metric tones of wheat to the World Food Progrmme. The House wished that 
Iraqi reconstruction is done under UN auspices. 
The Indian scholars voiced their utmost displeasure at the dismal 
performance and coveting the international body like UN by the few powerful 
nations like US and anothers. The war on Iraq exposed the nefarious designs of 
the super power particularly the USA in imposing sanction, declaring unjustified 
war in the name of human rights, in the name of extension of democracy and in 
the name of recent high profile war against terrorism. But behind all these the 
scholars find that those are just preserving the US interest in that region and 
domination at the international level. Kanti Bajpai expressed deep concern over 
growing irrelevance of the UN and blamed US for not only the UN's conditions 
but also for dividing the NATO and EU. He also raised the issue of arms 
proliferation to state and non-state actors. He emphasized the need for a stringent 
inspection regime. Lastly, he pointed out at the humanitarian crisis wherever the 
terrorism and war on terrorism is waged. In this overall context he proposed 
India to raise above quietism. "India can't be content to lie low when there is so 
much at stake. We are disowning a legitimate role in the international 
community if we think that some tactical sidestepping will suffice".^^ Whereas 
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Tavleen Singh favoured middle path for the country to safeguard national 
interest without getting bogged down by 'ideological mumbo jumbo'. She 
criticized the US for bringing the agenda of morally into this war, when 
attacking a sovereign country is a far cry from any sense of International 
morality7^ Whereas C. Raja Mohan, expressed his great pleasure in seeing the 
US and India coming closer, He titled this coming closer as a subject matter of 
his new book 'Crossing the Rubicon'7' According to C.R. Ghare Khan, India's 
former Permanent Representative to the UN, cautioned against writing off the 
UN. He infact proposed the option of the UN resolution "Uniting for Peace". 
For India he suggested the NAM route to actively strive for averting this and 
future crisis. 
J.N. Dixit, a former diplomat argued out that by being supportive of the 
US position on Iraq, India would ensure its potential and economic interests, in 
both regional and global terms. He proposed that India had got to be realistic. 
And, the realistic position is to tell the US that India generally understands the 
logic of US policies, but as a friend, must point out the consequences of 
unbridled unilateralism.^ ^ On the other hand Sanjay Baru brought down the 
arguments to realism, where national interests in the long run are preserved 
neither by allying with existing powers nor rhetoric and sloganeering against 
them but by patiently building up the attributes of modem power. This is to be 
done by developing country's very own political, economic and military 
capacities to much higher levels. This would be 'The Real Power'.''* 
Major conflicts in Iraq were declared over by US by the end of April 
2003. The low-intensity conflicts that began thence started crashing the hope of 
a swift stabilization. The sagging morales of troops, piqued guerilla warfare, 
exposure of lies behind the launch of war and domestic pressure forced the US 
and UK to take shelter under the UN umbrella. The UN Security Council 
Resolution 1483 passed on May 22, 2003 (14-0, with Syria abstaining) was 
ambiguous in giving any major role to the UN. The UN member countries were 
appealed to contribute troops in Iraq under the overall US led coalition 
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command. Initially, many countries like India who were looking for their due 
role in Iraqi reconstruction through the UN welcomed the Resolution 
enthusiastically. But the initial excitement soon died down as the nuances in the 
draft became clear. The onus from the international community once again 
suddenly shifted to respective national interests. On May 29, Government of 
India's Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) decided to postpone the decision 
on this contentions issue till the various factors were carefully analyzed.'^  
During this time Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani's visit to the US and the 
UK was most crucial wherein the 'drop in' style of Rumsfeld and Bush gave the 
impression of urgency and importance with which the US was looking for 
India's support. In his talks with George Bush, Advani said that CCS has 
postponed the decision twice, for some "clarifications" were needed like the 
exact role of Indian troops in Iraq, duration and command structure. Bush 
promised a Pentagon team to visit India within a week. In the final statement, 
Advani said, "the response I got convinced one that the American government is 
earnestly endeavoring to recognize India as a major power", that kind of 
relationship is consciously built up.'^ This made a section of the intelligentsia to 
speculate that Advani's statement was just a step away from sending troops to 
Iraq.^ ^ 
Back home the political parties started posturing themselves. The left 
parties - CPI (M), CPl, RSP and Forward Block in a joint statement declared 
their opposition to India's sending troops to Iraq. And by June 10, the Congress 
Party expressed its dissatisfaction over the issue. Continuing its opposition to 
Indian government's stand in 1991 war, when Chandra Shekhar was the Prime 
Minister, the Congress said this time the whole Iraqi exercise lacks any credible 
UN mandate including the May 22 UN Security Council Resolution 1483. 
Further, in the wake of Parliamentary Resolution against the aggression it make 
no sense in participating now.^ ^ Rasthriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), the 
socio-cultural backbone of the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) during this initial 
phase showed openness over the issue. Its press statement said, "there was no 
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question of RSS opposing move to send Indian troops".^' The Janata Party 
President, Subrahmaniam Swamy said, "Vajpaye's somersault in the Iraq 
situation is indication of my stand that India should have allied with the US in 
war. It should withdraw the Parliamentary Resolution now".*° Seeing opposition 
from the Congress, the main leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha, Sonia 
Gandhi was invited to discuss the issue. They met on June 15, 2003, a day before 
the Pentagon team arrived and two days before Advani came back from his 
Washington visit. The stance seemed to continue for the entire June month 
because Advani has remained busy in the BJP Chintan Baithak in Mumbai till 
June 20; and on June 12 the Prime Minister was to leave for China. 
On June 16'*' the Pentagon team of the US civilian and military official 
led by Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary for Defence, visited India to offer 
"clarifications". The team held talks with B.S. Parekh, Joint Secretary in 
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and other top-level civilian and military 
officials, including the Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal and National Security 
Adviser, Brajesh Mishra. The teanti offered best of their clarifications, but they 
did not seem convincing enough, which made India to leave the decision very 
much open. At this point government promoted its own assessment of the 
ground situation. B.B. Tyagi, India's Ambassador to Iraq, then stationed in 
Jordan was asked to move into Iraq and get an independent assessment of the 
situation in Iraq. Similarly, it also activated other ambassies in West Asia for 
their assessment in their host countries, if Indian troops are deployed in Iraq. 
Simultaneously the MEA allowed 500 Indian labourers to go to Iraq, as 
requested by a Kuwaiti company. And a three member's medical team was 
deputed to Iraq to work out the setting up of a 50-bed hospital in collaboration 
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with Jordan. This was all happening by the fag end of June month. 
By end June the US State Department started, announcing that sixteen 
countries have agreed to send troops to assist the US led coalition forces in Iraq. 
At the same time, informally the senior diplomats from the US and UK were 
trying to influence countries like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh etc. that were 
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capable of sending their considerable and professional military personnel. Igor 
Ivamov, the Russian Foreign Minister, visited India on June 20 to impress upon 
the plain fact that Resolution 1483 does not offer any 'clear mandate' to send 
troops by the UN member countries. The Russian Foreign Minister also said that 
the ground situation in Iraq is worsening day by day. The Amnesty International 
termed the situation 'turbulent'. In addition, after consulting Iraq's neighbor's, 
categorically meant that Iraq's neighbours want India to stay out. 
At home George Femandes, India's defence Minister revealed that the 
Pentagon team had failed to convince India on these issues. The involvement of 
UN, command and control of Indian troops, and the logistics, implying thereby 
that these were the issues Kanwal Sibal was expected to hammer out in the US. 
This was the time of some decision-making. 
Government of India's ambiguity on the Indian troop deployment in 
Iraq invited piqued domestic pressure. All the major newspapers disfavored 
troops deployment in their well-argued editorials. Several senior academicians 
strongly opposed the deployment in a joint statement issued on July 82. The 
statement read "sending of troops would do immense violation to all values of 
the country has cherished since the freedom struggle. We cannot be identified as 
an occupying imperialist force. It will be a mission for war making not peace-
keeping. We will be sending a terribly wrong message to the people not only in 
Arab countries but also to our friends around the world including Europe and the 
US".^ ^ 
Kanwal Sibal on his return said that there are some 'Grey Areas' in 
Resolution 1483. He added, that even if we could not send the troops, it would 
not impair the Indo-US bilateral relations. It implied that this Washington talks 
failed to hammer out the issue to India's satisfaction. When asked, has the US 
been able to convince India, he said, "they don't have to convince us. We have 
to convince ourselves". The Government of India however, was still far form 
being final on the decision. The parleys during the second week of July were 
hectic. On July 12, the government decided 'on balance of considerations' that it 
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cannot send troops to Iraq. The official decision formally announced was dated 
July 14. It said the entire Iraq crisis lacks any kind of UN sanctions. India does 
not want the repeat of International Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) and then there 
is no point in self-financing this deployment to get the Indian troops fired at in 
Iraq. 
The grief and shock expressed by the international community at the 
incident meant a few important lessons for India. First, the situation in Iraq is 
getting day by day from bad to worse. Second, the US forces and the UN 
activities not only lacked coordination but shared tension. The local population 
is apparently expressing their disapproval with the UN for its association with 
the invading forces. Lastly, the optimism in India that Iraqi might never 
welcome the US, but will feel relieved with the presence of a friendly country 
like India, got dampened. 
Considering these developments, India expressed its unwillingness to 
send the troops even after the UNSC Resolution 1483. Though the pemianent 
commitment to this statement is doubtful indefinitely, it at least affirmed the 
decision in unambiguous terms against Indian military deployment in Iraq. Later, 
in August 2003, the Defence Ministry said that India infact has no troops to 
spare due to current domestic compulsions. This was the India's current position 
on the issue at that time. 
Democratizing the UN Security Council 
"A theory of legitimate power is inescapably a theory of democracy in 
the interlocking processes and structures of the global system".*^ 
In the context of the debate about the United Nations in recent years, the 
expression "democratize" connotes an urge for a sense of equity which is 
perceived to be lacking. It inevitably relates to questions of representation, 
legitimacy, accountability and participation. It suggest that "democracy within 
the family of nations means the application of its principles within the world 
organization itself'. '^' 
194 
The end of cold war and the role of the Security Council in the Gulf 
conflict and its aftennath revived public interest in the Council. A parallel 
development, spearheaded by a group of developing countries aimed at 
revitalizing and reforming the IFN and its agencies.^^ The Tenth Summit of Non-
aligned countries in Jakarta in September 1992 addressed the problem and 
proclaimed NAM's determination "to play a leading role in contributing to the 
revitalization, restructuring, and democratization of the United Nations 
system".^^ The First Document of the Conference prescribed its adherence to the 
principles of equal participation, more balanced representation, and better 
equilibrium and, in relation to the Security Council, spelt out a set of objectives: 
(1) To ensure that the role of the Security Council reforms to its mandate as 
defined in the Charter so that there is no encroachment on the jurisdiction 
and prerogative of the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies; 
(2) To ensure that the exercise of special powers by "some states" does not 
create imbalances and discriminatory treatment in the international 
community or in the UN; 
(3) To review the veto power since it is contrary to the aims of democratizing 
the UN; and 
(4) To review the membership of the Council with a view to reflecting the 
increased membership of the UN and promoting more equitable and 
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balanced representation. Some of these principles were amplified in 
subsequent NAM statements. 
It was at this stage India having mentioned the subject of Security 
Council expansion in Foreign Minister Solanki's speech in the General 
Assembly in 1991 and also in Minister of State Faleiro's statement at the 47* 
General Assembly in 1992 took the initiative to activate the question during the 
session. This resulted in a consensus resolution (47/62 of 11 December, 1992) 
which called upon the Secretary General to ascertain the views of member-states 
in this regard. These written submissions were made available by the Secretary 
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General in September 1993 and paved the way for the General Assembly 
Resolution 48/26 of December 23, 1993, which set up an Open-Ended Working 
Group (OEWG) to consider all aspects of the question of increasing the 
membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Council. 
The debate was conducted at other fora also. A seminar organized by 
the Stanley Foundation in 1991 on the future of the UN concluded that "too 
much power resides in the World War II victors while regional powers have, 
little or none" by way of representation in the Security Council. Nevertheless, 
"the likelihood of near change in the Security Council's composition is dim, but 
eventually change is necessary". It is also opined that Germany and Japanese 
"economic super-powers" should have permanent seat in the Council. By 1993, 
these perceptions had crystallized further. Former National Security Advisor 
Brzezinski advocated the need for expansion on the ground that the Security 
Council "remains handicapped by the fact that its composition no longer reflects 
the existing realities of global power".^' Similarly, the United States 
Commission on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations (authorized 
by the US Congress under PL 100-204) said in its Final Report in September 
1993 that-
Finding a formula to include the most important global regional powers 
in the Security Council so that they bear their full share of responsibility, is an 
urgent and frustrating task. The Commission supports the addition of Germany 
and Japan to the Security Council as permanent members, without the veto. The 
Commission felt that an expanded Council could consist upto 20 members which 
are from Asia, Africa, and Latin America could be given rotating permanent seat 
without the veto power. It shortlisted India, Pakistan, and Indonesia (for Asia); 
Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt (for Africa); and Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
(for Latin America).^ ° 
The Open-Ended Working Group which worked from 1 March to 2 
September, 1994, considered all aspects of the quest question in a set of six 
clusters and reported that: 
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Although the debate was substantive and constructive, clarifying the 
position of member-states, no conclusion was drawn. While there was 
convergence of views that the membership of the Security Council should be 
enlarged, there was also agreement that the scope and nature of such 
enlargement required further discussion on other matter related to the Security 
Council. It was noted that the Council had initiated a number of steps to enhance 
its working methods and procedures. There were also views expressed on 
possible further measures the Security Council may be advised to take in this 
regard. 
Unavoidably, therefore, the 49* General Assembly decided to renew the 
mandate of the Working Group to enable it to continue its work. When the 
OEWG resumed its work in February 1995, it had before it a Secretariat 
tabulation incorporating the views of member-states on specific questions 
relating to clusters I and II, A scrutiny of this document reveals that substantial 
support exist for the view that: 
(1) the Security Council should be expanded; (2) the expansion should be in 
both permanent and non-permanent categories; (3) the Third World should be 
given permanent member seats in the Council; (4) the balance between North 
and South should be improved; (5) the size of the expanded Council should be 
between 20 and 25 (some supports was forthcoming for a Council of 29 
proposed by India, Indonesia, Tunisia, and Nigeria, while there was no support 
of a Council of less than 20 as suggested by the United States); and (6) the 
question of veto and the modalities of its use, should be addressed. 
The Secretariat tabulation also shows that there is little support for the 
view that expansion exercises should be completed in 1995. Further, only 21 
members (including nine from the West European and other group and nine from 
the East European group) expressed themselves specifically in support of the 
permanent membership being offered to Germany and Japan. 
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The proceedings of the OEWG in 1994 and in the early months of 1995 
have brought forth many innovative ideas with regard to the Council expansion. 
The Nordic countries support an enlarged Council in low twenties in which a 
small number of new seats could be allocated as permanent seat for certain states 
whose broad role and responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace 
and security merit acioiowledgment. Italy has proposed the identification of 20 
or 30 states - medium-size and small - who should be allowed more frequent 
and regular representation on the Council in group of two. The Italian proposal 
suggests that 10 additional non-permanent seat should be created for this group 
of countries while leaving intact the existing two categories of permanent and 
non-permanent members. The rationale of the Italian suggestion is that such a 
mechanism would not necessitate an expansion of the permanent membership 
and would yet allow that group of countries which has been active in matters 
related to the Security Council to be represented in the Council on a more 
regular basis. '^ Australia has suggested the creation of eight quasi-permanent 
seats to be allocated amongst regional groups along with reallocation of the 
existing membership of these regional groups to reflect the post-Cold War 
realities. NAM, on its part, has elaborated its views in a document submitted to 
OEWG and has asserted that (i) the gross under-representation of the NAM 
countries in the Council must be corrected; (ii) the negotiation process should be 
democratic and transparent; (iii) for the time being, expansion should take place 
only in the non-permanent category if no agreement is forthcoming "on other 
categories of membership"; (iv) the size of the Council should be increased from 
15 to 26; (v) the re-election clause in Art. 23(2) of the Charter should be 
examined in the context of the overall agreement on expansion; and (vi) after the 
completion of the present exercise "there should be a periodic review of the 
composition of the Council". The NAM paper also dwells at some length on the 
relationship of the Council with other organs of the UN, and with member-states 
which are not members of the Security Council, as well as on the Council's 
working methods and procedures.^ ^ 
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India's own views in the matters were enunciated in detail in the written 
submission to the Secretary-General incorporated in document Ay48/264 of 20 
July, 1993, in Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh's statement in the 48"^  General 
Assembly Session, and in the statements made in the Open-ended Working 
Group on 8 April, 1994, and 18 February, and 15 March, 1995. These have 
essentially focused on the subject in matter of Cluster I - expansion - and have 
emphasized the organic linkage between clusters I and II. The Indian argument, 
apart from endorsing the general NAM position and the NAM Position Paper of 
February 13, 1995, and powerfully reinforced by India's along and consistent 
record of contribution to all aspects of UN's work, has focused on: 
(i) the need to retain the proportion between general membership and 
membership of the Security Council as it was in 1945. This would 
necessitate as Council of 29 members. India, however, was willing to 
accept the NAM consensus figure of 26; 
(ii) the need to increase the number of permanent members by "at least" five to 
permit a fair and equitable proportion to be made available to NAM 
members; 
(iii) the need for objective criteria on the basis of which the selection of new 
permanent members could be undertaken (e.g. population, size of economy, 
contribution to the UN as a whole and to peace-keeping in particular, global 
role and interests, and future potential). These would need to be applied 
universally and without exception; 
(iv) the need to select new permanent members globally and not regionally; and 
(v) the need for transparency in the selection process and for the avoidance of 
disproportionate importance being given to "informal consultations". 
An interesting aspect of the matter is that, apart from the United States, 
permanent members have been reticent (in varying degrees) in the expansion of 
their views. While the United Kingdom and France are supportive in principle of 
the expansion of the pemianent membership, China and the Russian Federation 
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have maintained a noticeable silence (though the latter has lent support to India's 
candidature in bilateral fora but not in the IJN). Only France has specifically 
supported a permanent seat for a Third World country though China has, in more 
general terms, endorsed the view that the balance between North and South in 
the Council must be improved. France alone is supportive of giving veto rights 
to new permanent members. Only the United States, the UK, and France have 
lent specific support for the permanent membership of Germany and Japan. Only 
France and the United States have specifically endorsed proposals for increasing 
the number of non-permanent members in the Council. All these, together, tend 
to suggest that Russia and China would like to se no change in the permanent 
membership and the United States and the UK would essentially like to confine 
the enforcement of new permanent membership on Germany and Japan only. A 
more substantive aspect of this, which does not get clearly reflected in 
discussion in New York, is the interplay of interests and forces within the 
European Union, between the United States and the EU, between the United 
States and Japan, and China's perception of Japan's endeavour to raise its global 
profile. 
Expansion is one aspect of the reform agenda; equally relevant is the 
question of the working methods of the Security Council and its relationship 
both with other principal organ of the UN and with the membership of the 
Organization. The Council, after all, acts on "behalf of the members who, in 
Art. 24(1) of the Charter, agreed "to confer on the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". Hence 
the relevance of the cluster II, relating to measures to enhance effective and 
efficient fianctioning of the Council. 
Concerns about the working methods of the Security Council are not of 
recent origin and have focused on the lack of consultations with the wider 
membership of the UN, on an excessive reliance on "informal consultafions" and 
the resultant lack of transparency in decision-making, and on the absence of 
meaningfiil scrutiny by the General Assembly reports of the Council. In sum, the 
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Council's functioning seen to be violative of the spirit of Art. 24 and of the 
balance of considerations incorporated therein. 
Fifty years is a short period in life of an international organization, even 
if allowance is made for the fashionable perception relating to "acceleration of 
history". These 50 years have been unique in the sense that "for the first time in 
the history, the world has come to consist nominally equal sovereign states: 
almost all of them are members of one world organization and subscribe to the 
single set of principles - those of the UN Charter; and that there is a functioning 
global organization that the capacity to make important decisions".''* The need of 
the hour, therefore, is to induce confidence through removal of structural 
inequalities, through democratic functioning, and through genuinely common 
agenda. Only then would sovereign states come forth to make the United 
Nations "a centre for harmonizing the actions for nations" in the attainment of 
common ends. 
India's claim for the Permanent Seat in the UN Security Council 
Demands for the reform of the United Nations Organization (UNO) 
have been growing in recent years. This is because of two reasons. First, the UN 
is generally regarded as inefficient, over-bureaucratized, undemocratic, aloof 
and unresponsive to real human needs.'^ Second, there is a need for reforming 
the world body so that it can smoothly and efficiently face the challenges that 
await it in this new millennium.'^  
Probably the most popular target of the UN reform is the Security 
Council, its most important organ conferred with the primary responsibility of 
the maintenance of international peace and security. It has five permanent 
members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA) and ten rotating non-
permanent members elected for two year term. Unlike the non-permanent 
members, the permanent members have the veto power and considerable control 
over the Council's deliberations and decision. They naturally attract criticism 
from those who wish to "democratize" the UN lessen the influence of great 
powers. 
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Demands for the reforms of the Security Council are made due to 
several reasons. First, the increase of membership of tlie world organization has 
been reflected neither in the permanent membership nor in the non-permanent 
category. In 1945, when the General Assembly had 51 members, the Security 
Council had a total number of 11 members which included 5 permanent and 6 
non-permanent members. In 1963 when the strength of the General Assembly 
was 113, the Security Council membership was increased from 11 to 15. Since 
then the membership of the Assembly has gone up to 185, but the Council 
membership remains as it is. Thus, the Council is not an accurate reflection of 
the UN membership. 
Second, the permanent membership of the UN Security Council made 
up Britain, China, France, Russia and the USA is a historical anarchronism.**^  As 
Michael Howard has rightly remarked "the Security Council is basically a 
condonium of the victorious major allies who would jointly keep the rest in 
order". In the fifty years since the Council was established, the permanent seats 
occupied by Britain and France have appeared increasingly anomalous, 
apparently owing less to their international status than their positions as 
recognized nuclear weapon states. Thus, the Council is not an accurate reflection 
of the current distribution of power among states. Therefore, any change which 
better reflects the political realities of the 2000s rather than of 1945, will ensure 
its moral sanction and political effectiveness. 
Third, the five recognized nuclear weapon states which have also the 
distinction of being the largest arms exporters of the world, currently make up 
the entire permanent membership of the Security Council. When the UN Charter 
was first signed, only the US had an operational nuclear weapons but over the 
years, the permanent membership of the Council has become analogous to 
nuclear nuclear weapon status. This has given rise to the impression that the 
possession of nuclear weapons confers power and status to the owner. 
This perception has prompted at least half a dozen other countries 
(South Africa, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Israel, India and Pakistan) to go nuclear. 
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On the other hand, the inclusion of states that do not possess nuclear weapons or 
which have not apparent ambitions to develop them, in the permanent 
membership of the Council, combined with the removal of one or more of the 
nuclear weapon states from the Council will strengthen the case of disarmament. 
Fourth, the actual naming the five permanent members in the UN 
Charter introduced a static element in it. The Charter could not visualize the 
possibility and consequences of disintegration or disappearance of a permanent 
member of the Security Council. And finally, the way Security Council is 
structured goes against the principle of the equitable and fair representation of 
various regions. The admission of the new members into the UN General 
Assembly has been almost entirely from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but 
these regions remain under represented in the Security Council. So there is a 
strong need in reforming the UN Security Council. 
However, the demand for the restructuring of the Security Council has 
evoked negative response from many quarters. The opponents, first of all, argue 
that the Council in order to be effective, must remain a small body. Its small size 
enables it to deliberate and take decisions quickly. In this respect, its present size 
of fifteen members is rightly justified. Secondly, questions which may ultimately 
require economic and even military action for gravest nature cannot be 
reasonably examined in terms of the mathematical ratio drawn from the General 
Assembly. Thirdly, at present, the UN is working far more effectively than ever 
before: the Security Council debates are no longer characterized by familiar 
Cold War polemic and the Council is taking decisions and authorizing the UN 
operations in an unprecedented scale. Finally, the addition of more 
permanent/non-permanent members will hardly render the Security Council 
democratic because even without the permanent membership or a removal veto 
power, the great powers will always exercise disappropriationate influence on 
the decisions of the UN Security Council. So there is no need for the reform of 
the Council. 
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However, it can be advocated that the arguments against the reforms of 
the Security Council cannot be sustained in long run because the demand for 
reform among the UN members is a strong one and its growing stronger day by 
day. In fact, by now the permanent members have also felt the need for the 
reform of the Security Council although large scale differences persist among 
them on the nature and modilities of the reform. 
Any reforms of Council requires the amendment of the UN Charter 
under Article 108 and 109. But the question is: will the permanent members, 
especially the USA, allow the amendments to Charter even if it goes against its 
national interest? In fact, Jesse Helms, an Ainerican Senator, even warned that 
he along with Senator Colleagues would block the approval of the Council 
expansion plans if it goes against USA interest a threat rightly described by the 
international observers the "sixth veto power". It is however, natural that if a 
country which pays 25 per cent of UN budget owes $ 1.3 billion dues, will not 
accept any radical change that undermines its superior state.^ * 
Under these circumstances, the Security Council can be reformed when 
the UNO is financially independent from its permanent members, especially the 
USA and the Third World countries can play a more assertive role. With no 
authority to borrow and no cash reserves, the UN is almost entirely dependent 
for revenue on the contributions of its member states, especially on the major 
powers. They praise and support it where it serves their purpose and refuse to 
pay to it where it did not. Hence, so long as the UN is financially dependent 
upon them they will not allow any negative change in its Charter by financially 
blackmailing it. 
The world body can be financially self-sufficient in a number of ways. 
First, all the member states should pay their dues to the UN in full and in time 
and a defaulter should not only lose its vote from the General Assembly, but also 
from the Security Council. Second, the UN should be allowed to borrow money 
from commercial source like International Monetary Fimd (IMF) and the World 
Bank. Third, a "global tax" should be imposed by the world body on military 
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budgets, international financial transactions, petroleum and hydrocarbons and air 
tickets. These are justified on the ground that such activities depend 
predominantly on the exercise of peace and security. The developing countries 
also have an important role in getting the Security Council reformed. Their role 
has been very significant especially when the developed countries are in favour 
of a partial or selective expansion of the Security Council to the detriment of the 
developing countries. They should strongly disapprove the moves, especially of 
the USA, for including only Germany and Japan in the Council and pending a 
final decision on the choice of the other permanent members. The declaration of 
the 12 NAM Ministerial Conference which was held in New Delhi on the 
Security Council expansion is a right step in this direction. Since 3/4**^  members 
of the General Assembly arc developing countries and no amendment of the UN 
Charter can be made without their support, they should make it clear to the 
developed countries that they are not going to back anybody's candidature in the 
Assembly unless their gross under representation is corrected in the Security 
Council.^ ^ Meanwhile, the developed countries may try to divide the developing 
countries by suggesting that they should choose among themselves who will 
represent them in the Security council. Now it is the duty of the developing 
countries to remain united and decide among themselves as to who should be 
sent to the Council as their permanent member. 
However, while reforming the Security Council, all the UN member 
countries, both developed and developing should remember that co-operation not 
confrontation is essential if successful reform is to be achieved. Second, reforms 
should be incremental in nature in order to avoid direct confrontation with the 
developed countries. Third, any reform of the Council must be carefully 
engineered to ensure its political effectiveness while changing its legitimacy. 
If the Organization of American States chooses its candidate from 
Africa and Brazil is nominated from Latin America, the only continent which 
may have the problem in choosing its candidate for the Security Council is Asia. 
In such circumstances, the best way to avoid any controversy is to select a 
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member on the basis of the objective criteria which will be valid not only for 
Asia but for any other continent. These criteria include a very high military 
capability, a superior economic status, a large population, a significant regional 
status, a sincere commitment for the fulfillment of the financial obligations to 
the UN and a proven record of adherence to the Purpose and Principles of the 
UN Charter.'"^ 
Now lets take the case of India on the basis of the above criteria. 
Here, India claims could find avenues for fulfillment. India has a long-
term interest in a permanent seat consistent with its importance as an active and 
functional member of the UNO. Following is the objective criteria, which testify 
to its eligibility for permanent membership of the Security Council.'"' 
Military, India has the distinction of having the fourth largest army in 
the World. Besides being the sixth Nuclear Weapons States of the world, India 
has an indigenous ballistic missile programme. In economic terms, India is the 
eight largest industrialized country and is poised to become the fourth largest by 
2015 A.D."'^  It has a vast market, hidden potential of natural resources, and third 
largest scientific and technical community in the world. In terms of per capita 
GDP, both India and China are very close to each other. For example, in 1989, 
India's per capita GDP was $ 340 and China per capita GDP was 350.'"•^  
India is world largest democracy and the second most highly populated 
state which account for 16 per cent of the world population. Early in the next 
century, it will overtake China as the world's most populous country.'"'* India 
has significant standing in the South Asian region. It accounts for 73.4 per cent 
of the South Asia's territory and 76.5 per cent of its population. Barring 
Pakistan, it has good neighbourly relations with all the countries and has helped 
them at the time of their need. It helped Nepal in restoring democracy and 
played an important role in the liberation of Bangladesh. It has sent its troops to 
Sri Lanka to restore peace and normalcy and used its navy to protect President 
Gayoom of Maldives from a possible coup in 1998. It has played a leading role 
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in the formation of SAARC and ratification of south Asian Free Trade 
Agreement (SAFTA). By making concessions to its small neighbourers 
economically, India has proved that it does not have hegmonistic designs and 
seeks to befriend others through conciliatory moves. 
India has served six terms in the Security Council as a non-permanent 
members in 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1977-78, 1984-85 and 1991-92 and is 
also one of the new important countries which has good and honourable record 
as a regular and non-defaulting payer of its dues to the UN budget. But the most 
important qualification that should entitle India to a permanent seat in the 
Security Council is its consistent role in promoting the Purposes and Principles 
of the UN Charter. In his address to the UN General Assembly on November 3, 
1948, Pt. Jawahar Lai Nehru declared that "I should like to state to this General 
Assembly on behalf of my people and my government that we adhere 
completely and absolutely to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and 
that we shall try to the best of our ability to work for the realization of those 
principles and purposes".'^ ^ One of India's early concerns in the United Nations 
was that all states should be represented in the organization so that the UN might 
truly act as an instrument of peace settlement of international disputes.'°^ India 
supported China's claim to the permanent membership of the world body when 
the later was replaced by the Farmosa Regime following the communist 
revolution in 1949 by the USA and its allies. In the fifties when India counted 
for nothing in terms of political, economic and military power, played very 
crucial role in some important international issues relating to peace and security 
such as Suez Canal Crises, Hangarian Crises. ^ °* The leaders of many nations 
praised India a number of times for its role as a peace-maker. Whenever there 
was a conflict or an aggression or a grave dispute, there was voices abroad 
suggesting or hoping that India could play a role in their resolution. In view of 
such an important role of India in world affairs, there were suggestions by 
certain governmental and non-governmental organizations that India should be 
accorded the Great Power status, and a permanent membership of the UN 
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Security Council either in place of the Republic of China (The Formosa Regime) 
or even otherwise.'^ ^ But India humbly declined the offer India's concern for 
peace has also been reflected in her repeated stand for general and complete 
disarmament within the framework of the UN. During the 1950s, India was 
foremost among the non-nuclear powers to expose the dangers of nuclear testing 
and Nehru was the first head of the government to propose a test ban. India's 
efforts considerably reinforced the world wide campaign to ban nuclear tests and 
led to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1962. Recently, India has 
ratified the Chemical Weapons Conventions but it refused to sign the NPT and 
CTBT because of their discriminatory nature. 
In the field of human rights, racial discrimination and colonialism, the 
contribution of India is immense. She was the first country to raise the question 
of discrimination against the people of Indian origin in South Afi-ica in the UN 
General Assembly in 1946."^ Her aims was to bring about changes in South 
Afi-ican policies through moral and psychological pressure fi"om outside. 
On the issue of colonialism, India came out heavily against the 
maintenance of colonial system anywhere. Nehru argued that colonialism had to 
disappear in order to achieve peace and friendship between Asia and Africa and 
Latin America, on the one hand, and Europe on the other. Besides Indonesia, 
other major colonial questions in which India had played an important role were 
Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Cyprus etc. 
With the decline of colonialism by the 1960s, India played a leading 
role in bringing the newly independent states of Afiica and Asia together and 
organized them into the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The NAM while 
articulating the political and economic aspirations of its member states at its 
various conferences, assumed the role of an organized pressure group in the UN. 
One of its significant achievements in the 1960s was the creation of the United. 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). By the mid 1970s 
it succeeded in getting a resolution adopted in the UN General Assembly asking 
for the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). It played an 
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important role in the reformation of G-15 which aims at bringing greater 
interaction among the developing states in the Third World. 
India has always supported the peace-keeping activities of the United 
Nations and sincerely contributed both men and maternal for it. It has 
participated over 41 of the 59 UN peace-keeping operations in four continents 
including some of the most sensitive and protracted, starting with Korea in 1953-
54."' Some recent peace-keeping operations in which India as played an active 
role: UN Iraq Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), UN Angola Verification 
Mission in El-Salvador (UNUSAL), UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC), UN Operation in Somalia II (UTsfOSOM II) and many others. In fact, 
it has the distinction of having lost the highest number of soldiers in the UN 
peace-keeping operations. 
The above merely illustrate India's support to the Purposes and 
Principles of the UN Charter. Some states, particularly those which have a 
conflict of interests with India may have a different perception of New Delhi's 
role. But by any yardstick, India's contribution to the promotion of the 
objectives of the United Nations cannot be regarded as inferior or less valuable 
than that of any other member of the UN, including any permanent member of 
Security Council. The Secretary General of the UN in his recent visit to New 
Delhi on the eve of the 12''' NAM Ministerial Conference, has praised India for 
its contribution to the United Nations and strongly supported India's bid for a 
permanent seat in the Security Council as New Delhi, according to him, India 
would serve as the voice of the developing countries in the decision-making 
forum of the UN. "^ 
On September 25, 1992, India formally staked claim to a permanent seat 
in the Security Council when India's the then Minister of State for External 
Affairs, Eduado Felerio addressed the UN General Assembly. Felerio observed 
how, together with economic criteria, it was necessary to give weightage to 
certain other relevant issues too at the time of expanding the Security Council. In 
saying so, he reinforced the view held by the member of the other developing 
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countries that size and population of a country as well as standing in the region 
need to be given due weightage."'' Pranab Mukherjee, speaking in the 50* 
Session of the UN General Assembly, advocated that the new permanent 
member should be chosen not arbitrarily but objectively and it was his firm 
belief that on the basis of any such criteria, India would qualify to be a 
permanent member."^ 
Thereafter, Prime Minister, I.K. Gujral, in his address to the 52"** 
Session of the UN General Assembly, had made a strong plea for India's 
inclusions as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. According to 
him, "it is our conviction that on the basis of any global, non-discriminating and 
objective criteria, such as the size of the economy, population, support to the 
principles of the UN Charter, including its peace-keeping operations and future 
potential-India's case for the permanent membership of the Security Council is 
self evident". 
However, nobody is going to offer India a permanent seat on a platter. 
A contest is inevitable for the membership of the Security Council. As per the 
latest report, Indonesia may contest against India for the Asian seat kept for a 
developing country. 
Under such circumstances, India should immediately start campaigning 
vigorously for its candidature. The first constituency to approach should be the 
vast number of small and medium size countries which have no ambition of their 
own to become a permanent member either by name or on rotation.''^ They are 
in the best position to understand and appreciate India's case. Secondly, India 
should make a special effort to lobby among the ASEAN and Organisation of 
Islamic Countries (QIC) countries. It should do so without any further loss of 
time so as to pre-empt their endorsing, as a group to a particular candidate. 
Third, India's commercial strategy should be used fully as catalyst for 
agreement on New Delhi as a permanent member of the Security Council. This 
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will involved identifying major sources and institutions where commercial 
diplomacy can be indirectly affect procedure and interests of the United Nations. 
Fourth, India should certainly improve its relationship with USA which 
has reached to its lowest web after New Delhi went nuclear in May, 1998. It is 
worthy to mention that the USA especially its Congress which initially even 
announced to pass a resolution to support India's candidature for the permanent 
membership of the Security Council, has hardened its stand after India 
conducted the nuclear tests. The USA is not only pressurizing India to sign the 
CTBT immediately and unconditionally but also refiising to support its 
permanent membership. It is encouraging to note that two countries have 
recently started negotiating with each other on defense and disarmament issues 
and this is the right occasion for India to persuade the USA about its 
candidature. Since nothing is impossible thought dialogue and diplomacy, 
India's leadership should try to their best to convince the USA about the 
genuineness of India's membership. Finally, India needs to be cautious about 
Pakistan's role as a "spoiler". By raising the Kashmir issue at various 
international foras such as the Organisation of Islamic Countries, Islamabad may 
try to mobilize the member countries to oppose India's bid for a permanent seat 
in the Security Council. To counter Pakistan, India should create a bargaining 
asymmetry in its favour as soon as possible, instead of adopting a wait and the 
see attitude as our diplomacy is prone to do. 
India's essay in persuasion, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
descried the diplomatic drive to secure a permanent seat in the UN Security 
Council, did not yield the desired results. The year 2005 had witnessed one of 
the largest diplomatic campaigns in the annals of independent India's foreign 
policy. The following describes and analyse the diplomatic initiatives and 
strategies of India and other members of the G-4, for securing permanent 
membership in the Security Council; the issue of veto power; its strategic 
considerations of the P-5 and their responses to India's diplomatic drive; the 
dilemmas that faced the African Union (AU) and others; and finally the present 
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directions and future prospects in securing permanent membership - with or 
without power. 
The idea of UN reforms has been in the air at least since the year early 
1990s; and countries understood it to mean different things depending on their 
perspectives and perceived interests. For India, at least since 1994, it has 
primarily meant permanent membership in the Security Council. The debate on 
the expansion of Security Council has started in earnest in 1997, when the theft 
President of the UN General Assembly, Razali Ismail, proposed the induction of 
five new non-veto wielding members so as to reflect the changing global 
configuration of power. In the Millennium Declaration of 2000, member - states 
had resolved "to intensify their efforts" to achieve a comprehensive reform of 
the Security Council to underwrite the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the 
revelation of corruption in the UN oil-for-food programme in Iraq underlined the 
urgency of UN, including Security Council, reforms. In a landmark speech at the 
UN General Assembly in September 2003, Secretary General Kafi Annan had 
announced that UN had "reached a fork in the road" and need urgent reforms if 
it had to met the security challenges and charges of the twenty first century. In 
December 2003, he set up the 15-members High Level Panel on threats, 
Challenges and Change, which in its report of December 2004 recommended 
more than one hundred changes into the functioning of UN institutions and 
norms. 
As for the expansion of the Security Council, the report of the High 
Level Panel, titled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, proposed 
two models."^ Model A suggested induction of six new non-veto permanent 
members - two each from Asia and Africa and one each from Europe and the 
Americans. Besides, it proposed addition of three to the category of non-
permanent members. Model B, which had also envisaged a 24-member Security 
Council, suggested ahogether a new category of eight 'semi-permanent' 
members with four-year renewable-term; and addition of one to the category of 
non-permanent members. 
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In March 2005, Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN presented his 
own report, titled In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All, which incorporated both the models, with Security 
11 *? 
General not indicating preference for any of the two models. . In large Freedom 
was a particularly favourite phrase of Annan during 2005 conveying his vision 
of the inter-connectedness of security, development and human rights in the 
twenty-first century. Arman's report made some two hundred suggestions to 
improve the functioning of the international system including an expand Security 
Council that would become a central organ for the maintenance of international 
security and economic development. Annan had pleaded for UN reforms before 
the millennium summit of September 2005; and this added an element of 
urgency to the efforts of India and others, making the expansion of Security 
Council a major diplomatic issue in international politics during 2005. 
Now, Brazil, Germany, India and Japan (G-4) had been staking their 
individual claims for a permanent seat in the Security Council since the 1990s. 
In September 2004, the four had declared that "based on the firmly shared 
recognition that they are legitimate candidates for permanent membership in 
expanded Security Council support each other's candidature". The principle of 
regional representation, suggested in Model A, meant that the four aspirants 
would not undergo each other's claim. 
As stated earlier, from the inception, India's focus was almost solely on 
the expansion of Security Council. It is the principal organ for maintaining 
international peace and security; and the anomalies and deformities of the 
international system and in their worst forms manifested in the composition and 
functioning of the Security Council. The perception was that other reforms were 
important but could wait; far more imperative for the emerging economy and 
resurgent power was the democratization of the Security Council. 
Each of the G-4 countries perceived and presented itself as a 
'legitimate' candidate for a permanent seat; and argued that the composition of 
213 
the Security Council must reflect the realities of 2005 and not the power 
configuration of 1945. 
The then India's Foreign Minister, Natwar Singh defended the Indian 
approach of making common cause with Brazil, Germany and Japan; and 
referred to the opposition of China and US. He assured the Rajya Sabha that 
there is cause for "despair"; India, at least, had put the issue on international 
agenda. He explained that India had sacrified the right to vote for the sake of 
progress."* India was the weakest of the candidates when the campaign had 
begun but emerged the strongest as it progressed. 
India is recalibrating its diplomatic strategy. It is seeking a new 
understanding with China. During his visit to Beijing in January 2006, Shyam 
Saran had indicated that India was prepared to consider changes in its position 
on the issue of G-4. Saran stated: "Our effort is to find a common ground 
between the stand taken by the African Union (AU) and the G-4 nations"."^ 
Japan did not join other three in "re-tabling" the G-4 resolution on 5 January 
2006. The more was necessitated as the AU brought forward its own draft 
resolution when the UN General Assembly began a new session. An MEA 
statement said that three countries "will continue" the cooperative framework of 
the G-4 with Japan. It is time for restart the discussion. All member states 
genuinely interested in reform are welcome to discuss the draft resolution. 
Discussion will be undertaken with an open mind with a view to fiirther 
broadening the bases of support. The idea of an early vote has been put on the 
back-burner. The "aim of the re-tabling the G-4 draft resolution is not to call for 
a vote in the immediate ftiture, but to fiirther explore the potential of joining 
hands with all member states supporting structural reform of the Security 
Council.'^ " 
Future directions are fraught with geo-strategic meanings. As plateaning 
economies and declining populations, the prospects of Germany and Japan 
would only recede in time. Japan has left its fate in the hands of the US; 
Germany has no place in the neocon's strategic vision of Europe, nor does 
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Russia wait it. To have an emerging economy in its 'backyard' in the Security 
Council depends on whether Brazil agrees to play the role of regional gendarme 
of US. Such as scenario would only alienate Latin America and Caribbean votes 
from Brazil. Only India can take satisfaction that as its geo-strategic capabilities 
grow, its claim would become stronger. AU continues to hold the balance. China 
wants the AU to have a say in the UN reform; and that may be of some note to 
India beyond securing African votes. 
In September 2005, US Stand Department unveiled a new set of criteria, 
which looked, once again, tailor-made for India. The "potential members must 
be supremely well qualified based on factors such as commitment to democracy 
and human rights, economic size, population, military capacity, contribution to 
UN, and counter-terrorism and non-proliferation records.'^ ^ During her visit in 
November, Shirin reiterated that US favours only "a small expansion". She 
asked India to work with US for "balanced reforms" in a multiplicity of areas -
peace-building, a human rights council non-proliferation, a terrorism convention, 
etc., but still would not name India.'^ ^ In July, President Bush had stated that 
"international institutions are going to have to adapt to reflect India's central and 
growing role" but US stance did not go beyond 'two or so'. It was a way of 
telling India to align its position with whatever the US strategic interests; failing 
which US support for India's candidature would not forth-come. In the following 
months, India had gone ahead aligning its position on a democracy fiind, a 
human rights council, a convention of terrorism and had accepted in principle 
the formulation of 'Security Council reform being only a part' of the larger 
reform process but all to no avail. US has perceived role and status for India in 
the evolving strategic partnership; permanent membership, it is obvious, lies 
beyond that. 
India's bid for permanent membership, with or without veto, is a matter 
of strategic consideration for the major powers as well as the small countries. 
The political conditions and strategic considerations necessary to induct India as 
a permanent member - with or without veto - still do not exist. There is unlikely 
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to be an agreement among the P5 and a two-third majority of the General 
Assembly would never favour a particular country. India's quest for a seat in the 
Security Council is going to take longer, may be ill the 70* anniversary summit 
of UN; and it may still no turn out to be a permanent membership. By then, the 
UN itself might have undergone many debilitating transformations. 
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CONCLUSION 
The present work is an appraisal of the major international issues 
that the world community confronted in the post-Cold War era and the role 
that the United Nations (UN) played to resolve these issues. Here, the main 
theme of the study is examine and assess as to how the Indian diplomacy has 
been following its strategy and policy in the international politics in the UN. 
The UN was established under the compulsion by some of the 
victorious nations in the wake of devastation caused by World War II. But 
irony is that for the establishment of the World Organization, the leading 
role was played by the victorious nations themselves. Obviously the UN 
structured in the way as the founding members wanted, hence their future 
interests were taken into account while drafting the UN Charter. The 
interests enshrined in the Charter has proved to be the major weakness of the 
UN, for most of the nations of the world barring a few, has been the 
sufferers under the powerful States. The world in a way is divided into the 
nuclear and non-nuclear states and they have their say as per their own 
interest in the world politics. The big powers - the US, the Soviet Union, the 
UK, France and China are the declared and accepted nuclear states and the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council. They have veto powers, to 
use when ever their interests are at stake. The discriminatory nature of the 
UN Charter is its weakest point. The victims of the power blocs "•-
Communist bloc and the Western bloc during cold war in general and its 
aftermath in particular have been demanding amendment in the UN Charter 
in such a way that they must be given equal opportunity to work in favour of 
international peace and security in real term and save their own interest for 
their overall development. 
In the changed international scenario where the cold war would 
have been broken, enabled India to strengthen the links without ideological 
barriers. In this context India became sectorial dialogue partner of 
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Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) in 1992, full dialogue 
partner in 1995. Hence we find it logical to see India's inclination towards 
the US that began to operate and gain momentum during the years under 
study. In the thesis attempt has been made to analyse how far under 
domestic pressure and more impartially as a result of some disillusionment 
with the West with regard to Kashmir issue where Pakistan is a party to the 
issue, Indian diplomacy marched ahead successfully. 
India has willingly been co-operating with the UN in maintaining 
international peace and security throughout on the one hand while 
maintaining novel kind of neutrality without any alignment with any power 
blocs on the other. India's contribution in UN on major issues viz. peace-
keeping and peace making mission cannot be ignored. Throughout cold war 
period, India made endeavours to protect its interest and maintained at the 
same time platform of neutrality on major issues of the world. 
The Indian Ocean being third largest of the world has great 
geographical and economic significance, due to the multiple mineral 
resources and route of trade and commerce it offers. About 40% of the 
world's offshore oil production comes from the Indian Ocean. India's 5600 
km. long coast attached to it, is of great strategic significance to India. The 
question of Indian ocean as Zone of Peace Declaration was raised for the 
first time in September 1970 in the NAM Summit at Lusaka, followed by, in 
the General Assembly in the same year. Finally in 1971, Declaration of 
Indian Ocean as a Zone of peace could be interpreted as a clear instance of 
India's effective diplomacy for safeguarding its national interest. 
India's relation with most of the countries of South-East Asia 
started improving during this period, as most of the countries of this region 
are in Indian Ocean littoral. They felt that India being largest and strongest 
state could play major role for their economic and defence safety to declare 
it "a zone of peace" as they were constantly under the threat of their security 
due to the presence of troops of major world powers. However, India could 
224 
not fully subscribe to the views of some of the countries of the region like 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippine. Instead of withdrawal of the foreign 
power they moved in favour of a power balance in the region. 
India played an active role in setting the agenda for the UN on 
various major issues, viz. Korean, Suez, Congo, and Somalian crises. In this 
direction main aim of India's policy remained to help to maintain world 
peace and reduce international tensions, while maintaining impartiality. It 
also tried to pool the help, the smaller nations could play when the big 
powers were not together to resolve the crises. Indian diplomacy in the 
Korean crisis is considered to be the best with regard to the crossing of 38 
parallel by the UN troops. In the same way in the Suez crisis, India's role 
was praised by the world community. Factors behind India's stand was 
mainly to oppose colonialism, and inclusion of Pakistan in the Baghdad 
Pact, as it appeared that the cold war had been brought closer to her door 
step. In Congo crisis too India's stand was anti-colonialist, where India had 
a share of 5600 strong forces in a 30-nation pool of 20,000 forces and a 
contribution of $ 105,000 to UN fund for Congo. After the US, it was India 
upon which the UN operation in Congo depended to a large extent. 
The UN operation in Somalia in the post-Cold war era in 1993 is 
supposed to be the most dangerous and risky operation where India, suffered 
heavy casualty of its troop and technicians. So much so that the opposition 
in the Rajya Sabha tabled a motion for the immediate withdrawal of its 
troops from the operation. In spite of that India continued its help in the 
operation. 
India's response to the post-Cold War developments could be seen 
in the context of India's reaction to the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
where the long live Gorbachev era was replaced by the Russia, a pro-
democratic set-up. 
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A sudden shift on India's stand in the West Asian Politics, with 
establishment of diplomatic relation with Israel can be seen more in the light 
of the development that Arab countries themselves come to the terms with 
Israel. India expected that its relation with Israel would help in certain 
technological advantages, but at the same time it tried to take the Arab 
States in its confidence. 
The replacement of the bipolar world into the unipolar resulted in 
the establishment of control over international system by the US and its 
allies. The great powers virtually united in a single bloc with an aim of 
curbing the power and influence of the regional powers. 
As regards Non-Alignment movement, it virtually became an 
effective in the post-Cold War era. There are scholars who say, with the 
demise of cold war India has lost her foreign policy strategy, cannot be 
overlooked, has to be seen in the context of the changed world scenario. 
Indian tilt towards US is a two ways process as the US knows very 
well that India, the largest democracy with great military power and 
emerging marketing potential, may play major role in the future world. 
Moreover, the US see its common goal of tackling Islamic fundamentalism 
and terrorism jointly more effectively. 
The major contribution of India's participation in UN peace-keeping 
operation has been in terms of man power support. On several occasions 
India contributed more than the Super Powers. For example in 1994, India 
was the third largest contributor in the world. With the share of 7.93% of the 
total 75,000 troops deployed in that year. In 1994, India's contribution was 
6.4% out of the total UN troops of 14,347. As of October 2000, India was 
the second largest troops contributor to UN peace mission, serving in 15 
different locations, up to 2005 India's participation in UN peacekeeping 
operation was 41 out of 59 in number. However, India's commitment to the 
post-Cold War peace-keeping operation is seen in persuit of its political 
interest. 
226 
Financially too, India contributed in the UN budget, $ 7,8661, 
931.60, during 1998. The UN owes India approximately $ 45 million. The 
budgetary contribution under different heads in the UN by India, shows its 
commitment for effective functioning of the UN. 
So far as human and social activities are concerned, India 
participated actively in all discussions of the UN mission. Where India 
emphasized for constructive, balance and cooperative approach to human 
rights and universality, individuality and inter-relatedness of all rights for 
over all development. India got an opportunity to host the Seventh Asian 
Pacific Workshop on Regional Cooperation for the promotion and protection 
of Human Rights in 1991. Other progressive issues like Women rights and 
their empowerment, the economic and social consequences of massive flows 
into the developing countries towards refugees are highlighted. Environment 
and Sustainable Development were another important international issues in 
which India took part actively. India's nominee has been included in the 
adhoc panel on traditional knowledge sought by the UN in December 11, 
1998 on Science and Technology. 
The use of Atom bombs on Japan in August 1945, provided 
international community to take initiatives to check the nuclear proliferation 
and its elimination and this issue dominated throughout the cold war period. 
As a result, four treaties namely - Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), Nuclear 
Proliferation Treat (NPT), Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ's) and 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) were signed by the international 
community. In 1954, India brought the issue of nuclear disarmament to the 
UN with the demand that there should be cessation of all nuclear tests and 
after many years, in 1963, a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was initiated. 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) became effective since 1970 
which is considered to be principal nuclear arms control measures since the 
cold war period. But the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was 
adopted in September 1996 with an aim to ban all nuclear weapon tests 
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explosion. There are only three countries - India, Pakistan and Israel which 
are not signatories to the CTBT. 
India from the very beginning aimed at complete disarmament, as 
the CTBT being discriminatory and partial, India refuse to sign it due to its 
discriminatory nature. The nuclear tests if conducted by the nuclear states as 
these are allowed in treaty, will not limit within their own territories but will 
also expand to other states. Keeping this in mind India did not sign it. In this 
context India's refuse to signed the treaty in spite of high international 
pressure on it. 
More significantly, the US in league with the UK and China has 
developed a technique called "simulation explosion technology" to help and 
design and conduct nuclear tests secretly in such away that no one can 
detect. Thus, the CTBT become meaningless and will not serve the purpose 
for which effort has been made. It will remain more partial and 
discriminatory rather than universal and comprehensive. India is in favour of 
a CTBT but not in its present form. Indian view is that such a Test Ban 
Treaty should cover all states including the big powers. Moreover, the 
prohibition should extend to the underground tests and also should be for all 
times. 
With the nuclear test conducted by India in May 1998 and 
subsequent declaring it as nuclear states is an indication that India has 
exercised its nuclear option. Even then India has not indicated that it will 
sign CTBT, but one view is that it may not harm if India sign CTBT as the 
nuclear test conducted by it has served the purpose for which India delayed 
signing of the CTBT. 
The Gulf crisis (1990-91) is one of the most important events in the 
post-Cold War era. The occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein has 
united the world community to ally for the evacuation of Kuwait. Under the 
US and its allies Iraq was attacked with most sophisticated and modem 
equipments and finally Saddam was defeated. 
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Indian policy, priority, objective and shift in their persuit from its 
traditional path could be understood in the context of the changed 
international political system. India was the non-permanent member of the 
UN Security Council at that time, even then made a difference in its ability 
to articulate views, and modestly influenced interactions and the Indian 
diplomacy was under test to carve out beneficial role in the post-Cold War 
UN. 
In the first phase of the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) India adopted three 
policies, refraining from condemning Iraqi aggression, seeking relief from 
the UN in the context of UN sanctions and supporting the cause of a 
political, settlement peacefully. India did not provide military military 
support in this war. 
In the second phase (2003) Iraq was attacked by US without taking 
the UN into confidence, with a plea that Saddam Hussein had weapons of 
mass-destruction and supporting terrorism. Though US did not like UN 
approval with a fear that veto might be used by France or China, 
From Indian point of view the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee said that India did not want war and was hopeful of a solution 
through the UN. India adopted middle path as both Iraq and Kuwait were -
its friends. Though Indian Government in its foreign policy on Gulf crises 
was highly criticized, even then India maintained the same path. India failed 
to actively oppose the US aggressive stand not even other platforms like 
NAM were utilized to oppose US policy in the Iraqi war. However, when 
the war was in the final stage both Houses of Parliament condemned the US 
aggression in Iraq which was perhaps done deliberately. But the Indian 
intellectuals and the media highly criticised US for her nefarious design to 
over throw Saddam Hussein in the name of change in policy regime. Though 
financially India contributed a sum of Rs. 1000 crores and 50,000 metric 
tones of wheat for Iraqi people under the UN auspices. 
The output of Gulf War and the role of UN Security Council 
revived public interest and a parallel development with a group of countries 
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started demanding reformation of the UN, for that NAM Summit in 
September 1992 addressed to play a leading role in restructuring and 
democratizing the UN. Indian Foreign Minister in 1991 actively raised the 
question in the Security-Council that resulted in a concensus resolution 
which called upon the Secretary-General to express his views in this regard. 
Initiative has been taken by the Secretary-General but for finding 
formula to include most important Global regional powers in the Security 
Council so that they could bear their full share of responsibility, was a tough 
task. Many proposals came up either to include some members that go up 
from two to twenty in the Security Council with or without veto power. But 
nothing in concrete term has yet come up. 
While the UN structuring initiative started getting momentum, 
potential states, started their effort to get their support in their favour. India 
could no longer waited for it, but showed its willingness that it deserved for 
the membership of the UN Security Council more than any other country. 
India's basis of the claim are as follows - in military power India is the 
fourth largest State in the world; It being the sixth nuclear State of the 
world; In economic terms India is eighth largest industrialized country and 
is expected to become fourth largest by 2015 AD, it is also the third largest 
Scientific and Technical country in the world; India is the largest democracy 
and second most populous State which accounts about 16% of the world 
population. It accounts for 73.4% of the South Asia's territory and 76.5% of 
its population. Moreover, India's support and cooperation to the UN has 
been very positive especially in peace-keeping and peace-making operations 
as it could be seen that it participated in 41 out of 59 UN peace-keeping 
operations till 2005 led by the UN. 
India's claim for the Security Council membership in the UN has 
solid base. But all these will depend how the nuclear States particularly the 
US takes India's claim. India needs to convince the world community 
particularly the U.S., that its claim has merits in one hand while working in 
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